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Abstract 
This thesis aims to improve our understanding of firms’ incentives to offer add-
ons, as well as the implications that selling add-ons has for competition and welfare. 
It consists of three studies. 
In the first study we develop two models that explain the establishment of add-on 
pricing equilibria in markets with physical add-on services (e.g. hotels, airlines), and 
in software markets (e.g. apps with microtransactions). We show that add-on pricing 
equilibria can emerge despite consumers being fully rational and despite the presence 
of a binding price floor. 
The second and third studies analyse markets with naïve consumers. The goal of 
both studies is to explore the extent to which the incentive to exploit naïve consumers’ 
mistakes affects firms’ choices of horizontal product differentiation in the core product 
market. 
In the second study we analyse a model in which add-ons are unwanted – they are 
never purchased by sophisticated consumers. We identify conditions under which 
firms offer maximally differentiated products in order to soften competition, and 
conditions under which each firm offers a product similar to its rival’s in order to 
maximise profits from exploitation. 
In the third study we develop a model in which add-ons are desirable – 
sophisticated consumers buy them under certain circumstances. We find that the 
sophisticates’ demand for add-ons complicates the relationship between prices and the 
degree of horizontal product differentiation. This raises the possibility that 
intermediate product differentiation also emerges in equilibrium. 
Both the second and the third study show that benefits to consumers from the 
firms’ choices of product differentiation can more than offset the harm to consumer 
welfare from the exploitation of consumer mistakes. Thus, whether conventional 
regulatory interventions have a positive effect on consumer welfare depends, to a large 
extent, on their effect on firms’ product differentiation incentives.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
In a wide range of industries, firms offer add-ons alongside their core services. 
Traditional examples include hotels selling breakfast and access to a minibar, airlines 
selling on-board meals and extra luggage space, and durable goods sellers offering 
extended warranties and repair services. The practice of separating core from add-on 
services has become particularly common for sellers of digital goods. Many 
smartphone apps, for instance, offer functionality and aesthetic upgrades via in-app 
purchases. Finally, the sale of add-on services is widely used in retail financial 
services. For example, holders of personal current accounts can pay for access to an 
overdraft service, while credit card users have the option of delaying repayments at 
the cost of interest and late payment charges.  
This thesis aims to improve our understanding of firms’ incentives to offer add-
ons, as well as the implications that selling add-ons has for competition and welfare. 
What market characteristics drive firms to separately sell core and add-on services? 
How does the sale of add-ons affect consumer prices? How does it affect firm 
behaviour in other dimensions? What is the role of boundedly rational consumers? 
This thesis seeks to shed some light on these questions. 
2 
 
We define add-on pricing as the business strategy in which a firm separately sells 
a core service, or base good, and an add-on (component or service). We define all-
inclusive pricing as the business strategy in which a firm sells only a bundle that 
includes the base good and the add-on. Any add-on is usually characterized by three 
features that distinguish the study of add-on pricing from the study of related but 
distinct problems. First, the add-on cannot be purchased separate from the base good. 
For example, a consumer cannot buy an on-board meal without a flight ticket, or use 
an overdraft service without a personal current account. This feature distinguishes the 
study of add-on pricing from the study of more traditional bundling and tying problems 
in markets with two products that each can be used to some capacity on its own (e.g. 
Whinston, 1990; Chen, 1997). 
Second, inherent switching costs allow add-on pricing firms to enjoy some market 
power over the add-on market. For example, a flight passenger cannot buy on-board 
meals from a different supplier; a credit card user can secure funds from other sources, 
but that often carries inconvenience costs. Because of this market power, add-on 
pricing models feature similar characteristics with models in the switching cost 
literature, most notable being the subsidised first-period prices (Klemperer, 1987). The 
inherent nature of such switching costs distinguishes the study of add-on markets from 
the study of markets in which firms may choose to actively monopolise secondary 
markets in order to raise prices (Shapiro, 1995; Borenstein et al. 2000) or exclude 
rivals (Carlton and Waldman, 2002; Kühn and van Reenen, 2009) 
Third, the purchase of add-ons is optional and independent of the decision to buy 
the base good. For instance, a bank account holder may choose to reduce spending 
rather than go into overdraft, while an app user may prefer to be interrupted by 
advertisement instead of paying for the upgraded, ad-free version of the same app. 
This distinguishes add-on pricing from partitioned pricing (e.g. Office of Fair Trading, 
2013; Greenleaf et al., 2016), in which mandatory additional surcharges are revealed 
during the transaction.1 
                                                          
1 A related term, drip pricing, describes a business strategy in which firms reveals various charges at 
the later stages of a transaction. Drip pricing may be closer to add-on or partitioned pricing, depending 
on whether the dripped price is optional (e.g. purchase of one-day delivery) or mandatory (e.g. booking 
fees). For more information on drip pricing see Shelanski et al. (2012). 
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The thesis consists of three theoretical essays, each with relevant policy 
implications. The first essay, in Chapter 2, is motivated by the popularity of add-on 
pricing strategies in the real world vis-à-vis a theoretical result that add-on pricing is, 
in many cases, not an equilibrium strategy. More specifically, an influential paper by 
Ellison (2005) shows that firms which adopt an add-on pricing strategy may have 
limited ability to offer competitive deals. This effect results in supra-competitive 
profits if firms jointly adopt add-on pricing, but also implies that add-on pricing is not 
adopted in equilibrium.2  
In Chapter 2 we develop two models that extend Ellison’s framework. Each model 
explains the establishment of add-on pricing equilibria in different settings, even when 
add-on pricing limits firms’ ability to offer competitive deals, and even when 
consumers are fully rational. The first model takes into account various cost savings 
that are, in some cases, associated with add-on pricing, and specifies conditions under 
which the benefit of such cost savings can outweigh the harm to add-on pricing firms’ 
ability to compete. The presence of such cost savings is likely to play a role in the 
choice of business strategy of firms in markets with physical add-on services, such as 
hotels and airlines.  
The second model recognizes that a consumer’s choice of whether to buy add-on 
may not depend only on her valuation of the add-on, but also on her valuation of the 
base good. The model approximates a market of experience goods, in which any given 
product may or may not match consumers’ tastes. In such a market, an add-on pricing 
business strategy can permit uninformed consumers to learn about a product’s match 
quality by using the basic good as a “trial version”. We show that the conditioning of 
add-on purchases on correct matching allows add-on pricing firms to price 
discriminate between consumers that are informed ex ante about match quality, and 
consumers that are uninformed. The possibility of such price discrimination can, under 
certain parameter constellations, establish an add-on pricing equilibrium even if add-
on pricing constrains firms’ ability to compete. Our model specification is particularly 
applicable to markets for digital products. For example, smartphone users can taste the 
                                                          
2 We explain the model of Ellison (2005) in detail in the following section. 
4 
 
basic features of most apps for free and may buy optional functionality or cosmetic 
upgrades after good matching is realised.  
Chapters 3 and 4 consider markets in which naïve consumers purchase add-on 
services by mistake. Prominent examples include retail financial markets, in which 
many consumers accidentally use overdraft facilities (Office of Fair Trading, 2008) or 
miss credit card payments (Gathergood et al., 2018), and mobile telecommunications 
markets, in which many consumers accidentally exceed the call or data usage 
thresholds that are described in their contracts (Federal Communications Commission, 
2010; Grubb, 2015b).  
In such markets, firms have an incentive to alter their pricing strategies in order to 
profitably exploit naïve consumers’ mistakes. Optimal pricing is described by 
relatively low core product prices – what we refer to as upfront prices – and relatively 
high add-on prices. The aim of both chapters is to explore the extent to which firms’ 
incentive to profitably exploit naïve consumers affects non-price strategic variables. 
The strategic variable we study in both chapters is horizontal product differentiation. 
In studying this question, both chapters contribute to a growing literature that studies 
distortive effects of consumer exploitation.3  
In Chapter 3 we model a market in which add-ons are unwanted – they are never 
bought by sophisticated consumers. We find that the degree of horizontal product 
differentiation affects prices in a non-linear way, and critically influences how much 
profit firms can retain from the sale of add-ons. When the choice of horizontal 
differentiation is endogenous, we identify conditions under which firms offer 
maximally differentiated products in order to soften competition, and conditions under 
which each firm prefers to offer a product similar to its rival’s in an attempt to 
maximize add-on profits. We find the surprising result that the presence of naïve 
consumers may in fact lead to lower profits compared to the benchmark case in which 
all consumers are sophisticated. Conventional interventions, such as price controls and 
disclosure remedies may or may not improve consumer welfare. 
In Chapter 4 we study how the findings of Chapter 3 change when add-ons are 
desirable – sophisticated consumers buy them under certain circumstances. We find 
                                                          
3 See, for instance, Heidhues et al. (2016). We review this literature in greater detail in section 1.2. 
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that the sophisticated consumers’ demand for add-ons results in a more complicated 
relationship between the degree of horizontal product differentiation and prices. 
Depending on how close substitutes the products are, firms may compete on upfront 
prices to attract both consumer types, on add-on prices in order to attract sophisticated 
types, or may choose add-on prices randomly as part of a mixed strategy. The choice 
of product differentiation becomes more complicated as well: products may feature 
maximum, minimum, or even intermediate product differentiation. This possible 
emergence of intermediate product differentiation is hard to explain using standard 
models. Conventional interventions may or may not be desirable both from a social 
and a consumer welfare perspective. 
 
1.2 Issues in markets with add-ons: A review of the 
literature 
A crucial question regarding markets with add-ons is whether firms can enjoy 
supra-competitive profits from add-on purchases. In section 1.2.1 we explain the profit 
irrelevance result that arises in most model settings and relate this result to loss-leader 
pricing and the literature on switching costs. We also discuss a version of the profit 
irrelevance result that emerges in markets with naïve consumers. Finally, we discuss 
literature in which firms can retain some extra profits from selling add-ons. 
Add-on pricing is, at its core, a second-degree price discrimination strategy, aimed 
at extracting higher surplus from high-value consumers. Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 study 
its role as such. In markets with rational consumers, add-on pricing allows firms to 
extract more surplus from consumers that value add-ons the most. The literature in 
section 1.2.2 studies firms’ decision to sell add-ons separately or bundle them with 
base goods when such preference-based price discrimination is possible.4 
In some markets consumers often naïvely underestimate their demand for certain 
product features when making a purchase decision. In such markets, add-on pricing 
                                                          
4 Stole (2007) provides an excellent review of classical preference-based price discrimination models 
of imperfectly competitive markets. 
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can permit a second-degree naïvete-based price discrimination.5 To answer whether 
naïvete-based price discrimination indeed takes place when add-ons are sold 
separately, a crucial question is whether firms prefer to educate naïve consumers about 
their future add-on demand by unshrouding, or whether firms prefer to keep add-on 
information shrouded in order to hold naïve consumers up. With regards to firms’ 
ability to price discriminate, shrouding is similar to unbundling in that it aims to extract 
more surplus from a few valuable consumers, while unshrouding is similar to selling 
to everyone at an all-inclusive price. Section 1.2.3 reviews the literature that studies 
firms’ incentives to shroud/unshroud. 
Section 1.2.4 discusses externalities that arise between sophisticated and naïve 
consumers in market settings with add-on services. Section 1.2.5 discusses market 
distortions that often arise when naïve consumers underestimate their demand for add-
ons. Section 1.2.6 discusses the effectiveness of regulations as a means to protect naïve 
consumers from exploitation. 
 
1.2.1 How add-ons affect profits 
A classic result in the add-on pricing literature is that firms compete away add-on 
profits by subsidising base good prices to even below marginal cost. Intuitively, if 
firms in a perfectly competitive industry earn profit 𝜋 from the sale of add-ons, then 
the zero-profit condition requires that each firm makes losses equal to –𝜋 in the first 
period. The same logic applies when markets are imperfectly competitive: firms 
compete away add-on profits and end up earning no more than permitted by their 
market power on the base good.  
This competition-for-the-market logic is used by Shapiro (1995), who argues that 
durable goods sellers have an incentive to discount their equipment to capture 
aftermarket profits. In an earlier work, Lal and Matutes (1994) show that the profits 
that retailers enjoy from impulse goods (which can be loosely interpreted as the add-
ons) are used to subsidise loss-leader goods that attract consumers in the store. 
                                                          
5 For a study of first and third-degree naïvete-based price discrimination, see Heidhues and Koszegi 
(2017). 
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Verboven (1999) also finds that firms compete away add-on profits in a model in 
which heterogeneous consumers make a purchase choice based on base good prices. 
He finds evidence from the automobile industry that is consistent with this finding. 
A competition-for-the-market argument appears also in the switching cost 
literature.6 For instance, Klemperer (1987) shows that firms can earn monopolistic 
profits from consumers that are locked with that firm due to switching costs. However, 
firms compete more fiercely in the first period in order to attract and lock these 
consumers in, dissipating anticipated future profits.  
Dissipation of add-on profits also takes place in markets in which boundedly 
rational consumers underestimate future add-on costs and make purchase decisions 
based on base good prices only. For instance, in Armstrong and Vickers (2012), fees 
paid for overdraft services by naïve consumers incentivise firms to compete more 
fiercely in the personal current accounts market, selling accounts at below-cost prices. 
In some sense, competition for the base good at least partially7 protects consumers 
from exploitation – what Heidhues and Koszegi (2018) refer to as the “safety-in-
markets” effect. 
Ellison (2005) is the first to show that complete dissipation of add-on profits does 
not always emerge, as an adverse selection effect may constrain firms ability to cut 
base good prices. Such an adverse selection takes place if lower base good prices 
attract a disproportionate amount of consumers that do not buy add-ons.8 Ellison and 
Ellison (2009) find evidence of such an adverse selection effect in a market for 
computer parts. The large number of retail financial products with zero base price (e.g. 
DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Armstrong and Vickers, 2012) can be explained 
by the possibility that an adverse selection takes place at negative prices.  
Some works that model markets with boundledly rational consumers adopt 
simpler variants of Ellison’s adverse selection mechanism. In Heidhues et al. (2016; 
2017), setting base good prices below some exogenously set “price floor” is 
                                                          
6 Farrell and Klemperer (2007) provide an excellent survey of this literature. 
7 Protection is partial if sophisticated consumers buy the base good but not the add-on. See Armstrong 
(2015) for an analysis of such rip-off externalities. 
8 For a more detailed review of Ellison (2005) see section 1.2.2. 
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unprofitable, as it attracts a large number of arbitrageurs that enjoy the subsidised 
prices and avoid add-ons at a small inconvenience cost. Exogenous price floors are 
also assumed in an extension of Armstrong and Vickers (2012) with regards to 
personal current accounts, as well as in the working paper version of Grubb (2015b) 
with regards to mobile phone contracts.   
Price floors can arise endogenously if base goods and add-ons are imperfect 
substitutes. This is the case in Michel (2017), who models a market in which the add-
on is an extended warranty. Cutting base good prices below a certain threshold may 
be unprofitable if consumers find it less costly to replace a faulty product with a new 
one instead of buying a warranty. A similar mechanism takes place in a model of 
printer systems (which include ink) and cartridges by Miao (2010). If firms set 
cartridge prices too low, consumers may prefer to buy a new printer system instead of 
a new cartridge. 
In reality, price floors may also arise due to market regulations (below-cost pricing 
may be viewed as prohibited predatory behaviour; regulation in the mutual funds 
industry may rule out “signing bonuses”, as modelled in Heidhues et al. 2017), due to 
consumers’ perception of high upfront prices as a signal for quality (Wolinsky, 1983), 
or if consumers are suspicious of extremely low prices, expecting a trap. 
Models in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this thesis join the list of works that study market 
outcomes when price floors constrain competition on base prices. Chapter 2 specifies 
conditions under which an add-on pricing equilibrium exist in markets in which a price 
floor is present. Chapters 3 and 4 study how the presence of a price floor affects 
horizontal product differentiation in the market. 
 
1.2.2 Selling add-ons to rational consumers 
The seminal paper of Ellison (2005) highlights the effectiveness of add-on pricing 
as a price discrimination device in a competitive framework. In his model, two firms 
sell imperfect substitutes to consumers with high and low marginal utility of income. 
Each firm offers a high-quality and a low-quality version of its product. In the 
“standard price discrimination game” each firm advertises the prices of both versions 
of its product. In the “add-on pricing game” each firm only advertises the price of its 
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low-quality product version; a consumer can observe the price of the high-quality 
version only by visiting that firm.  
Ellison shows that firm profits at the standard price discrimination game are lower 
than profits at the add-on pricing game. The reason is that, in the add-on pricing game, 
firms can only compete on the price of the low-quality version. Because of consumer 
heterogeneity in their marginal utility of income, price cuts attract a disproportionate 
number of low-type consumers that do not buy the high-quality version. This adverse 
selection effect limits price-cutting, softening competition. 
While more profitable, following an add-on pricing strategy (that is, keeping the 
price of the high-quality version hidden) is never an individually rational firm strategy 
when the choice to advertise prices is endogenous. The reason is precisely the adverse 
selection effect described above. Given a firm’s choice to hide the price of its high-
quality version, it is always profitable for a rival to advertise their own high-quality 
version and undercut in order to steal some high-type consumers. 
Several works explore market conditions that facilitate the existence of add-on 
pricing equilibria versus all-inclusive equilibria when Ellison’s adverse selection 
effect is not present. Geng and Shulman (2015), emphasise on the role of cost savings, 
often cited to be the rationale behind unbundling add-ons, and heterogeneity in 
consumers’ price sensitivity. They show that the firms’ choice of pricing strategy 
depends on add-on production costs, on the relative price sensitivity of consumers that 
have demand for add-ons to that of consumers that do not, as well as on the existence 
of consumers that consume the add-on if and only if it is bundled with the base good. 
They note the possibility that an add-on pricing equilibrium may emerge despite 
leading to lower profits than an all-inclusive equilibrium. 
Lin (2017) studies incentives to unbundle base goods from add-ons in a model in 
which two firms are vertically differentiated. The high-quality firm has an incentive 
to sell the add-on separately in order to price discriminate. The low-quality firm faces 
two conflicting incentives: selling the add-on separately permits that firm to price 
discriminate, while bundling core service and add-on allows that firm to differentiate 
itself from its high-quality rival. In equilibrium, the high-quality firm always sells the 
add-on as optional. The low-quality firm may bundle the add-on with the core service, 
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sell it as optional, or not offer it at all, depending on the add-on’s production cost-to-
value ratio. 
Geng et al. (2018) show that an upstream monopolist’s choice of business strategy 
depends on the distribution contract this firm has with a downstream platform. In their 
model, add-ons, when sold separately, can be purchased directly from the monopolist. 
Under an agency contract, this effect makes add-on pricing more profitable than all-
inclusive pricing. This is because it allows the monopolist to enjoy the full add-on 
revenue, while permitting it to pass some of the revenue loss from the lower base price 
to the platform through the commission rate (what they call the loss-sharing effect). 
Under a wholesale contract, a loss-sharing effect does not arise. In that case, the 
monopolist prefers to bundle base good with add-on, as that permits it to sell add-ons 
even to consumers that do not value them.  
Cui et al. (2018) show that a monopolist’s choice to unbundle the add-on depends 
on whether that monopolist can price discriminate between high and low-value 
consumers on the base good. Under uniform pricing on the base good, add-on pricing 
is more profitable when high base good valuation is correlated with high add-on 
valuation, as it allows the monopolist to price discriminate. Under discriminatory 
pricing on the base good, add-on pricing emerges when both high- and low-type 
consumers’ add-on valuation is relatively low. This is because the optional nature of 
the add-on component can be used to capture consumers of each type that do not value 
the add-on service.  
In a related question, Gomes and Tirole (2018) explain why some markets feature 
high add-on prices, while in other markets add-ons are given away for free. In their 
model, consumers may choose not to buy the base good if add-on prices are too high. 
The authors show that this possibility deters a base good monopolist from setting high 
add-on prices, and may even incentivise the monopolist to offer add-ons below cost. 
The higher the mark-up on the base good, the weaker the incentive to set high add-on 
prices. Hold-ups (i.e. high add-on prices resulting from the firm’s inability to commit 
to lower prices) can occur when consumers are uninformed about add-on prices or 
when they naïvely ignore them; however, the extent of the hold-up is limited by the 
concern for missed sales. 
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Fruchter et al. (2011) study the same question in an earlier work by analysing a 
model in which add-on valuation is independent of base good valuation. They show 
that, in most cases, a monopolist is better off setting a high add-on price in order to 
extract the surplus of consumers that value the add-on. If high add-on valuation is 
associated with low base good valuation, then the monopolist may have an incentive 
to offer complimentary add-ons. This is because the free add-on yields additional 
surplus to consumers with low base good valuation (the low types). The monopolist 
then can charge a higher base price and extract more surplus from all consumers 
without driving away these low types.  
The primary contribution of Chapter 2 relates to this literature, specifying 
conditions under which firms unbundle and sell add-ons separately from base goods 
even when Ellison’s adverse selection effect takes place.  
 
1.2.3 Shrouding add-ons (and other product features) from naïve 
consumers 
The seminal paper of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) sparks the literature that studies 
shrouding incentives. In their model, naïve consumer types expect they have no 
demand for add-ons. They choose from which firm to purchase based on base good 
prices only, and end up buying add-ons at any price below their willingness to pay 
once they commit to a base good purchase. Sophisticated types, on the other hand, are 
aware of their future add-on demand, and so make a purchase choice based on 
expected lifetime costs.  
Shrouding add-ons permits firms to sell add-ons at high prices to naïve types. 
Sophisticates types, expecting to be held up, substitute away. If at least one firm 
unshrouds, a fraction of naïve types become educated and act as the sophisticated 
types. If the fraction of naïve types is high enough then both firms shroud in 
equilibrium. No firm has incentive to unshroud, as a firm can only profit from 
unshrouding by cutting prices enough to prevent educated naïve types from 
substituting away. This is unprofitable, as it results in lower revenues from consumers 
that remain naïve. 
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If, instead, the fraction of naïve types is sufficiently low, each firm has an 
incentive to unshroud and sell add-ons to all consumers at lower prices. Shrouding is 
not profitable when rivals are unshrouding, as the only consumers that purchase add-
ons from a shrouded firm are uneducated naïve types. Sophisticated and educated 
naïve types that purchase from a shrouding firm would expect to be held up and would 
substitute away. 
Profits under both shrouding and unshrouding are independent of add-on sales, as 
firms compete away extra add-on profits by lowering base good prices. 
Heidhues et al. (2017) is the first to study shrouding incentives when a binding 
price floor prevents complete dissipation of add-on profits. In their model, each firm 
sells a product that features an upfront price that is visible to all consumers and an 
unavoidable add-on fee that is hidden unless at least one firm unshrouds. Under 
shrouding, firms set the highest possible add-on fees, and compete upfront prices down 
to the price floor. Under unshrouding, firms compete over the total price, resulting in 
price competition a la Bertrand.  
The authors show that, given no unshrouding costs, shrouding can only arise in 
equilibrium if the price combination under shrouding is higher than the intrinsic utility 
of the sold product. More specifically, the difference between price combination under 
shrouding and intrinsic utility must be high enough that each firm prefers to serve a 
fraction of the market at the shrouded prices, over unshrouding and serving the whole 
market at monopoly prices. 
When products are socially valuable (i.e. their intrinsic utility is higher than their 
production costs), increasing the number of firms can bring about unshrouding in 
equilibrium. This is because profits under shrouding are shared between a higher 
number of firms, making deviations to unshrouding more profitable in comparison. 
On the contrary, when products are socially wasteful (i.e. their intrinsic utility is lower 
than their production costs) then shrouding is the unique equilibrium market outcome. 
This is because firms cannot profitably sell socially wasteful products at any price 
when unshrouding takes place.  
The model in Chapter 2 of this thesis gives two alternative explanations as to why 
firms profitably sell add-ons to consumers when a price floor is present, without 
requiring the presence of boundedly rational consumers. The models in Chapters 3 and 
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4 take a shrouding equilibrium as a given (which is possible in Heidhues et al. (2017) 
even without above-monopoly prices if unshrouding costs are sufficiently high) in a 
market with naïve consumers that ignore add-on fees and sophisticated consumers that 
observe and take them into account in their purchase decision. The two models study 
second-order effects in firms’ choice of horizontal differentiation under the 
assumption of such shrouding taking place. 
A few works extend the model of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) to provide additional 
insights regarding shrouding incentives when add-on profits are fully competed away. 
Dahremoller (2013) assumes that the shrouding decision takes place before price-
setting and that firms are heterogeneous in their add-on production costs. In this 
setting, unshrouding always emerges in a duopoly. Depending on parameter values, at 
least one firm always has an incentive to unshroud in order to reduce its rival’s add-
on profits, since lower add-on profits result in softer competition for the base good 
market.  
Wenzel (2014) modifies the Gabaix and Laibson framework in a different 
dimension, studying how shrouding incentives may change depending on competition 
intensity. The author models a market in which the effect of unshrouding on the 
education of naïve types depends on the number of unshrouding firms. Each 
unshrouding firm reduces the number of naïve types in the market, thus incentivising 
rivals to unshroud as well. As a result, the parameter range for which unshrouding 
emerges increases with the number of firms in the market. For parameter values for 
which both shrouding and unshrouding equilibria exist, unshrouding dominates in 
terms of risk. This is because shrouding firms’ add-on revenues fall with a higher 
number of unshrouding rivals. When unshrouding is costly, the relationship between 
the number of firms and unshrouding becomes non-monotonic. This is because 
stronger competition erodes unshrouding profits, incentivising firms to save on the 
fixed unshrouding costs when competition is too intense. 
Wenzel (2015) studies how shrouding decisions are affected by differences in add-
on production costs when, as in Wenzel (2014), the education effect of unshrouding 
depends on the number of unshrouding firms. The author shows that firms with low 
add-on production costs have a stronger incentive to unshroud, as they benefit more 
from an increase in add-on sales. For naïve consumer populations of intermediate size, 
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the asymmetric unshrouding incentives permit a partial shrouding equilibrium, in 
which efficient firms unshroud and inefficient firms shroud. 
In Murooka (2015), the decision whether to educate consumers about hidden add-
on fees is taken by an intermediary under an agency model. The author shows that 
intermediaries have a weaker incentive to educate consumers the larger the hidden fee 
is, as the hidden fee finances higher commissions. As a result, intermediaries fail at 
their role to educate consumers and deception (that is, provision of products with 
hidden fees) emerges in equilibrium precisely when hidden fees are large. 
Related to the literature on shrouding add-ons and additional fees are various 
works that study firms’ incentives to hide product information or confuse consumers 
in order to soften competition on the visible prices. Some works study the use of 
different price frames (e.g. Piccione and Spiegler, 2012; Chioveanu and Zhou, 2013; 
Spiegler, 2014) or price complexity (Carlin 2009; Carlin and Manso, 2011) by firms 
to make product comparison difficult. Others (e.g. Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012; 
Wilson, 2010) study firm efforts to increase search costs in order to deter consumers 
from searching for better deals. Spiegler (2016) provides an excellent review of the 
literature on choice complexity and consumer confusion. 
 
1.2.4 Externalities between naïve and sophisticated consumers 
When consumers naïvely underestimate their demand for add-ons (or, 
equivalently, their probability of paying additional fees and charges), a relevant 
question is whether sophisticated consumers can protect them from being exploited. 
In some settings, sophisticated consumers can improve the deals available to all 
consumers by inducing firms to compete in all product dimensions. Armstrong (2015) 
refers to this competition-strengthening effect that sophisticated types create as a 
“search externality”. 
A search externality takes place in Armstrong and Chen (2009). In this model, 
firms can offer high quality (e.g. a low add-on fee) at high marginal cost and low 
quality (e.g. a high add-on fee) at zero cost. Sophisticated consumers observe both 
prices and qualities, while naïve consumers only observe prices, believing that quality 
is always high. In a market populated solely by naïve types, all firms supply low 
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quality. Introducing some sophisticated types incentivises firms to randomise between 
high and low qualities. Interestingly, the relationship between consumer surplus and 
the proportion of sophisticated types is non-monotonic. This is because randomisation 
across qualities introduces price dispersion. The surplus loss associated with 
sometimes selling low qualities at high prices to naïve types dominates the surplus 
gain from the offering of high qualities when the fraction of sophisticates is relatively 
small. 
A search externality can also take place in markets in which sophisticated types 
cannot avoid add-on fees, and upfront prices of all firms are competed down to a price 
floor. With upfront prices equal to the floor, naïve types do not exert any more 
competitive pressure and get shared evenly across firms. Sophisticated types, on the 
other hand, incentivise firms to compete on add-on fees. Interpreting his framework 
as one in which upfront prices are fixed and firms compete over add-on fees, Schultz 
(2004) provides insights on how naïvete about add-on fees affects horizontal 
differentiation in the market. He shows that product differentiation increases in the 
number of naïve consumers, as the weaker competitive pressure due to naïvete allows 
firms to translate product differentiation into even higher add-on fees.  
The model of Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between naïvete and 
horizontal product differentiation when search externalities are present in a more 
general setting, revealing parameters for which Schultz’s finding applies and results 
in intermediate product differentiation, and parameters for which other forces result in 
maximum, or minimum product differentiation. 
If competition intensity is sufficiently intense, search externalities can result in 
price dispersion in a fashion similar to Varian (1980). Intuitively, if rivals’ fees are 
low enough, firms have an incentive to set high add-on fees and exploit “captive” 
naïve types. The model of Chapter 4 features parameter values for which such price 
dispersion takes places, with unique results on product differentiation incentives. 
Search externalities do not always arise. If sophisticated types avoid add-ons they 
do not intensify competition on add-on fees. Instead, they take advantage of the lower 
base good prices that are funded solely by naïve types’ add-on purchases. Armstrong 
(2015) refers to such cross-subsidisation from naïve to sophisticated types as a “rip-
off” externality. Armstrong and Vickers (2012) illustrates this externality type in a 
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model of personal current accounts. Cross-subsidisation between consumers that are 
inattentive about past mobile phone usage and consumers that are attentive takes place 
in Grubb (2015b). The model in Chapter 3 of this thesis exhibits such rip-off 
externalities and shows how their emergence affects product differentiation incentives. 
 
1.2.5 Distortions in markets with add-ons and naïve consumers 
When naïve consumers underestimate future add-on payments, distortions can 
emerge. An avoidance distortion arises when consumers must spend effort to avoid 
high add-on fees. For instance, in Grubb (2015b) consumers need to spend attention 
costs in order to ensure that they do not incur overage charges. In Armstrong and 
Vickers (2012), avoiding overdraft charges requires a diligence cost. In Armstrong et 
al. (2009), consumers need to spend search costs to looks for firms that offer better 
deals. Avoidance costs are not always wasteful; Zenger (2013) shows that some 
avoidance effort may be efficient if add-on production costs are high.  
A participation distortion appears when firms use add-on revenues to subsidise 
base good prices. This subsidisation results in consumers buying too many base goods. 
For example, in Zegners and Kretschmer (2017) if aftermarket power is sufficiently 
high then the base good subsidy is large enough that even consumers with valuation 
below marginal cost buy the base good. Heidhues and Koszegi (2015) demonstrates 
such price distortions in the US credit market. Crucially, the extent of this participation 
distortions depends on demand and supply elasticities, as mentioned in Grubb (2015a). 
Under certain circumstances, the participation distortion may be beneficial. For 
instance, using an isoelastic demand curve, de Meza and Reyniers (2012) show that 
the participation distortion can improve welfare by allowing consumers that value the 
base good to purchase it, when they would not do so in the absence of subsidies. 
A particularly worrying distortion is that underestimation of future add-on 
payments can lead to the prevalence of low quality products. In Michel (2018), some 
consumers naïvely underestimate the costs of returning a product to a manufacturer 
when choosing whether or not to buy a warranty. If the size of warranty payments can 
signal product quality, consumer naïvete can permit a monopolist to offer a low-
quality product with a warranty that signals high quality. Given sufficiently strong 
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underestimation of return costs, low quality provision to naïve consumers can emerge 
even in a competitive market. 
In the search model of Gamp and Krahmer (2018), “candid” firms, which produce 
a good of efficiently high quality at high cost, compete with “deceptive” firms, which 
produce a good of inefficiently low quality at low cost. Quality can be interpreted as 
presence or absence of hidden add-on fees or surcharges. Sophisticated consumers 
recognise low quality products, and search until they find a sufficiently cheap candid 
product. Naïve consumers, on the other hand, search for the cheapest product without 
regards to quality. In equilibrium, sophisticated consumers search and buy candid 
products, while naïve consumers buy the first product they see, and may end up with 
a deceptive product. As search frictions disappear, sophisticated consumers search 
between all candid firms, driving their mark-up to zero. Deceptive firms, on the other 
hand, maintain positive mark-ups due to their lower production costs. As a result, the 
deceptive business model dominates, and candid products are driven out of the market. 
In Heidhues et al. (2017), as already discussed, shrouding attributes can permit 
firms profitably sell wasteful products. The authors extend their model to markets in 
which firms sell high-quality products at transparent prices, and low-quality products 
with add-on fees. In such markets, there exist equilibria in which firms sell the low-
quality product with shrouded fees to naïve consumers, earning positive profits from 
it, and sell the high-quality product to sophisticated types, earning zero profits from it. 
In a companion paper, Heidhues et al. (2016), the authors show that naïvete can 
also distort firms’ innovation incentives. When shrouding is an equilibrium, firms 
have no incentive to invest in value-increasing innovations if these innovations are 
non-appropriable, as rivals that copy the innovation may find it profitable to unshroud. 
However, the same is not the case with non-appropriable exploitative innovations – 
that is, innovations that increase the shrouded prices that naïve consumers are paying. 
A firm has an incentive to invest in such innovations because these innovations (i) 
allow the innovative firm to extract more surplus from naïve types, and (ii) allow all 
rivals that copy to extract more surplus as well, weakening their incentives to 
unshroud. Incentives for appropriable value-increasing innovations may also be 
distorted downwards under shrouding, as innovative firms consider the possibility that 
rivals unshroud in response to a successful innovation.  
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Chapters 3 and 4 reveal that naïvete with respect to add-on fees can introduce a 
novel type of distortion: a distortion in horizontal product differentiation. We show 
that distortion in this dimension may not be necessarily harmful; in fact, it may help 
correct the excessive product differentiation predicted by classical models (e.g. 
d’Aspremont et al., 1979; Neven, 1985). 
 
1.2.6 Can regulation protect naïve consumers? 
When exploitation of naïve consumers is severe, regulators may intervene to 
improve market performance. Supply-side interventions, such as price controls, aim 
at directly constraining firms’ exploitative behaviour. Demand-side interventions, 
such as disclosure remedies, aim at improving consumers’ ability to choose good deals 
and avoid exploitation. Fletcher (2016) provides an excellent review and evaluation 
of various demand-side interventions in real markets.  
Supply-side responses play an important role in the effectiveness of interventions. 
In markets with add-ons, interventions may succeed at reducing consumers’ add-on 
expenses, but firms may adjust their business strategies and undo some of the benefits. 
Typically, firms may respond to a reduction in add-on revenues by increasing other 
prices. This is commonly known as a waterbed effect.  
Grubb (2015b) shows the possibility for a waterbed effect in a market for calling 
plans. In his model, consumers that are not attentive with respect to past consumption 
make calls that exceed their plan’s coverage and incur penalty charges. A bill-shock 
regulation that alerts consumers when they are about to exceed their plan coverage can 
protect naïve consumers that would otherwise incur penalty charges. The author shows 
that eliminating penalty expenses may not make the average consumer better off; in 
equilibrium firms respond by raising first-period prices. 
The importance of price readjustments is stressed in an empirical work by Grubb 
and Osborne (2015), which simulates the effect of bill-shock alerts on phone plans 
using data from the years 2002-2004. They show that, holding other prices fixed, 
consumers benefit from the alerts. When equilibrium price readjustments are taken 
into account, the alerts may benefit or harm consumers, depending on whether 
consumers underestimate their probability on incurring penalty fees or not. 
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Agarwal et al. (2014) show that the extent of the waterbed effect depends on cost 
pass-through. From the firms’ point of view, add-on revenues are equivalent to a 
reduction in marginal costs. As such, an intervention that limits add-on revenues is 
equivalent to a marginal cost tax, and its effect on base good prices depends on 
mechanisms well-studied in the pass-through literature (e.g. Weyl and Fabinger, 
2013). An example case in which pass-through is zero takes place when base good 
prices are constrained by a price floor both before and after regulation takes place. 
Armstrong and Vickers (2012) show that this is a possibility in UK retail banking. 
A difference-in-difference analysis by Agarwal et al. (2015) finds no support for 
a waterbed effect after the implementation of the CARD Act, a regulatory intervention 
aimed at protecting U.S. credit card users from incurring unanticipated charges. The 
authors find that the regulation reduced overall borrowing costs, and they no evidence 
of offsetting increases in interest charges or interchange fees, or offsetting reductions 
in credit volumes and various operational costs. 
For a regulator with distributional concerns9, a market intervention that limits add-
on payments may be desirable even in the presence of a strong waterbed effect. If, for 
instance, it is only naïve consumers that incur add-on charges, eliminating these 
charges benefits naïve consumers at the cost of harming sophisticated consumers that 
only pay the base prices. The model in Chapter 3 of this thesis, describes a market 
situation in which interventions affect naïve and sophisticated consumers differently.  
Firms’ shrouding behaviour plays a role on whether regulatory interventions yield 
net benefits. By modifying the framework of Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Ko and 
Williams (2017) show that a price control remedy may harm both social surplus and 
the surplus of naïve consumers if it supports a shift from an unshrouding to a shrouding 
equilibrium. This is because a shrouding equilibrium features inefficient add-on 
substitution by sophisticated consumers, and high add-on expenses by naïve 
consumers. Using a similar model, Kosfeld and Schuwer (2017) demonstrate that 
disclosing hidden add-on fees can harm social welfare, unless the disclosure is strong 
enough to shift the market to an equilibrium in which add-ons are fully unshrouded. If 
                                                          
9 Helping vulnerable consumers is at the core of the Competition and Markets Authority’s 2018/2019 
plan. See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/competition-and-markets-authority-annual-
plan-2018-to-2019/competition-and-markets-authority-annual-plan-20181.  
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the market features shrouding after the disclosure remedy takes place, then at least 
some of the newly educated naïve types prefer to (inefficiently) substitute away from 
add-on consumption.  
Regulatory interventions may also affect consumers’ own efforts to protect 
themselves from exploitation. In the search model of Armstrong et al. (2009), 
regulation affects consumer self-protection efforts in a detrimental way. Price controls 
dampen consumers’ incentives to become informed, softening competition. By 
considering consumers’ limited mental capacity, Heidhues et al. (2018) show that the 
effect of regulation on consumers’ self-protection efforts is positive. In their model, 
consumers have to choose between studying a product’s features in order to avoid 
hidden charges and browsing more products in order to find a better deal. Regulating 
hidden charges permits consumers to devote more effort into shopping around, 
strengthening competition and improving welfare. 
The models in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis contribute to the literature that 
explores the effectiveness of regulatory interventions in markets with add-ons by 
studying whether certain types of interventions are desirable when horizontal product 
differentiation is a choice variable. The two models reveal a novel effect; regulatory 
interventions can alter firms’ equilibrium choice of product differentiation. Whether 
this is to the benefit or detriment of consumer and social surplus depends on pre- and 
post-intervention market parameters. 
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Chapter 2 
Add-on Pricing Equilibrium with 
Rational Consumers 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In a wide range of industries, firms charge extra for add-ons that complement their 
core products. Hotels sell breakfast or internet access separately; airlines charge extra 
for on-board meals or luggage; smartphone apps sell functionality or cosmetic 
upgrades. Add-ons are a major source of revenue for many of these firms. Apps 
following the freemium business model rely entirely on add-on revenues. Low-cost 
airlines are reported to earn up to 46% percent of their total revenue from ancillary 
services.10 Despite the popularity of “add-on pricing” as a business strategy, 
identifying the incentives behind firms’ choice to unbundle and offer base goods and 
add-ons separately remains an open question. This chapter attempts to shed some light 
on this question. 
While the firms often enjoy monopoly power on the add-ons they sell, traditional 
competition arguments (Shapiro, 1995; Lal and Matutes, 1994; Verboven, 1999) 
                                                          
10 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/airlines-that-rely-most-on-extra-charges/ [accessed August 
2018]. 
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suggest that add-on revenues have no effect on profits; firms compete away add-on 
revenues by offering low (even below-cost) prices for the base goods. Using a 
competitive price discrimination model, Ellison (2005) shows that add-on pricing may 
increase profits if an adverse selection problem prevents firms from cutting base good 
prices below a certain threshold. However, he also shows that add-on pricing is not an 
equilibrium strategy precisely when such a threshold is binding.11  
In this chapter we model two market settings in which unbundling base goods 
from add-ons (what we call the add-on pricing strategy) may be an equilibrium even 
when adverse selection constrains competition on base prices. In each market setting 
we specify conditions under which the adoption of an add-on pricing strategy is 
individually rational and permits firms to enjoy supra-competitive profits. In contrast 
with much of the extant literature, our work does not rely on behavioural assumptions 
regarding consumer choices; consumers correctly anticipate own behaviour and have 
rational expectations about unobservable features.  
We begin in section 2.2 by presenting a benchmark duopoly model to simply 
illustrate Ellison’s insight: that an add-on pricing equilibrium does not exist when a 
constraint prevents add-on pricing firms from cutting base prices below a certain 
threshold. Following existing literature (e.g. Heidhues et al., 2017), we model this 
constraint as an exogenous price floor. In real markets, such a price floor can be 
established if low base good prices attract a disproportionate amount of low-value 
consumers that refrain from add-on purchases.12 For example, setting flight ticket 
prices below a certain threshold may fill airplane seats with consumers that prefer to 
substitute away from on-board meals. Selling apps for negative prices may attract 
arbitrageurs that enjoy the subsidy without using the app itself. The price floor, when 
                                                          
11 In section 2.2 we illustrate Ellison’s mechanism in a simple benchmark model. In Ellison’s original 
work, add-on pricing is defined as the business strategy in which firms sell add-ons at high unadvertised 
prices. An adverse selection problem arises because competition on base prices attracts a 
disproportionate amount of low-type consumers that do not buy the add-ons. While this dampens price-
cutting incentives, a profitable deviation from an add-on pricing equilibrium takes place if the choice 
to advertise any price is endogenous. When this is the case, any firm can bypass the adverse selection 
problem by advertising a slightly lower add-on price and attracting high-type consumers.  
12 This is precisely the adverse selection problem that prevents price cutting in Ellison (2005). See 
Ellison and Ellison (2009) for evidence of an adverse selection problem in a market for computer parts. 
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binding, permits add-on pricing firms to earn supra-competitive profits. However, an 
equilibrium in which both firms follow the add-on pricing strategy does not exist in 
this case. Firms can deviate to offering an integrated good (what we call the all-
inclusive strategy) and profitably undercut. 
In section 2.3 we develop our first main model. In this model firms that follow the 
add-on pricing strategy can condition the production of an add-on on its purchase and 
save on production costs when an add-on purchase does not take place. This 
specification is particularly relevant to real markets with physical add-on products. 
For example, hotels can save on ingredients costs if residents do not buy breakfast; 
airlines can save on handling and fuel costs if passengers do not check luggage; 
supermarkets can save on transport costs if consumers visit the store instead of buying 
online.  
We show that the prospect of abandoning potential cost savings associated with 
the add-on pricing strategy may be sufficient to deter firms from bundling base goods 
and add-ons (all-inclusive strategy) and undercutting, even when a binding price floor 
keeps base good prices relatively high. Compared to a world in which both firms 
bundle base goods with add-ons, the add-on pricing equilibrium, whenever it exists, 
improves social surplus and may or may not benefit consumers. 
Our second main model, in section 2.4, analyses a market in which products may 
or may not match consumers’ tastes. Informed consumers know the match quality of 
each product in advance and purchase from the cheapest firm that matches their tastes. 
Uninformed consumers are uncertain about match quality, and only learn about the 
match quality of a given product after purchase. Add-on pricing allows uninformed 
consumers to learn about match quality by buying only the base good, thus permitting 
them to condition purchase of the add-on on the revelation of good matching.  
This model specification is applicable to various markets with experience goods, 
and in particular to digital products. For example, smartphone users that download a 
freemium app can taste some basic product features for free and may buy optional 
functionality or cosmetic upgrades after good matching is realised. Purchasing a paid 
app, instead, is riskier if a user is uninformed about match qualities. 
We show that the voluntary nature of add-on purchases allows add-on pricing 
firms to price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers. In contrast, 
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all-inclusive firms can only offer the same deal to both consumer types. Under certain 
parameter specifications, the prospect of abandoning the ability to price discriminate 
can deter firms from following the all-inclusive strategy in order to undercut. When 
the price floor constraint is binding, this can establish an add-on pricing equilibrium 
with supra-competitive profits. Our model shows that this is the unique pure strategy 
equilibrium when matching is uncertain. This may, in part, explain the prevalence of 
the freemium business model in the apps market. Compared to a world in which both 
firms bundle base good with add-ons, the add-on pricing equilibrium, whenever it 
exists, improves social surplus and firm profits. 
This chapter is, to the best of our knowledge, the first work that shows existence 
of an add-on pricing equilibrium even when a price floor limits add-on firms’ ability 
to cut prices and even when consumers are fully rational. Our two main models are 
applicable to a wide range of industries in which add-on pricing is a popular business 
strategy.  
Several related works study firms’ incentives to unbundle base goods from add-
ons, but do so without addressing the possibility that a price floor may constrain price 
cutting. Closest to our cost-savings model is Geng and Shulman (2015), who study 
how cost savings associated with add-on pricing affect competitive firms’ choice of 
business strategy when consumers are heterogeneous in their price sensitivity. Lin 
(2017) shows that vertical product differentiation plays a role in the firms’ choice to 
unbundle or integrate. Geng et al. (2018) show that an upstream monopolist’s choice 
of business strategy depends on the distribution contract this firm has with a 
downstream platform. Cui et al. (2018) study how the monopolist’s incentives to 
unbundle ancillary services changes depending on whether that monopolist can price 
discriminate between high and low-value consumers on the main service.  
In a related question, Gomes and Tirole (2018) explain why some markets feature 
high add-on prices, while in other markets add-ons are given away for free. Modelling 
a market in which consumers may choose not to buy the base good if add-on prices 
are too high, they show that the possibility to miss base good sales deters a base good 
monopolist from setting high add-on prices and may even incentivise the monopolist 
to offer add-ons below cost. The higher the mark-up on the base good, the weaker the 
incentive to set high add-on prices. Hold-ups can occur when consumers are 
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uninformed about add-on prices or naïvely ignore them; however, the extent of the 
hold-up is limited by the concern for missed sales. Addressing the same question in 
an earlier work, Fruchter et al. (2011) show that a monopolist may have an incentive 
to sell add-ons at a loss to low-value consumers, as the associated additional surplus 
that these consumers enjoy may allow the firm to charge higher base prices to both 
low and high-value consumers. 
Add-on pricing is, at its core, a second-degree price discrimination strategy, aimed 
at extracting higher surplus from high-value consumers. In markets with rational 
consumers, the price discrimination is preference-based: add-ons are bought by 
consumers that value them the most. Stole (2007) provides an excellent review of 
classical preference-based price discrimination models of imperfectly competitive 
markets.  
In markets with boundedly rational consumers, add-on pricing can permit a 
second-degree naïvete-based price discrimination.13 This type of price discrimination 
is studied in a large literature following Gabaix and Laibson (2006). In that literature, 
firms can choose between shrouding add-ons to extract large surplus from naïve 
consumers that accidentally purchase them, or unshrouding and selling add-ons to both 
naïve and sophisticated consumers at lower prices. With regards to its ability to 
discriminate, shrouding is similar to unbundling and selling add-ons separately, while 
unshrouding is similar to selling add-ons to everyone at an all-inclusive price. In the 
absence of a binding price floor, firms’ incentive to keep add-ons shrouded depends, 
among other parameters, on the proportion of behavioural consumers in the market 
(Gabaix and Laibson, 2006), on competition intensity (Wenzel, 2014), and on cost 
asymmetries (Dahremoller, 2013; Wenzel, 2015). With a binding price floor, however, 
shrouding is an equilibrium only if it permits firms to sell to naïve consumers at prices 
above the monopoly value (Heidhues et al. 2017).  
The add-on pricing strategy is related to drip pricing, a business strategy in which 
firms reveal various charges at the later stages of a transaction. Shelanski et al. (2012) 
provides a review of this business strategy from a consumer policy perspective. When 
                                                          
13 For a study of first and third-degree naïvete-based price discrimination, see Heidhues and Koszegi 
(2017). 
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the dripped price is optional (e.g. purchase of one-day delivery), drip pricing closely 
resembles add-on pricing. When the dripped price is mandatory, the business strategy 
is also referred to as partitioned pricing. Partitioned pricing differs from the standard 
process of selling by posting a single price due to psychological biases that often arise 
from the revelation of costs later in the purchasing process (Ahmetoglu et al., 2014; 
Office of Fair Trading, 2013; Greenleaf et al., 2016). 
 
2.2 Benchmark model 
In this section we develop a benchmark model to simply illustrate the finding of 
Ellison (2005) that an add-on pricing equilibrium does not exist if the add-on pricing 
strategy constrains firms’ ability to offer low prices.  
 
2.2.1 Model structure 
Consider two identical firms selling a good of quality 𝑣 to a consumer segment of 
size 1. Consumers are homogeneous and have unit demand. Firms face marginal 
production cost 𝑐 and compete on prices. Each firm 𝑖 operates under a business 
strategy 𝑅𝑖 ∈ {𝐼, 𝐴}. Strategy 𝐼, or all-inclusive strategy, involves selling the good in 
one piece, at an observable all-inclusive price 𝑝𝐼. Strategy 𝐴, or add-on pricing 
strategy, involves separating the product in two parts; a base good of quality 𝑣 − 𝑤 >
0 at an advertised base price 𝑝𝑏 and an add-on component of quality 𝑤 at an 
unadvertised14 add-on price 𝑝𝑎. 𝑝𝑏 is assumed to be bound below by a price floor 𝑓, 
where 𝑓 ≤ 𝑐. Consumers can purchase the add-on component only from the firm from 
which they purchased the base good and only after they purchase the base good. They 
                                                          
14 Advertising add-on prices may be prohibitively expensive. For example, advertising optional extras 
available with a car purchase takes up valuable space in a specialist magazine, or valuable time in a TV 
commercial. Advertising an add-on price may also be ineffective at informing consumers about the 
associated add-on expense. For example, informing a consumer of a videogame about the price of an 
in-app purchase that gives her an extra life does not convey any information about how often she will 
need that extra life. 
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can observe the 𝑝𝑎 of their firm of choice only after they purchase the base good from 
that firm. They have rational expectations regarding prices they cannot observe.  
Consumers that purchase the base good from a firm also purchase the add-on 
component from that firm at any price 𝑝𝑎 ≤ 𝑤 with probability 𝑞 ∈ (0,1).
 15 A firm 
that follows the add-on pricing strategy has no incentive to cut add-on prices since 
they are unadvertised, and thus always sets 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑤. Consumers and firms know the 
value of 𝑞 but do not know ex ante whether a given consumer will buy the add-on. For 
brevity, we refer to firms following the add-on pricing strategy as add-on firms, and 
firms following the all-inclusive strategy as all-inclusive firms. 
Consumers purchase from the firm that offers the best deal. To resolve ties, we 
assume that firms share consumers evenly if they offer the same deal. We also assume 
that consumers always buy if they are indifferent between buying and not buying.  
 
Timing 
Firm decisions take place in two stages. In stage 1 firms simultaneously choose 
business strategies. In stage 2 they simultaneously choose prices. A firm that chooses 
business strategy 𝐼 sets and posts an all-inclusive price, 𝑝𝐼. A firm that chooses 
business strategy 𝐴 sets a price pair (𝑝𝑏 , 𝑝𝑎) and posts its base price, 𝑝𝑏. Consumers 
observe the pricing strategies of each firm and the posted prices, form rational 
expectations about the price of the add-on component, if any, and choose from which 
firm to purchase. We solve the game using backward induction and look for symmetric 
subgame perfect pure strategy equilibria. We refer to a pure strategy equilibrium in 
which both firms follow the add-on pricing (all-inclusive) strategy as an add-on 
pricing (all-inclusive) equilibrium. 
 
                                                          
15 This assumption can be interpreted in the following way. Each consumer 𝑘 has individual valuation 
for the add-on component 𝑤𝑘 ,  where 𝑤𝑘 = 𝑤 with probability 𝑞 and 𝑤𝑘 = 0 with probability 1 − 𝑞.  
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2.2.2 Equilibrium analysis - Non-existence of an add-on pricing 
equilibrium 
We first consider the subgame in which both firms follow the add-on pricing 
strategy (add-on subgame). In this subgame, firms earn, on average, 𝑤𝑞 from each 
customer and compete on base prices.  
If the price floor is not binding then the equilibrium base price is such that profits 
are equal to zero; that is, 𝑝𝑏
∗ = 𝑐 − 𝑤𝑞. The intuition behind why firms set below-cost 
prices in equilibrium is that firms have an incentive to compete more fiercely for 
consumers because they expect revenues 𝑤𝑞 from add-on purchases. This more 
intense competition results in firms subsidising base prices enough to dissipate all add-
on revenues, leaving firms with zero profits. Due to this subsidisation on base prices, 
consumers pay an expected total price 𝐸𝑛𝑓
𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 𝑝𝑏
∗ + 𝑤𝑞 = 𝑐, where subscript 𝑛𝑓 
indicates a non-binding price floor, and the superscript add indicates the add-on 
subgame. 
If the price floor is binding (that is, if 𝑓 > 𝑐 − 𝑤𝑞) firms cannot compete away all 
add-on revenues by subsidising lower base prices, as the price floor limits price 
cutting. As a result, equilibrium base price is 𝑝𝑏
∗ = 𝑓, and expected total price is 
𝐸𝑓
𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 (where subscript 𝑓 denotes a binding price floor). Benefitting from 
the price floor constraint, firms share consumers evenly and earn supra-competitive 
profits: Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 =
𝑓+𝑤𝑞−𝑐
2
. Note that base prices are partially subsidised, as firms’ 
incentive to compete more fiercely for the add-on revenues remains. Note also that the 
subsidisation is precisely why the price floor constraint binding; assumption 𝑓 ≤ 𝑐 
implies that the price floor can be binding only if firms set below-cost prices. 
To see that a symmetric add-on pricing equilibrium does not exist when the price 
floor is binding, consider the subgame in which firm 𝑖 follows the add-on pricing 
strategy and firm 𝑗 follows the all-inclusive strategy (asymmetric subgame). In this 
case, the all-inclusive firm can always undercut its add-on pricing rival. To see why, 
notice that an all-inclusive firm’s pricing behaviour is not constrained by the price 
floor. This is because it expects no future add-on revenues, so it has no incentive to 
offer a subsidised price. Thus, its pricing behaviour is only constrained by the marginal 
cost (𝑐). If the price floor is binding, then 𝑐 is greater than the lowest expected total 
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price that an add-on firm can offer (𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞). Thus, the all-inclusive firm can always 
offer a better deal to consumers. In the unique pure strategy price equilibrium of the 
asymmetric subgame, the add-on firm sets a base price 𝑝𝑏 = 𝑓, with an associated 
expected total price 𝐸𝑓
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 (superscript asym indicates the asymmetric 
subgame, and 𝑓 indicates a binding price floor). The all-inclusive firm sets an all-
inclusive price 𝑝𝐼 slightly below 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 and serves every consumer, earning Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 =
 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐.  
Since Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 > Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 , each firm is better off choosing the all-inclusive strategy 
when its rival chooses the add-on pricing strategy. Hence, a symmetric pure strategy 
equilibrium in which both firms follow the add-on pricing strategy does not exist. 
On the contrary, an all-inclusive pure strategy equilibrium always exists. In the 
subgame in which both firms follow the all-inclusive strategy (all-inclusive subgame) 
firms compete a la Bertrand, setting 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑐 and earning Π
𝑖𝑛𝑐 = 0, where superscript 
inc indicates the all-inclusive subgame. No firm has incentive to deviate to the add-on 
pricing strategy, as the firm that follows the add-on pricing strategy in the asymmetric 
subgame also earns zero profits.16  
An add-on pricing equilibrium trivially exists when the price floor is non-binding. 
In the asymmetric subgame, a non-binding price floor permits the add-on firm to 
subsidise the base price enough to match any deal that the all-inclusive firm may offer. 
As a result, in the equilibrium of this subgame, firms share consumers and earn zero 
profits each. The add-on firm dissipates future add-on revenues by setting 𝑝𝑏 = 𝑐 −
𝑤𝑞, resulting in an expected total price 𝐸𝐴𝐼
𝑛𝑓 = 𝑐. The all-inclusive firm sets 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑐. 
Thus, an add-on pricing equilibrium exists when the price floor is non-binding since a 
firm always earns, regardless of its own business strategy, zero profits when its rival 
chooses the add-on pricing strategy. Similarly, an all-inclusive equilibrium in which 
both firms earn zero profits also exists. Proposition 1 summarises the equilibrium 
outcome in the benchmark model. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Firms have no incentive to deviate if a deviation is not strictly profitable. 
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Proposition 1. (Ellison benchmark). 
(i) In the benchmark model, if the price floor constraint is non-binding (𝑐 ≥ 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞) 
(a) There always exists an add-on pricing equilibrium.  
(b) There always exists an all-inclusive equilibrium. 
(ii) In the benchmark model, if the price floor constraint is binding (𝑐 < 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞) 
there always exists an all-inclusive equilibrium. This is the unique symmetric 
equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Proof: In appendix A.  
 
Note that the results and intuitions do not change if pricing strategies and 
individual prices are chosen at a single stage (as in Ellison (2005)). With a binding 
price floor, a firm is always better off selling through an all-inclusive strategy if its 
rival follows the add-on pricing strategy, as it can bypass the price floor constraint and 
undercut. This only permits an all-inclusive equilibrium. With a non-binding price 
floor, an add-on firm can match any price offered by an all-inclusive firm, permitting 
an add-on pricing equilibrium with zero profits. Similarly, an all-inclusive equilibrium 
with zero profits also exists.  
This simple benchmark model illustrates the intuition in Ellison (2005) that a 
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which both firms follow the add-on pricing 
strategy does not exist when that business strategy constrains the adopting firm’s 
ability to compete by offering lower total prices.17 Firms can profitably deviate to the 
all-inclusive strategy, bypass the price floor constraint and offer a strictly better deal 
to consumers. In the following sections we modify our benchmark model to settings 
that more closely describe real markets in which add-on pricing strategies are 
prevalent. We show analytically that the firms’ incentive to deviate is weaker in these 
settings and describe conditions under which an add-on pricing equilibrium arises.  
 
                                                          
17 Our model is a simple variant, developed solely to capture this intuition. The model in Ellison (2005) 
is much richer.  
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2.3 The cost-savings model 
In this section we modify the benchmark model in order to study markets in which 
add-on pricing firms can condition the production of the add-on component on its 
purchase. This can permit firms to save on costs when a consumer has no demand for 
the add-on. Our cost-savings model specification applies to a range of markets in 
which firms often offer add-on services. Hotels charge separately for breakfast and 
save on production costs if residents do not purchase it; airlines charge extra for 
checked luggage and can save on handling and fuel costs if passengers only travel with 
carry-on luggage; supermarkets charge more for home deliveries, saving on transport 
costs when consumers visit the store for groceries.  
We show that the associated cost savings that a firm can enjoy by following an 
add-on pricing strategy can mitigate firms’ deviation incentives. Under certain 
conditions, this may establish a symmetric add-on pricing equilibrium even when that 
equilibrium is characterised by positive firm profits. 
 
2.3.1 Model structure 
We modify the benchmark model as follows. We assume that a firm that follows 
the add-on pricing strategy incurs marginal cost 𝑐𝑏 to produce and sell the base good, 
and a separate marginal cost 𝑐𝑎 to produce the add-on component. The production of 
the add-on component only takes place if a consumer buys the add-on. To ensure that 
an add-on firm always has an incentive to offer the add-on component, we assume that 
𝑤 > 𝑐𝑎. Following the benchmark model, add-on prices are unadvertised, so firms set 
𝑝𝑎 = 𝑤 in any equilibrium in which they follow the add-on pricing strategy. Also 
following the benchmark model, consumers buy the add-on only with probability 𝑞. 
Hence, an add-on firm’s marginal cost function is given by 𝐶𝐴 = 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞. As in the 
benchmark model, a firm that follows the all-inclusive strategy faces a constant 
marginal cost 𝑐.  
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In order to avoid trivial cases in which one business strategy is always less costly 
than the other, we assume 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎 ≥ 𝑐 ≥ 𝑐𝑏;
18 that is, a firm that sells both price 
components to a consumer would save on costs by following the all-inclusive strategy. 
However, if the consumer only has demand for the base good then the seller can save 
on costs by following the add-on pricing strategy. As in the benchmark model, we 
solve the game using backward induction, and look for symmetric subgame perfect 
pure strategy equilibria. All other model assumptions are as in the benchmark model. 
 
2.3.2 Equilibrium analysis 
With different marginal cost structures, the firms’ choice of business strategy is 
governed by two incentives. The first is the incentive to offer the best deal to 
consumers. Since products are homogeneous, the firm offering the best deal serves the 
whole market. The second is the incentive to take advantage of cost savings in order 
to enjoy the highest possible profit for any given price.  
In absence of a binding price floor constraint, both incentives work in the same 
direction. The business strategy that features the lowest costs also permits firms to 
offer the best deal to consumers, and is, thus, chosen in equilibrium. With a binding 
price floor this is not necessarily the case. For certain parameter values, firms offer the 
best deal to consumers when following the all-inclusive strategy but enjoy the lowest 
costs when following the add-on pricing strategy. This may permit an add-on pricing 
equilibrium to emerge even if that equilibrium features worse deals for consumers. 
Proposition 2 presents the symmetric pure strategy equilibria that arise from the 
interaction of the two incentives. 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 The inequality in the left side of the expression may hold if selling add-on separately results in higher 
operating costs. For example, selling in-flight meals instead of giving them away requires marketing 
efforts to induce flyers to purchase. Nevertheless, the inequality is not necessary for our key results. On 
the contrary, our key results arise more easily if we restrict our analysis to cases with  𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎 = 𝑐. 
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Proposition 2. (Pure strategy equilibrium in the cost-savings model). 
(i) In the cost-savings model, if the price floor constraint is non-binding (𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 ≥
𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞) 
(a) There exists an add-on pricing equilibrium if and only if 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 ≥ 0 
(b) There exists an all-inclusive equilibrium if and only if 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 ≤ 0 
(ii) In the cost-savings model, if the price floor constraint is binding (𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 < 𝑓 +
𝑤𝑞):  
(a) There exists an add-on pricing equilibrium if and only if 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 ≥ 𝑓 +
𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐. 
(b) There exists an all-inclusive equilibrium if and only if 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐 > 0 
Proof: In appendix A.  
 
Before addressing the logic behind the outcome described in Proposition 2, it is 
useful to clarify the conditions under which we consider the price floor to be binding 
in this model. We define the price floor as binding if it does not permit add-on pricing 
firms to compete away add-on revenues that they anticipate at the add-on pricing 
subgame.19 Given a non-binding price floor, firms at the add-on pricing subgame 
compete on base prices till the total expected price is equal to marginal cost; that is 
they set 𝑝𝑏
∗ = 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 − 𝑤𝑞. A binding price floor prevents firms from offering such 
low base prices, satisfying 𝑓 > 𝑝𝑏
∗ . Rearranging gives that the price floor is binding if 
𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 < 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 and non-binding otherwise. 
Proposition 2 shows that, given a non-binding price floor constraint, each 
individual firm chooses the business strategy that is associated with the lowest cost in 
order to offer the best possible deal to consumers. As such, the conditions for which 
each equilibrium arises are mutually exclusive. 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 > 0 indicates that the 
add-on pricing strategy is associated with lower total cost and thus offers the best deal 
                                                          
19 A price floor that constrains add-on firms’ behaviour at the add-on pricing subgame may not constrain 
the add-on firm’s behaviour at the asymmetric subgame.  
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to consumers. When this is the case, there exists a unique add-on pricing equilibrium. 
Firms earn, on average, 𝑤𝑞 from each consumer, and set base prices low enough that 
they dissipate add-on revenues; that is, they set 𝑝𝑏
∗ = 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 − 𝑤𝑞. Equilibrium 
profits are zero. 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 < 0 indicates that it is the all-inclusive strategy is 
associated with lower total cost and thus offers the best deal to consumers. In this case 
both firms choose that business strategy and compete a la Bertrand, setting 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐, 
sharing consumers evenly and earning zero profits each. In the knife-edge case in 
which both strategies have the same cost ( 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 = 0) both equilibria exist, as 
both strategies can offer the same deals to consumers. 
The conditions determining the market equilibrium differ crucially when the price 
floor constraint is binding, as the binding price floor breaks the relationship between 
deals available to consumers and costs. Together with the fact that the two strategies 
face different marginal costs, this means that the market equilibrium is determined not 
only by which business strategy can offer the best deal to consumers, but also by the 
costs that each firm incurs to serve the consumers it attracts. To give an example, the 
best deal that add-on pricing firm can offer to consumers is an expected total price 𝑓 +
𝑤𝑞, while facing a marginal cost 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞. This implies that an all-inclusive firm with 
marginal cost 𝑐 < 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 can offer a better deal to consumers, but face higher 
marginal costs if, at the same time, 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 < 𝑐. This results in equilibrium 
conditions that are overlapping for certain parameter values – for certain parameter 
regions both an all-inclusive and an add-on pricing equilibrium exist. 
To see the equilibrium outcome analytically, recall that the best deal an all-
inclusive firm can set is 𝑐, while the best deal an add-on firm can set is an expected 
total price 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞. In the add-on subgame both firms compete on base prices, charging 
𝑝𝑏
∗ = 𝑓 in equilibrium and sharing consumers. Equilibrium profits are Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 =
𝑓+𝑤𝑞−𝑐𝑏−𝑐𝑎𝑞
2
. In the all-inclusive subgame, firms compete on the all-inclusive price, 
charging 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐 and earning Π𝑖𝑛𝑐 = 0. 
In the asymmetric subgame, the add-on firm can serve all consumers by offering 
a better deal if 𝑐 > 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞. This results in profits Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 for the add-
on firm, as it serves all consumers at a total expected price slightly below 𝑐, and 
Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 0 for the all-inclusive firm. Since Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 > Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
, each firm is better off 
choosing the add-on pricing strategy when its rival chooses the add-on pricing 
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strategy. Thus, there exists an add-on pricing equilibrium if 𝑐 > 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞. This 
inequality is satisfied in the condition of part (ii-a) of Proposition 2.20  
The all-inclusive firm can serve all consumers by offering a better deal at the 
asymmetric subgame if 𝑐 < 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞. This results in profits Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐 for 
the all-inclusive firm, as it serves all consumers at a price slightly below 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞. The 
profits of the add-on firms are Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 0. Since Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = Π𝑖𝑛𝑐, a firm is indifferent 
between the two strategies if its rival follows the all-inclusive strategy. Thus, there 
exists an all-inclusive equilibrium if 𝑐 < 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞, as described in part (ii-b) of 
Proposition 2. However, this may not be the unique symmetric equilibrium. 
Comparison between Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 and Π𝑎𝑑𝑑  yields that Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 > Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 if  𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 >
𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐, meaning that an add-on pricing equilibrium exists when this inequality is 
true. This is exactly the condition in part (ii-a) of Proposition 2.  
Intuitively, the fact that an all-inclusive strategy may be able to offer a better deal 
to consumers is not sufficient to guarantee that an add-on pricing equilibrium does not 
exist. The add-on pricing equilibrium may still exist if the lower costs that a firm 
abandons by deviating to the all-inclusive strategy (that is, the difference between 𝑐 
and 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞) can more than offset the higher revenues that this firm can earn by 
serving all consumers. 
The coexistence of equilibria for certain parameter values raises the issue of 
equilibrium selection. Naturally, firms prefer to coordinate towards the add-on pricing 
equilibrium, as it yields positive profits (Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 =
𝑓+𝑤𝑞−𝑐𝑏−𝑐𝑎𝑞
2
), unlike the all-inclusive 
equilibrium which yields zero profits. 
As in the benchmark model, the equilibrium outcome does not change if pricing 
strategies and individual prices are chosen at a single stage. With a non-binding price 
floor, whether each equilibrium exists depends solely on which business strategy can 
offer the best deal to consumers. With a binding price floor, existence of an add-on 
pricing equilibrium depends not only on whether a rival firm can undercut by deviating 
to the all-inclusive strategy, but also on whether it abandons significant cost savings 
                                                          
20 If 𝑐 > 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 then the term 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 is positive when the price floor is binding. 
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in order to deviate to that strategy. Existence of an all-inclusive equilibrium depends 
solely on whether an add-on pricing firm can undercut its all-inclusive rival.  
 
2.3.2.1 Comparative statics 
Given a non-binding price floor, the equilibrium is determined solely by which 
business strategy features the lowest marginal costs. As such, higher marginal costs at 
the add-on pricing strategy (higher 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞) and lower marginal costs at the all-
inclusive strategy (lower 𝑐) facilitate the existence of an all-inclusive equilibrium and 
reduce the parameter space for which an add-on pricing equilibrium exists. 
Given a binding price floor, higher per customer revenues at the add-on pricing 
strategy (𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞) decrease the parameter space for which an add-on pricing 
equilibrium exists and increase the parameter space for which the all-inclusive 
equilibrium exists. Intuitively, this is because higher 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 increase the profits that 
any firms can earn by deviating to the all-inclusive strategy. Higher 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞, and 
lower 𝑐 work in the same direction as 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞, increasing the incentives of firms to 
deviate to the all-inclusive strategy. 
The role of the add-on component’s demand (𝑞) is critical in determining the 
market equilibrium. Given a non-binding price floor, a higher 𝑞 affects the equilibrium 
outcome only by increasing the marginal cost that an add-on firm faces from the 
production of the add-on component (higher 𝑐𝑎𝑞). Hence, higher 𝑞 reduces the 
parameter space for which an add-on pricing equilibrium exists and increases the 
parameter space for which an all-inclusive equilibrium exists.  
For a market with a binding price floor, increasing 𝑞 has two effects. First, it 
increases the add-on revenues that an add-on firm can earn from each customer it 
serves (higher 𝑤𝑞). Second, it increases add-on firms’ marginal costs (higher 𝑐𝑎𝑞). 
Since 𝑤 > 𝑐𝑎, increasing 𝑞 has a positive net effect on the add-on firms’ profits at an 
add-on pricing equilibrium is positive (to see this notice that Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 is increasing in 𝑞). 
However, higher 𝑞 also reduces the parameter space for which the add-on pricing 
equilibrium exists, as it increases the profits that a firm can enjoy by deviating to the 
all-inclusive strategy. This happens for two reasons. First, a higher 𝑞 increases total 
37 
 
expected prices at the add-on pricing equilibrium (higher 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞), as it increases the 
likelihood in which they purchase the add-on component. This permits the deviating 
firm to set a higher 𝑝𝐼 at the asymmetric subgame, thus increasing the profitability of 
a deviation to the all-inclusive strategy. Second, by increasing marginal costs at the 
add-on pricing strategy, a higher 𝑞 reduces the cost-saving that a firm abandons in 
order to deviate to the all-inclusive strategy. 
 
2.3.2.2 Welfare 
In a market with a non-binding price floor, the business strategy used in 
equilibrium is the one that maximises social and consumer surplus. This is intuitive, 
as firms play the business strategy that minimises costs in order to offer the best 
possible deal to consumers. The relationship between social and consumer surplus and 
market equilibrium is not as straightforward in markets with a binding price floor.  
The add-on pricing equilibrium, if it exists, always maximises social surplus. This 
is because the add-on pricing strategy requires strictly lower marginal costs than the 
all-inclusive strategy in order for firms to have no incentive to deviate. The all-
inclusive strategy, on the other hand, may characterise an equilibrium even if that 
business strategy features higher marginal costs than the add-on pricing strategy. To 
see this analytically, notice that the all-inclusive strategy features lower marginal costs 
if 𝑐 < 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞, but an all-inclusive equilibrium exists if 𝑐 < 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞. Since, by the 
binding price floor condition we have 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 > 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞, we can see that an all-
inclusive equilibrium exists despite being wasteful in terms of social welfare if 𝑐𝑏 +
𝑐𝑎𝑞 < 𝑐 < 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞. 
The all-inclusive equilibrium, whenever it exists, maximises consumer surplus. 
The intuition is straightforward: an all-inclusive equilibrium can only exist if the all-
inclusive strategy features the lowest possible prices. On the contrary, existence of an 
add-on pricing equilibrium does not imply that the add-on pricing strategy features the 
best deal to consumers. This is because an add-on pricing equilibrium may exist even 
if the all-inclusive strategy permits lower prices, as long as the cost savings associated 
with the add-on pricing strategy are large enough to mitigate deviation incentives.  
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2.4 The matching uncertainty model 
In this section we modify the benchmark model in order to study markets in which 
some consumers are uncertain about whether a certain product’s characteristics 
matches their taste. Consumers that purchase from an add-on pricing firm can learn 
about whether they are a good match by buying the base good, and purchase the add-
on only on the condition that good matching is revealed. 
This model specification is applicable to various markets with experience goods, 
and in particular to digital products. Examples include smartphone apps and software-
as-a-service (SaaS) products (e.g. Skype, Dropbox). Products in these categories often 
permit users to access some features for free, while charging them extra for 
functionality or cosmetic upgrades (such as the option to remove ads, improve the look 
of ones’ in-game avatar or permit calls to landlines). Consumers can get a taste of the 
product through the basic version, and can buy the upgrades if the basic version suits 
their needs.  
We show that the presence of consumers that are uninformed and uncertain about 
matching quality alongside consumers that are informed ex ante about matching 
quality can establish a profitable add-on pricing equilibrium by mitigating firms’ 
incentives to deviate to the all-inclusive strategy and undercut. We also show that this 
is the unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium that may arise in such a market; a 
pure strategy equilibrium in which both firms follow the all-inclusive strategy does 
not exist.  
 
2.4.1 Model structure 
As in the benchmark model, each firm 𝑖 operates under a business strategy 𝑅𝑖 ∈
{𝐼, 𝐴}. Strategy 𝐼 involves selling a good of quality 𝑣 in one piece, at an observable 
all-inclusive price 𝑝𝐼. Strategy 𝐴 involves separating the product in two parts; a base 
good of quality 𝑣 − 𝑤 > 0 at an advertised base price 𝑝𝑏 and an add-on component of 
quality 𝑤 at an unadvertised add-on price 𝑝𝑎. 𝑝𝑏 is assumed to be bound below by a 
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price floor 𝑓. We assume that both pricing strategies entail the same marginal cost, 
𝑐.21 To simplify modelling further, we also assume 𝑐 = 𝑓 = 0.22 
Consumers can purchase the add-on component only from the firm from which 
they purchased the base good and only after they purchase the base good. They can 
observe the 𝑝𝑎 of their firm of choice only after they purchase the base good from that 
firm. They have rational expectations regarding prices they cannot observe. Since add-
on prices are not advertised, add-on firms have no incentive to compete on add-on 
prices, so they always set 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑤. 
The intrinsic utility a consumer enjoys from a specific product depends on how 
closely that product matches her taste. A product perfectly matches a consumer’s taste 
with probability 𝑞 ∈ (0,1). If that is case the consumer enjoys the full utility that the 
product offers. If the product is a mismatch (probability 1 − 𝑞), the product yields zero 
utility to that consumer. We refer to 𝑞 as match quality. A consumer that buys from 
an add-on pricing firm buys the add-on component only if matching is correct. 
All consumers know the value of 𝑞. However, they differ on whether they know 
in advance whether a specific product matches their taste. A proportion 𝑠 ∈ (0,1) of 
consumers are informed ex ante about match qualities. An informed consumer buys 
from the cheapest firm if both firms’ products match her tastes (probability 𝑞2). If only 
one firm’s product matches her tastes (probability 𝑞(1 − 𝑞)) then she buys from that 
firm as long as she anticipates a total price below 𝑣. If no product matches her tastes 
(probability (1 − 𝑞)2) then she does not make a purchase. Since she is informed about 
                                                          
21 We do this for two reasons. First, assuming identical marginal costs avoids confounding any 
equilibrium effects arising from matching uncertainty with the effects of cost asymmetries that we 
studied in section 2.3. Second, the identical marginal cost assumption fits our primary example, digital 
experience goods, particularly well. Digital products typically have high fixed costs during the 
development stage, but almost zero costs for selling and distributing a copy to a buyer. It is, thus, 
unlikely that cost savings matter in a software firm’s choice between all-inclusive or add-on pricing.  
22 Assuming a price floor equal to marginal cost is reasonable when marginal costs are zero, as, for 
example, in the case of digital goods. Negative prices may be undesirable because they may attract a 
large proportion of consumers that purchase the product solely to enjoy the subsidy and ignore any add-
ons. 
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match quality before purchase, she always buys the add-on component if she purchases 
the base good. 
A proportion 1 − 𝑠 of consumers are uninformed about match qualities ex ante. 
An uninformed consumer that buys from an all-inclusive firm learns about the match 
quality only after she purchases the product. As such, her ex ante intrinsic valuation 
of the all-inclusive product is 𝑣𝑞. An uninformed consumer that buys from an add-on 
firm learns about the match quality after purchasing the base good. As such, her ex 
ante intrinsic valuation of the base good is (𝑣 − 𝑤)𝑞. She buys the add-on component 
only if the base good purchase reveals that the product is a good match (probability 
𝑞). If the product is a good match, then she also buys the add-on component at any 
𝑝𝑎 ≤ 𝑤. Since she buys the add-on component with probability 𝑞, her intrinsic 
valuation of the complete product ex ante is 𝑣𝑞. Since an uninformed consumer is 
unaware of match qualities in advance, she always buys from the cheapest firm. 
We assume that firms choose business strategies and prices at a single stage. 23 A 
firm that chooses strategy 𝐼 sets and posts an all-inclusive price, 𝑝𝐼. A firm that chooses 
strategy 𝐴 sets a price pair (𝑝𝑏, 𝑝𝑎) and posts its base price, 𝑝𝑏.  
After business strategies and prices are chosen, consumers observe the business 
strategies of each firm and all posted prices, form rational expectations about the price 
of the add-on components, if any, and choose from which firm to purchase. Consumers 
who purchased the base good from an add-on firm choose whether or not to buy the 
add-on component. 
As in the benchmark model, we look for symmetric pure strategy equilibria. We 
refer to a pure strategy equilibrium in which both firms follow the add-on pricing (all-
inclusive) strategy as an add-on pricing (all-inclusive) equilibrium. 
 
                                                          
23 Unlike in the models of the previous sections, we do not discuss the equilibrium of a 2-stage game 
in which firms first choose business strategies and then choose prices. This is because an equilibrium 
in which the two firms adopt different business strategies may not exist even in mixed strategies. While 
restrictive, the assumption of a setting is realistic in markets in which firms can costlessly switch 
between the two pricing strategies and notify consumers before purchase whether additional fees and 
charges apply.  
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2.4.2 Equilibrium analysis 
Differences in the match quality information that is available to consumers can 
diminish the firms’ price cutting incentive in two crucial ways. First, the presence of 
consumers that are matched with only one firm can make it profitable to set 
monopolistic prices and extract all the value from these consumers. In what follows 
we refer to these consumers as “captive consumers”. We refer to consumers that pick 
from the cheapest firm as “contestable consumers”.  
Second, due to uncertainty in match quality, uninformed consumers’ ex ante 
valuation of any product is less than the valuation of informed (and well-matched) 
consumers. This implies that in certain situations, serving uninformed consumers can 
require discrete price cuts, which may not be in any firm’s best interest to provide.  
Due to these two effects, firms’ equilibrium behaviour goes beyond simply 
offering the best possible deal. Proposition 3 presents our findings regarding the 
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3. (Pure strategy equilibrium in the matching uncertainty model). 
(i) Let 𝑣𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) >  𝑤 (𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑠𝑞2
2
+
(1−𝑠)𝑞
2
), so that the price floor 
constraint is not binding in the matching uncertainty model. Then a symmetric 
pure strategy price equilibrium does not exist. 
(ii) Let 𝑣𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) ≤  𝑤 (𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑠𝑞2
2
+
(1−𝑠)𝑞
2
), so that the price floor 
constraint is binding in the matching uncertainty model. Then there exists an 
add-on pricing equilibrium if 
1
1+𝑞
> 𝑠 >
1
3(1−𝑞)
. This is the unique symmetric 
equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Proof: In appendix A.  
 
Proposition 3 shows that an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist in absence 
of a binding price floor. The reason is the presence of captive consumers, and the logic 
of the result is as follows. As usual, prices which earn positive mark-ups cannot 
constitute a pure strategy equilibrium, as rivals can always profitably undercut. 
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However, prices that earn zero mark-ups cannot constitute a pure strategy equilibrium 
either. Regardless of whether firm 𝑖 chooses all-inclusive or add-on pricing, given a 
sufficiently low total expected price by firm 𝑖, firm 𝑗’s best response is not to undercut 
or match its rival’s price, but to set a total expected price such that captive consumers 
are indifferent between buying and not buying. That is, its best response is to set either 
𝑝𝑏 such that 𝑝𝑏 + 𝑤 = 𝑣 (following the add-on pricing strategy), or 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑣 (following 
the all-inclusive strategy), and serve only its captive consumers, earning 𝑣𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞). 
Since firms can always profitably deviate from any price pair, the non-binding price 
floor game exhibits price dispersion as in Varian (1980).24 
This price dispersion requires us to redefine the condition under which we 
consider the price floor constraint to be binding. It is meaningless to define a binding 
price floor condition simply as a relationship which, when satisfied, prevents add-on 
firms from competing down to zero profits (as we did in the cost-savings model). This 
is because a lower bound that prevents such price cutting arises endogenously, as the 
lowest price below which firms find it profitable to price as monopolists and exploit 
their captive consumers. Therefore, a meaningful binding price floor condition needs 
to prevent add-on firms from cutting prices below this endogenous lower bound. In 
particular, that condition needs to ensure that no firm has incentive to deviate to a 
monopolistic price if both firms choose the add-on pricing strategy and set base prices 
equal to the price floor. Put formally, we define a price floor 𝑓 = 0 as binding if it 
satisfies 
 𝑤 (𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑠𝑞2
2
+
(1 − 𝑠)𝑞
2
) ≥ 𝑣𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) (𝐵𝐹) 
(𝐵𝐹) is the binding price floor condition used in part (b) of Proposition 3 (and its 
reverse in part (a)). The left-hand side represents the profits of an add-on pricing firm 
that sets 𝑝𝑏 equal to the price floor when its rival does the same. In this case, that firm 
serves all its captive consumers and half the contestable consumers in the market, 
earning 𝑤 from each customer. The term 𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) represents the firms’ captive 
                                                          
24 Fully characterising a mixed-strategy equilibrium is challenging, as a firm can respond to a rival’s 
action not only by choosing a specific total expected price but also by choosing a different business 
strategy. The characterisation of such an equilibrium lies outside the scope this chapter. 
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informed consumers, that is, the informed consumers that are only matched with that 
firm. The term 𝑠𝑞2 represents the informed consumers that are matched with both 
firms. Of these, the firm serves half. Finally, the term (1 − 𝑠) represents the 
uninformed consumers in the market. The firm serves half of these consumers. The 
proportion 𝑞 of them buy the add-on, yielding profit 𝑤 to the firm. The right-hand side 
represents the profits that any firm can earn by exploiting its captive informed 
consumers, by setting either 𝑝𝑏 + 𝑤 = 𝑣 (if following the add-on pricing strategy), or 
𝑝𝐼 = 𝑣 (if following the all-inclusive strategy). 
Higher values of 𝑤 and lower values of 𝑣 increase the parameter space for which 
the binding price floor condition is satisfied. This is intuitive; larger 𝑤 increases the 
profits that a firm can earn from the sale of add-ons, while smaller 𝑣 reduces the 
monopolistic profits that a firm can enjoy by exploiting its captive consumers. 
By ensuring that a deviation to monopolistic prices is unprofitable, the binding 
price floor condition describes the behaviour of firms at an add-on pricing equilibrium, 
if one exists: firms set 𝑝𝑏 = 0, 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑤 and share the contestable consumers while 
serving the captive consumers. Standard undercutting arguments do not permit 
equilibria at higher 𝑝𝑏. Each firm, thus, earns Π
𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 𝑤 (𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑠𝑞2
2
+
(1−𝑠)𝑞
2
).  
However, while necessary for the existence of the add-on pricing equilibrium, the 
binding price floor condition cannot ensure that neither firm has an incentive to deviate 
to the all-inclusive strategy and undercut. Condition 
1
1+𝑞
> 𝑠 >
1
3(1−𝑞)
 guarantees that 
such deviations are also unprofitable.  
To get an intuition behind why undercutting is unprofitable if 
1
1+𝑞
> 𝑠 >
1
3(1−𝑞)
, 
first notice that, by setting an add-on price 𝑤, an add-on firm charges an expected total 
price 𝑤 to informed consumers (who always buy the add-on), and an expected total 
price 𝑤𝑞 to uninformed consumers (who buy the add-on with probability 𝑞). In other 
words, due to the voluntary nature of the add-on purchase, the add-on pricing strategy 
permits firms to price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers. By 
following the all-inclusive strategy, the deviating firm cannot price discriminate; it 
offers the same deal to both consumer types. As such, it can undercut in one of two 
ways. 
44 
 
The first way is by setting some 𝑝𝐼 slightly below 𝑤 and stealing all the informed 
contestable consumers. At this 𝑝𝐼, the deviating firm cannot attract any uninformed 
consumers, as these consumers are better off purchasing from the add-on firm, at an 
expected total price 𝑤𝑞. Hence, the deviating firm’s profit is approximately 
𝑤(𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) + 𝑠𝑞2). Comparison with 𝑤 (𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑠𝑞2
2
+
(1−𝑠)𝑞
2
) yields that the 
deviation is not profitable if 
1
1+𝑞
> 𝑠. Intuitively, the fact that the deviating firm serves 
only informed consumers makes this deviation unprofitable if the proportion of 
uninformed consumers is sufficiently large.   
The second way is by setting some 𝑝𝐼 slightly below 𝑤𝑞 and stealing all 
contestable consumers, earning approximately 𝑤𝑞(𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) + 𝑠𝑞2 + (1 − 𝑠)). 
Comparison with 𝑤 (𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑠𝑞2
2
+
(1−𝑠)𝑞
2
) yields that the deviation is 
unprofitable if 𝑠 >
1
3(1−𝑞)
. Intuitively, this is because by setting a price that attracts 
uninformed consumers (𝑤𝑞), the deviating firm makes a discrete cut in the price paid 
by informed consumers, who otherwise paid 𝑤. This discrete price cut makes the 
deviation unprofitable if the proportion of informed consumers is large enough. 
To see that a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist when either of these 
deviations is profitable, notice that a profitable deviation to an all-inclusive 
equilibrium implies that undercutting remains a best response to prices that yield 
positive mark-ups. Because of this, each firm’s optimal behaviour is similar to that 
described in the non-binding price floor case: firms have an incentive to undercut when 
prices are relatively high, and to deviate to monopolistic prices when prices are 
sufficiently low. 
 
2.4.2.1 Comparative statics 
Given a binding price floor, higher matching quality 𝑞 reduces the parameter space 
for which an add-on pricing equilibrium exists, as it increases the profits from both 
deviations.  
The profits of a deviating firm that aims to steal all the informed contestable 
consumers increase because higher 𝑞 increases the number of informed contestable 
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consumers that the deviating firm can serve (𝑠𝑞2) more than the number of contestable 
consumers that each firm serves at the add-on pricing equilibrium (
𝑠𝑞2
2
+
(1−𝑠)𝑞
2
). The 
profits of a deviating firm that aims to steal all contestable consumers increase because 
higher 𝑞 permits the deviating firm to undercut at a higher price (higher 𝑤𝑞). 
The binding price floor condition is more easily binding the larger the population 
of contestable consumers in the market (𝑠𝑞2 + (1 − 𝑠)𝑞), and the smaller the 
population of captive consumers in the market (𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞)). Whether a higher 
proportion of informed consumers (𝑠) increases or decreases the parameter space for 
which the binding price floor is binding depends on how 𝑠 affects contestable and 
captive consumer population. The binding price floor condition is more easily satisfied 
if the newly informed consumers are more likely to be contestable (probability 𝑞2) 
and less easily satisfied if the newly informed consumers are more likely to be captives 
(probability 𝑞(1 − 𝑞)). In a similar way, whether a higher match quality (𝑞) is 
conducive to a binding price floor constraint depends largely on whether or not the 
higher 𝑞 increases the population of captive consumers versus the population of 
contestable consumers. 
Note that equilibrium condition 𝑠 >
1
3(1−𝑞)
 implies that 𝑤 > 𝑣 − 𝑤 is necessary 
for the price floor to be binding. Put differently, the value of the add-on must be greater 
than the value of the base good. To see this, rearrange (𝐵𝐹) to 𝑤 > (𝑣 − 𝑤)
2𝑠𝑞(1−𝑞)
𝑠𝑞2+(1−𝑠)𝑞
 
and notice that the fraction in the right-hand side is greater than 1 when 𝑠 >
1
3(1−𝑞)
. 
This suggests that an add-on pricing equilibrium with rational consumers and 
matching uncertainty requires that the product’s functionality more than doubles after 
the purchase of the add-on. Dropbox is an example of a product that appears to have 
this feature; the basic (free) version offers 2 gigabytes of storage space, while paid 
version Dropbox Plus offers 1 terabyte of storage space and various additional 
services. To heavy users, 1 terabyte of storage space could be worth more than twice 
as much as the basic 2 gigabytes space. 
If add-on valuation differs across consumers then 𝑤 > (𝑣 − 𝑤)
2𝑠𝑞(1−𝑞)
𝑠𝑞2+(1−𝑠)𝑞
 only 
needs to hold on average. To see this, consider the following modification to the main 
model. Suppose that, among consumers that are correctly matched, the add-on has 
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intrinsic value 𝜔 for a proportion 𝛼 of consumers, and intrinsic value 0 for proportion 
1 − 𝛼. Suppose also that consumers and firms know the sizes of 𝛼 and 𝜔, but do not 
know in advance whether a consumer values the add-on or not. Then we can reinterpret 
𝑤 as the expected value of the add-on; that is, we can define 𝑤 as 𝑤 = 𝛼𝜔. Given 
monopoly power over the add-on, an add-on firm sets 𝑝𝑎 = 𝜔 and earns, on average, 
𝛼𝜔 from all its customers that are correctly matched. Applying 𝑤 = 𝛼𝜔 to (𝐵𝐹) and 
rearranging gives  
 𝛼𝜔 > (𝑣 − 𝛼𝜔)
2𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞)
𝑠𝑞2 + (1 − 𝑠)𝑞
 (𝐵𝐹′) 
(𝐵𝐹′) shows that a binding price floor requires that only the expected add-on 
value, 𝛼𝜔, is large enough. The price floor can be binding even if the add-on has no 
value for a proportion 1 − 𝛼 of the consumer population, as long as 𝜔 is sufficiently 
high for the rest of the consumers. To the extent that 𝜔 may have extremely large 
values for certain consumers, (𝐵𝐹′) makes our model consistent with evidence that 
the freemium business model relies on the presence of a few “whale” customers that 
spend large amounts of money on microtransactions.25 
 
2.4.2.2 Welfare 
Compared to a world in which firms cannot separate the base good from the add-
on component (and, thus, can only follow the all-inclusive strategy), the add-on pricing 
equilibrium strictly improves both firm profits and social surplus.  
The logic is as follows. If firms are constrained to playing the all-inclusive strategy 
(the all-integrated game), then the unique equilibrium is in mixed strategies.26 Each 
firms chooses a price randomly from a support [𝑣, 𝑣(1 − 𝑞)] if 𝑞 ≤
2𝑠−1
2𝑠
, or 
                                                          
25 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/appsblog/2011/jul/26/freemium-mobile-games-whales 
[accessed September 2018]. 
26 For a detailed analysis of the mixed-strategy equilibrium when both firms follow the all-inclusive 
strategy see section 2.3 in Armstrong (2015). In his model, match quality is denoted by 𝛼 and the 
population of informed consumers (which Armstrong refers to as “savvy”) is denoted by 𝜎. 
47 
 
[𝑣, 𝑣
1−𝑠+𝑠𝑞2
1−𝑠+𝑠𝑞
] ∪ [𝑣𝑞, 𝑣(1 − 𝑞)] otherwise. Intuitively, firms have an incentive to 
compete on 𝑝𝐼, but each individual firm has an incentive to set 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑣 and serve all its 
captive consumers if the rival’s price is too low. Since every price in the equilibrium 
distribution must yield the same expected profits, equilibrium firms profits are given 
by 𝑣𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞); the profits that each firm earns by setting 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑣 and serving only its 
captive consumers with probability 1. Since the price floor is binding at the add-on 
pricing equilibrium, it follows from condition (𝐵𝐹) that firm profits at the add-on 
pricing equilibrium are higher than 𝑣𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞). 
To see why social surplus is higher at the add-on pricing equilibrium, notice that 
the equilibrium price support at the all-integrated game includes prices that are above 
the uninformed consumers’ reservation value, 𝑣𝑞. In particular, if 𝑞 ≤
2𝑠−1
2𝑠
 the 
uninformed consumers are not served at any price in equilibrium, as 𝑣(1 − 𝑞) > 𝑣𝑞. 
Therefore, at a market with only integrated goods, uninformed consumers may be left 
unserved. In contrast, firms in the add-on pricing equilibrium always serve uninformed 
consumers. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter aims to provide a rational explanation to why firms may adopt add-
on pricing strategies in equilibrium when the adoption of add-on pricing constrains 
own firms’ ability to offer competitive deals. We highlight two distinct mechanisms 
that can play a role in competitive firms’ choice to unbundle base goods from add-ons. 
The first mechanism, relevant to a wide range of markets with physical add-on services 
(e.g. hotels, airlines) is that add-on pricing firms can save on costs if add-ons are not 
purchased. The second mechanism, particularly relevant to software markets, is that 
add-on pricing can permit firms to price discriminate between consumers that are 
informed about match quality and consumers that are uninformed. This type of price 
discrimination is not possible if firms bundle base goods and add-ons.  
We show conditions under which either mechanism, on its own, is sufficient to 
establish an add-on pricing equilibrium even when consumers are fully rational and 
add-on pricing limits price-cutting. In the cost-savings model we find that an add-on 
48 
 
pricing equilibrium emerges when the cost savings associated with the add-on pricing 
business strategy are sufficiently large. This holds even if the add-on pricing strategy 
is associated with a higher expected total price. In the matching uncertainty model, we 
find that an add-on pricing equilibrium emerges if the proportion of informed 
consumers is of moderate size and the add-on component is of sufficiently high value. 
For markets described by this model, add-on pricing is the unique equilibrium market 
outcome in pure strategies. 
By unveiling non-behavioural mechanisms that may be responsible for the 
adoption of add-on pricing strategies in various markets in which price cutting is 
constrained, our work is informative to regulators in two ways. First, it shows that the 
adoption of add-on pricing may not be a supply-side response to consumers’ 
behavioural biases. As such, demand-side market remedies that aim to improve 
consumers’ decision making (e.g. by disclosing features or nudging consumers) may 
be ineffective. Second, our work shows that add-on pricing may in fact improve social 
surplus if it is an equilibrium strategy in markets with rational consumers. Thus, 
steering firms away from this business practise may be harmful. 
In attempting to most clearly illustrate the role of cost savings and matching 
uncertainty, our models pay little attention to various other parameters that may be 
important in the firms’ choice to unbundle. For instance, by assuming that products 
are perfect substitutes we overlook the role that competition intensity may play. The 
answer appears not to be straightforward, as firms offer add-ons in both highly 
competitive (e.g. apps) and very differentiated (e.g. airlines) markets. Another aspect 
that our models overlook is the importance of intermediaries, which are often used for 
the sale of products with add-ons (e.g. apps are sold in Play Store and Apple Store; 
hotel rooms are sold via platforms like Booking.com). A richer model may be able to 
study how the presence of a binding price floor interacts with firms’ vertical 
agreements and provide conditions under which add-on pricing may arise.  
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2.6 Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Part (i): Non-binding price floor. 
Stage 2 
Suppose that 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐼 in stage 1. Then in stage 2 firms compete on the all-inclusive 
price, 𝑝𝐼. Standard Bertrand arguments suggest that the unique equilibrium in stage 2 
is characterised by 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐 and profits Π𝑖𝑛𝑐 = 0. 
Now suppose that 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 in stage 1. Then in stage 2 there exists a unique 
equilibrium in which both firms play 𝑝𝑏
∗ = 𝑐 − 𝑤𝑞 and each firm earns Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 0.  To 
see that 𝑝𝑏
∗  constitutes an equilibrium base price, notice that a firm that deviates to 
some 𝑝𝑏
′ > 𝑝𝑏
∗  serves no consumers, while a firm that deviates to some 𝑝𝑏
′ < 𝑝𝑏
∗  serves 
each consumer but makes losses. Thus 𝑝𝑏
∗  indeed characterises an equilibrium. 
Uniqueness follows from standard undercutting arguments. 
Next, suppose that 𝑅𝑖 = 𝐼 and 𝑅𝑗 = 𝐴 in stage 1. Then in stage 2 there exists a 
unique equilibrium in which the add-on firm sets 𝑝𝑏
∗  such that 𝑝𝑏
∗ + 𝑤𝑞 = 𝑐, and the 
all-inclusive firm sets 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐. At this equilibrium, each firm earns Π𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 0. To see 
that 𝑝𝑏
∗  and 𝑝𝐼
∗ characterise an equilibrium, notice that any firm that deviates to a higher 
price serves no consumers, while any firm that deviates to a lower price serves each 
consumer but makes losses. Uniqueness follows from standard undercutting 
arguments. 
 
Stage 1 
Since Π𝑖𝑛𝑐 = Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 = Π𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚, each firm is indifferent between the add-on pricing 
strategy and the all-inclusive strategy in stage 1. Therefore, both an add-on pricing 
equilibrium, and an all-inclusive equilibrium exist. 
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Part (ii): Binding price floor. 
Stage 2 
Suppose that 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐼 in stage 1.  Then in stage 2 firms compete on the all-inclusive 
price, 𝑝𝐼. Since the 𝑓 ≤ 𝑐, the price floor constraint is never binding. Therefore, 
standard Bertrand arguments suggest that a unique equilibrium in stage 2 is 
characterised by 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐 and profits Π𝑖𝑛𝑐 = 0. 
Now suppose that 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 in stage 1.  Then in stage 2 there exists a unique 
equilibrium in which both firms play 𝑝𝑏
∗ = 𝑓 and each firm earns Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 =
𝑓+𝑤𝑞−𝑐
2
.  To 
see that 𝑝𝑏
∗  constitutes an equilibrium base price, notice that a firm that deviates to 
some 𝑝𝑏
′ > 𝑝𝑏
∗  serves no consumers, while the price floor constraint does not allow 
firms to set any 𝑝𝑏
′ < 𝑝𝑏
∗ . Thus 𝑝𝑏
∗𝑏 indeed characterises an equilibrium. Uniqueness 
follows from standard undercutting arguments. 
Next, suppose that 𝑅𝑖 = 𝐼 and 𝑅𝑗 = 𝐴 in stage 1. Then in stage 2 there exists a 
unique equilibrium in which the add-on firms sets 𝑝𝑏
∗ = 𝑓, which corresponds to an 
expected total price 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞, and the all-inclusive firm sets some 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 − 𝜖, 
where 𝜖 is infinitesimal. Since 𝑝𝐼
∗ < 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞, the all-inclusive firm serves every 
consumer, earning Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐, while the add-on pricing firm serves no 
consumers and earns Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 0. Uniqueness follows from standard undercutting 
arguments. 
 
Stage 1 
Since Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 > Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 , each firm is better off choosing the strategy 𝐼 when its rival 
chooses strategy 𝐴. Therefore, an add-on pricing equilibrium does not exist. Since 
Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 , each firm is indifferent between strategies 𝐴 and 𝐼, when its rival 
chooses strategy 𝐼. Therefore, an all-inclusive equilibrium exists.∎ 
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Proof of Proposition 2. 
Part (i): Non-binding price floor. 
Stage 2 
Suppose that 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐼 in stage 1. Then in stage 2 each firm sets 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐 and earns 
profits Π𝑖𝑛𝑐 = 0. For proof see part (i), in the proof of Proposition 1 when 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐼. 
Now suppose that 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 in stage 1. Then in stage 2 each firm sets 𝑝𝑏
∗  such that 
𝑝𝑏
∗ + 𝑤𝑞 = 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 and earns profits Π
𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 0. For proof replace 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 with 𝑐 
and follow part (i) in the proof of Proposition 1 when 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴. 
Next, suppose that 𝑅𝑖 = 𝐼 and 𝑅𝑗 = 𝐴 in stage 1. Then in stage 2, if 𝑐 > 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 
there exists a unique equilibrium in which the all-inclusive firm sets 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐, and the 
add-on firm sets 𝑝𝑏
∗  such that 𝑝𝑏
∗ + 𝑤𝑞 = 𝑐 − 𝜖. At this equilibrium, the add-on pricing 
firm serves every consumer, earning profits Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 − 𝜖. The all-
inclusive firm does not serve any consumers, and, thus, earns Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 0. To see why 
the pair (𝑝𝐼
∗, 𝑝𝑏
∗) constitutes an equilibrium, notice that the all-inclusive firm has no 
incentive to deviate to any 𝑝𝐼
𝑑 ≠ 𝑝𝐼
∗, as at 𝑝𝐼
𝑑 > 𝑝𝐼
∗ the firm does not attract any 
customers, and at 𝑝𝐼
𝑑 < 𝑝𝐼
∗ the firms serves all consumers at a loss. The add-on pricing 
firm has no incentive to deviate to 𝑝𝑏
𝑑 = 𝑝𝐼
∗, as that results in profits 
𝑐−𝑐𝑏−𝑐𝑎𝑞
2
< Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
. 
It also has no incentive to deviate to 𝑝𝑏
𝑑 > 𝑝𝐼
∗, as that results in zero demand. Finally, 
it has no incentive to deviate to 𝑝𝑏
𝑑 < 𝑝𝑏
∗ , as that result only in a lower mark-up, with 
no effect on demand. Uniqueness follows from standard undercutting arguments. 
If 𝑐 < 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 there exists a unique equilibrium in which the add-on firm sets 𝑝𝑏
∗  
such that 𝑝𝑏
∗ + 𝑤𝑞 = 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞, and the all-inclusive firm sets 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 − 𝜖. At 
this equilibrium, the all-inclusive firm serves every consumer, earning profits 
Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 − 𝑐 − 𝜖. The add-on firm does not serve any consumers, and, thus, 
earns Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 0. The arguments as to why the pair (𝑝𝐼
∗, 𝑝𝑏
∗) constitutes an equilibrium 
are analogous to those for the case in which 𝑐 > 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞. Uniqueness follows from 
standard undercutting arguments. 
If 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 there exists a unique equilibrium in which the add-on firm sets 𝑝𝑏
∗  
such that 𝑝𝑏
∗ + 𝑤𝑞 = 𝑐, and the all-inclusive firm sets 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐. At this equilibrium, 
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each firm earns Π𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 0. To see that 𝑝𝑏
∗  and 𝑝𝐼
∗ characterise an equilibrium, notice 
that any firm that deviates to a higher price serves no consumers, while any firm that 
deviates to a lower price serves each consumer but makes losses. Uniqueness follows 
from standard undercutting arguments. 
 
Stage 1 
Suppose 𝑐 > 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞. Then, comparing Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 with Π𝑎𝑑𝑑  yields Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 .  
Therefore, an add-on pricing equilibrium exists. Comparing Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 with Π𝑖𝑛𝑐 yields 
Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 > Π𝑖𝑛𝑐. Therefore, an all-inclusive equilibrium does not exist. Thus if 𝑐 >
𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞  an add-on pricing equilibrium exists and is the unique symmetric subgame 
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Now suppose 𝑐 < 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞. Comparing Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 with Π𝑎𝑑𝑑  yields Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 > Π𝑎𝑑𝑑.  
Therefore, an add-on pricing equilibrium does not exist. Comparing Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 with Π𝑖𝑛𝑐 
yields Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = Π𝑖𝑛𝑐. Therefore, an all-inclusive equilibrium exists. Thus if 𝑐 > 𝑐𝑏 +
𝑐𝑎𝑞  an all-inclusive equilibrium exists and is the unique symmetric subgame perfect 
equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Finally, suppose 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞. In this case Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = Π𝑎𝑑𝑑  and Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = Π𝑖𝑛𝑐. 
Therefore, both an all-inclusive equilibrium and an add-on pricing equilibrium exist. 
 
Part (ii): Binding price floor. 
Stage 2 
Suppose that 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐼 in stage 1.  Then in stage 2 there exists a unique equilibrium 
in which each firm sets 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐 and earns profits Π𝑖𝑛𝑐 = 0. For proof see part (i), in 
the proof of Proposition 1 when 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐼. 
Now suppose that 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 in stage 1.  Then in stage 2 there exists a unique 
equilibrium in which both firms play 𝑝𝑏
∗ = 𝑓 and each firm earns Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 =
𝑓+𝑤𝑞−𝑐𝑏−𝑐𝑎𝑞
2
.  For proof replace 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑎𝑞 with 𝑐 and follow part (i) in the proof of 
Proposition 1 when 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴. 
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Next, suppose that 𝑅𝑖 = 𝐼 and 𝑅𝑗 = 𝐴 in stage 1. Then in stage 2, if 𝑐 > 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 
there exists a unique equilibrium in which the all-inclusive firm sets 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐, and the 
add-on firm sets 𝑝𝑏
∗  such that 𝑝𝑏
∗ + 𝑤𝑞 = 𝑐 − 𝜖. At this equilibrium, the add-on pricing 
firm serves every consumer, earning profits Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 − 𝜖. The all-
inclusive firm does not serve any consumers, and, thus, earns Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 0. To see why 
the pair (𝑝𝐼
∗, 𝑝𝑏
∗) constitutes an equilibrium, notice that the all-inclusive firm has no 
incentive to deviate to any 𝑝𝐼
𝑑 ≠ 𝑝𝐼
∗, as at 𝑝𝐼
𝑑 > 𝑝𝐼
∗ the firm does not attract any 
customers, and at 𝑝𝐼
𝑑 < 𝑝𝐼
∗ the firms serves all consumers at a loss. The add-on pricing 
firm has no incentive to deviate to 𝑝𝑏
𝑑 = 𝑝𝐼
∗, as that results in profits 
𝑐−𝑐𝑏−𝑐𝑎𝑞
2
< Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
. 
It also has no incentive to deviate to 𝑝𝑏
𝑑 > 𝑝𝐼
∗, as that results in zero demand. Finally, 
it has no incentive to deviate to 𝑝𝑏
𝑑 < 𝑝𝑏
∗ , as that result only in a lower mark-up, with 
no effect on demand. Uniqueness follows from standard undercutting arguments. 
If 𝑐 < 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞  there exists a unique equilibrium in which the add-on firm sets 
𝑝𝑏
∗ = 𝑓, which corresponds to an expected total price 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞, and the all-inclusive 
firm sets 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 − 𝜖. At this equilibrium, the all-inclusive firm serves every 
consumer, earning profits Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐 − 𝜖. The add-on firm does not serve 
any consumers, and, thus, earns Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 0. The arguments as to why the pair (𝑝𝐼
∗, 𝑝𝑏
∗) 
constitutes an equilibrium are analogous to those for the case in which 𝑐 > 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞. 
Uniqueness follows from standard undercutting arguments. 
If 𝑐 = 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 then in the unique equilibrium the add-on pricing firm sets 𝑝𝑏
∗ = 𝑓 
and the all-inclusive firm sets 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑐. Consumers are shared evenly. The add-on 
pricing firm earns Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 =
𝑓+𝑤𝑞−𝑐𝑏−𝑐𝑎𝑞
2
, while the all-inclusive firm earns  Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 =
0. To see why the pair (𝑝𝐼
∗, 𝑝𝑏
∗) constitutes an equilibrium, notice that the all-inclusive 
firm has no incentive to deviate to any 𝑝𝐼
𝑑 ≠ 𝑝𝐼
∗, as at 𝑝𝐼
𝑑 > 𝑝𝐼
∗ the firm does not attract 
any customers, and at 𝑝𝐼
𝑑 < 𝑝𝐼
∗ the firms serves all consumers at a loss. The add-on 
pricing firm has no incentive to deviate to 𝑝𝑏
𝑑 > 𝑝𝑏
∗ , as that results in zero demand, and 
the price floor does not permit a deviation at 𝑝𝑏
𝑑 < 𝑝𝑏
∗ . Uniqueness follows from 
standard undercutting arguments. 
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Stage 1 
Suppose 𝑐 > 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞. Then, comparing Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 with Π𝑎𝑑𝑑  yields Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 > Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
. 
Therefore, an add-on pricing equilibrium exists. Comparing Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 with Π𝑖𝑛𝑐 yields 
Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 > Π𝑖𝑛𝑐. Therefore, an all-inclusive equilibrium does not exist. Thus if 𝑐 > 𝑓 +
𝑤𝑞 an add-on pricing equilibrium exists and is the unique symmetric subgame perfect 
equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Now suppose 𝑐 < 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞. Comparing Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 with Π𝑎𝑑𝑑  yields Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 ≥ Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 if 
𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 ≥ 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐. Therefore, if 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 ≥ 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐 an add-on 
pricing equilibrium exists. If 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑞 < 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐 each firm prefer to choose 
strategy 𝐼 when its rival chooses strategy 𝐴; that is, an add-on pricing equilibrium does 
not exist. Comparing Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 with Π𝑖𝑛𝑐 yields Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 = Π𝑖𝑛𝑐. Therefore, if 𝑐 > 𝑓 +
𝑤𝑞 an all-inclusive equilibrium exists. 
Finally, suppose 𝑐 = 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞. Comparing Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 with Π𝑎𝑑𝑑  yields Π𝑎𝑑𝑑 >
Π𝐼
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
. Therefore, an add-on pricing equilibrium exists. Comparing Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
 with Π𝑖𝑛𝑐 
yields Π𝐴
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 > Π𝑖𝑛𝑐. Therefore, an all-inclusive equilibrium does not exist. Thus if 
𝑐 = 𝑓 + 𝑤𝑞 an add-on pricing equilibrium exists and is the unique symmetric 
subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. ∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Part (i): Non-binding price floor. 
Suppose that both firms choose strategy 𝐼 and set 𝑝𝐼 = 0, each earning zero 
profits. Then firm 𝑗 can increases its profits by choosing strategy 𝐼 and setting 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑣. 
At this price it sells to all its captive consumers, earning 𝑣𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞).  
Now suppose that both firms choose strategy 𝐴 and set 𝑝𝑏 = 0. At this price each 
firm earns Π𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 = 𝑤 (𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑠𝑞2
2
+
(1−𝑠)𝑞
2
). Then, again, firm 𝑗 can increases 
its profits by choosing strategy 𝐼 and setting 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑣. At this price it sells to all its 
captive consumers, earning 𝑣𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞). By the condition in part (i), this deviation is 
always profitable. 
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Standard undercutting arguments suggest that any 𝑝𝐼 > 0 and any 𝑝𝑏 > 0 is not 
an equilibrium, as a rival can undercut and steal all contestable consumers. Therefore, 
a symmetric pure strategy price equilibrium does not exist. 
 
Part (ii): Binding price floor. 
Suppose that both firms choose strategy 𝐴 and set 𝑝𝑏 = 0. At this price each firm 
earns profits Π𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 = 𝑤 (𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑠𝑞2
2
+
(1−𝑠)𝑞
2
). The price floor constraint does 
not allow any firm to set 𝑝𝑏 < 0. We, therefore, are left with two possible deviations: 
(a) A deviation in which firm 𝑗 chooses strategy 𝐼 and undercuts at a price that steals 
all informed consumers. The highest price that achieves this is some 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑤 − 𝜖. 
At this price, the deviating firm earns, approximately, 𝑤(𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) + 𝑠𝑞2). 
Comparison with Πfloor yields that the deviation is not profitable if 
1
1+𝑞
> 𝑠. 
(b) A deviation in which firm 𝑗 chooses strategy 𝐼 and undercuts at a price that steal 
all consumers. The highest price that achieves this is some 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑤𝑞 − 𝜖. At this 
price, the deviating firm earns, approximately, 𝑤𝑞(𝑠𝑞(1 − 𝑞) + 𝑠𝑞2 + 1 − 𝑠). 
Comparison with Πfloor yields that the deviation is not profitable if 𝑠 >
1
3(1−𝑞)
. 
Therefore, if 
1
1+𝑞
> 𝑠 >
1
3(1−𝑞)
 there exists an add-on pricing equilibrium. 
Uniqueness follows from part (i) of this proof.∎ 
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Chapter 3 
Paying for Unwanted Add-ons in a 
Market with Endogenous Product 
Differentiation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Credit card users forget payments and incur late payment charges. Mobile phone 
users accidentally incur roaming charges and experience bill-shock. Insurance buyers 
are surprised by unexpected excesses. Receivers of free trials pay unanticipated 
monthly charges for unwanted membership plans. What these examples show is that 
consumers often make mistakes and face unexpected costs. Some of these costs are 
the result of unforeseen contingencies. Others arise due to consumers’ limited 
memory, their insufficient attention to product details, or other behavioural biases 
(Grubb, 2015a). 
While some consumers are careful, others fail to avoid mistakes. Firms adjust their 
business strategies to take advantage of this. For example, firms may offer back-loaded 
contracts (e.g. DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Grubb, 2015b), draw consumers’ 
attention to the product’s best attributes (Bordalo et al., 2016), shroud certain price 
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components (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006) and invest in the development of more 
innovative traps (Heidhues et al., 2016). 
In this chapter we show that the firms’ incentives to profitably exploit consumer 
mistakes may also affect their choice of horizontal product differentiation.27  
Commonly, a firm’s choice of product differentiation is determined by two forces: (i) 
the incentive to soften competition by offering a more differentiated product (the price 
effect), and (ii) the incentive to capture more consumers from rivals by offering a less 
differentiated product (the demand effect). We explore how the presence of naïve 
consumers interacts with these forces. 
In order to more simply capture the problem of firms exploiting consumer 
mistakes, we model a market in which products feature a salient upfront price and a 
fee that is associated with the purchase of an “unwanted” add-on service. Such an 
unwanted add-on may be a roaming service used by accident, or an unconscious 
enrolment to a costly membership plan. Viewed more broadly, the cost of an unwanted 
add-on may represent the late payment cost incurred by a forgetful credit card user, or 
the unexpectedly limited coverage of an insurance plan. “Sophisticated” consumers 
avoid making mistakes and only pay the upfront price, while “naïve” consumers 
accidentally purchase the unwanted add-ons. 
Standard competition arguments suggest that firms cannot profit from selling add-
ons to naïve consumers. The prospect of high future revenues incentivises firms to 
compete more fiercely, lowering upfront prices possibly below marginal cost and 
dissipating profits from the add-on fees.28 However, this stronger competitive pressure 
may not always succeed at competing away all revenues from add-on fees. Constraints 
may be limiting the extent to which firms can compete on upfront prices, allowing 
firms to retain some excess profits. To capture the idea that competition does not 
                                                          
27 Horizontal differentiation may be real or spurious (Spiegler, 2006; Tremblay and Polasky, 2002). We 
model it in a traditional way, as a choice of product characteristics over which consumers have 
heterogeneous preferences. 
28 Gabaix and Laibson (2006) contains such a profit irrelevance result regarding unanticipated valuable 
add-ons. A similar dissipation argument appears in models where firms have monopoly power over an 
aftermarket due to switching costs (see, for example, Lal and Matutes, 1994; Shapiro, 1995). 
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always erode exploitation profits completely, we assume that upfront prices are bound 
below by a price floor.29  
In real markets, a price floor may arise if price cutting attracts a disproportionate 
amount of unprofitable consumers (Ellison, 2005). For example, setting upfront prices 
below zero may attract a large proportion of sophisticated types that avoid any 
additional prices (Heidhues et al., 2017). The presence of a zero price floor is hinted 
by the zero annual fees in numerous consumer credit card products (DellaVigna and 
Malmendier, 2004) and the free-if-in-credit business model for personal current 
accounts (Armstrong and Vickers, 2012). For products with aftermarket services, a 
price floor may be established by the consumers’ ability to buy multiple units of the 
base good (Miao, 2010; Michel, 2017). Price floors may also arise due to market 
regulations (below-cost pricing may be viewed as prohibited predatory behaviour; 
regulation in the mutual funds industry may rule out “signing bonuses”, as modelled 
in Heidhues et al. (2017)), due to consumers’ perception of high upfront prices as a 
signal for quality (Wolinsky, 1983), or if consumers are suspicious of extremely low 
prices, expecting a trap. 
We model firms’ endogenous choice of horizontal differentiation as a choice of 
locations on a Hotelling line. The degree of horizontal differentiation is crucial to 
whether firms can enjoy any excess profits. Firms face two conflicting incentives 
regarding their location choice: (i) locate far apart to soften competition and enjoy 
higher prices, or (ii) locate close together to capture more consumers from rivals, while 
retaining some profits from the add-on fees through the price floor. Our model shows 
the conditions that influence the balance of these forces. 
In contrast with traditional Hotelling models (Hotelling, 1929; d’Aspremont et al., 
1979; Neven, 1985) in which fixed prices lead to minimum differentiation and variable 
prices lead to maximum differentiation, we show that the firms’ ability to exploit 
consumer mistakes may establish a maximum or a minimum-differentiation 
equilibrium, depending on market parameters. Firms may be better off at the 
                                                          
29 See sections 2.2 and 2.3 in Heidhues and Koszegi (2018) for a review of articles in which price floors 
matter. 
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maximum-differentiation equilibrium despite dissipating all revenues from add-on 
fees. 
The impact of consumer exploitation on product differentiation raises particular 
issues for consumer protection policy. The ex-ante degree of product differentiation, 
as well as the possibility that firms respond to interventions by choosing different 
product locations influence the effectiveness of conventional regulatory policies (e.g. 
informing consumers about the existence of costly add-ons, putting a cap on add-on 
fees). 
Our model contributes to the growing literature in Behavioural Industrial 
Organisation (Heidhues and Koszegi, 2018; Grubb, 2015a) by investigating how the 
presence of behavioural consumers may affect firms’ choice of product differentiation. 
In that our work is most closely related to Schultz (2004), who reveals that a more 
opaque price strengthens the competition softening effect of product differentiation, 
incentivising firms to offer more differentiated products. We, instead, show that a 
combination of a transparent and an opaque price component can induce firms to 
compete over product locations, resulting in less differentiated products. 
To better distinguish the effect of consumer exploitation on equilibrium product 
differentiation, we abstract away from other issues that may arise when consumers 
incur unexpected fees. In assuming unit demands we exclude the possibility that the 
subsidised upfront prices may result in excessive consumption of the primary service 
(Heidhues and Koszegi, 2010; 2015). We develop a model in which sophisticated 
consumers can costlessly avoid any unexpected fees. However, avoidance may require 
pecuniary or effort costs, or an inefficient altering of consumption decisions (Gabaix 
and Laibson, 2006; Grubb, 2015b). In modelling an exogenous proportion of naïve 
consumers, we abstract away from the question whether firms (Gabaix and Laibson, 
2006; Heidhues et al. 2017; Wenzel, 2014) or intermediaries (Murooka, 2015) have 
an incentive to educate such consumers. 
Our model shows that consumer exploitation can have a knock-on effect on 
product differentiation, which may be beneficial to welfare. Other knock-on effects 
may not be as benign. Michel (2018), Gamp and Krahmer (2018) and Heidhues et al. 
(2017) reveal that the possibility to exploit naïve consumers can establish markets with 
products of inefficiently low quality. Heidhues et al. (2016) show that profitable 
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exploitation can incentivise firms to invest towards more exploitative contracts, taking 
resources away from value-enhancing R&D. 
We contribute to the academic discussion regarding whether the presence of 
sophisticated consumers benefits (e.g. Varian, 1980; Armstrong and Chen, 2009; 
Heidhues and Koszegi, 2017) or harms (e.g. Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Armstrong 
and Vickers, 2012) naïve consumers. In particular, our model exhibits what Armstrong 
(2015) dubs a “rip-off externality”: the add-on expenses of naïve consumers cross-
subsidise the spending of sophisticated types. Going further, we show that, given 
endogenous product differentiation, the harm to naïve consumers may go beyond the 
first-order effect of the cross-subsidisation. The presence of a sufficiently large 
proportion of sophisticated consumers may establish a maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium, resulting in disproportionately higher upfront prices. Viewed the other 
way around, naïve types may benefit sophisticates not only directly, through funding 
lower upfront prices, but also indirectly, by facilitating a minimum-differentiation 
equilibrium. 
Finally, our model warns of previously understudied supply-side responses that 
may undermine the effectiveness of conventional regulatory policies, or even lead to 
more adverse market outcomes. In studying unintended effects of regulatory 
interventions, Grubb (2015b) warns that bill-shock regulation can harm social welfare 
when firms offer multiple contracts to discriminate between low- and high-demand 
consumers. This is because bill-shock regulation forces firms to introduce quantity 
distortions in order to discriminate. Armstrong et al. (2009) show that price controls 
dampen consumers’ incentives to become informed, which may lead to higher prices. 
Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) demonstrate that firms may cancel out the beneficial 
effects of disclosure policies by increasing their obfuscation efforts. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 sets up our model. 
Section 3.3 presents our equilibrium analysis. In section 3.3.1 we characterise the price 
equilibrium for fixed symmetric locations. In section 3.3.2 we characterise the location 
stage given equilibrium prices. In Section 3.4 we study welfare and policy 
implications. Section 3.5 concludes.  
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3.2 Model 
Consider two firms located at 𝑙1, 𝑙2 on a Hotelling line between 0 and 1, and, 
without loss of generality, let 𝑙1 ≤ 𝑙2. Each firm produces a homogenous good of 
utility 𝑣 at cost 𝑐, 𝑐 < 𝑣. Assume that 𝑣 is large enough that the market is always fully 
covered. 
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] and have mass 1. Each 
consumer has unit demand, and may visit and purchase from at most one firm. For a 
consumer located at 𝜒 ∈ [0,1], visiting and purchasing from firm 𝑖 entails a distance 
cost 𝑡(𝜒 − 𝑙𝑖)
2. 
Purchasing product 𝑖 entails two price components: an upfront price 𝑓𝑖 ∈ [𝑓,+∞), 
where  𝑓 < 𝑐 represents an exogenous price floor, and an exogenous add-on fee ?̿?. 
Purchase of product 𝑖 requires payment of both prices, unless the add-on fee is 
avoided. Avoidance is costless.30 Consumers have different types depending on 
whether they are aware of the add-on fee. Sophisticated consumers (proportion 𝑞 ∈
[0,1]) are aware the add-on fee and costlessly avoid it. Naïve consumers (proportion 
1 − 𝑞) are unaware before making a purchase choice and pay ?̿? upon purchase.31 Both 
types are uniformly distributed on the line. 
                                                          
30 Costly avoidance is associated with a welfare loss (e.g. Gabaix and Laibson, 2006) whose study is 
not central to our model. A positive but relatively small avoidance cost ?̅? does not alter our results 
qualitatively, as long as it satisfies ?̅? ≤ ?̿?(1 − 𝑞). Chapter 4 studies a model in which an avoidance cost 
exists and is high enough to violate this inequality.  
31 The add-on fee represents a contingent charge that consumers may incur by mistake (e.g. by entering 
an unauthorised overdraft). In this case ?̿? represents the maximum charge permitted by the regulator. 
Our model assumes that such charges are only incurred accidentally, so firms have no incentive to set 
a charge below ?̿?. In a more dynamic setting, the add-on fee could represent a periodic charge for having 
access to a service after the trial period. In a world in which consumers are paying for such service 
primarily by accident, ?̿? represents the price above which naïve consumers become aware of the 
recurring expenses and avoid any further payments. Finally, the add-on fee may represent the money 
that disengaged back-book customers leave on the table by not switching to a different product. In that 
case, ?̿? represents the price below which back-book customers remain disengaged.  
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The timing is as follows. In stage 1 firms simultaneously choose locations on the 
line. In stage 2 firm simultaneously set upfront prices. Consumers observe firm 
locations and upfront prices, form expectations about whether add-on fees apply, and 
choose from which firm to purchase. We solve the game using backward induction 
looking for symmetric equilibria. 
 
3.3 Equilibrium analysis 
3.3.1 Equilibrium price structure for fixed symmetric locations 
We first analyse the Nash equilibrium in prices for any given symmetric location 
pair (𝑙1, 𝑙2). With full coverage, each firms’ demand is determined by the position of 
the consumer who is indifferent between buying from firm 𝑖 versus buying from firm 
𝑗. The add-on fees do not affect consumers’ purchase decision, as sophisticated types 
avoid them while naïve types ignore them. Hence, the location of the indifferent 
consumer is given by 𝑥, which satisfies 𝑓1 + 𝑡(𝑥 − 𝑙1)
2 = 𝑓2 + 𝑡(𝑥 − 𝑙2)
2. Solving 
for 𝑥 gives that 𝑥 =
𝑙1+𝑙2
2
−
𝑓1−𝑓2
2𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)
. At any symmetric pure strategy price equilibrium 
each firm serves at least some consumers, so the indifferent consumer in located 
between 0 and 1. Hence, for prices around an equilibrium upfront price 𝑓∗, 𝑥 
represents the demand of firm 1 and 1 − 𝑥 represents the demand of firm 2.  
The add-on fees are only paid by the naïve types. Thus, firm 1’s maximisation 
problem is max
𝑓1
Π1  𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑓1 ≥ 𝑓, where Π1 = (𝑓1 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐)𝑥. Similarly, firm 
2’s maximisation problem is max
𝑓2
Π2  𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑓2 ≥ 𝑓, where Π2 = (𝑓2 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) −
𝑐)(1 − 𝑥). Profit maximisation yields the following best response functions: 
𝑓1
𝐵𝑅 = max(
𝑡(𝑙1 + 𝑙2)(𝑙2 − 𝑙1) + 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) + 𝑓2
2
, 𝑓) 
𝑓2
𝐵𝑅 = max(
𝑡(2 − 𝑙1 − 𝑙2)(𝑙2 − 𝑙1) + 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) + 𝑓1
2
, 𝑓) 
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The slope of the best response functions guarantees that there exists a unique and 
stable32 price equilibrium for each location pair. Depending on firm locations, this 
equilibrium may be characterised by a binding price floor constraint for none, one, or 
both firms, as best response functions are kinked at 𝑓. To gain better intuition we focus 
on the equilibrium outcome when firm locations are symmetric.33  
 
3.3.1.1 Prices 
Proposition 1 presents the price equilibrium for symmetric locations (𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2). 
Subscripts in 𝑓∗, 𝑎∗denote the range of 𝑙2 for which these variables characterise a pure 
strategy price equilibrium. For example, if 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 the pure strategy price equilibrium 
is characterised by 𝑓𝐻
∗, 𝑎𝐻
∗ , and Π𝐻
∗ . 
 
Proposition 1. (Price equilibria for symmetric fixed locations). Let 𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2. 
(a) For 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 = [
1
2
+
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
2𝑡
, 1] there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium 
with 𝑓𝐻
∗ = 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) and Π𝐻
∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
2
. 
(b) For 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 = [
1
2
,
1
2
+
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
2𝑡
) there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium 
with 𝑓𝐿
∗ = 𝑓 and Π𝐿
∗ =
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
2
. 
Proof: In appendix B. 
 
Proposition 1 reveals how product differentiation, traditionally represented by 
𝑡(𝑙2 − 𝑙1) in Hotelling models, affects price structure when a proportion of naïve 
                                                          
32 Each best response function has slope 𝑟𝑖 =
1
2
 at the unconstrained part and 𝑟𝑖 = 0 at the constrained 
part, satisfying the stability condition |𝑟𝑖| < 1 (Dixit, 1986). 
33 An analysis of the pricing stage for general locations is required for the derivation of Proposition 2 
in section 3.3.2. For details see Appendix B. 
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consumers does not anticipate paying add-on fees. To better comprehend the effect of 
product differentiation, it is useful to decompose it into two distinct elements: inherent 
differentiability, denoted by 𝑡, and the degree to which firms exploit the inherent 
differentiability, denoted by interfirm distance 𝑙2 − 𝑙1. For ease in exposition we make 
use of the symmetry in firm locations and indicate interfirm distance by 𝑙2, with high 
(low) 𝑙2 representing large (small) interfirm distance. 
With no incentive to lower add-on fees, firms can only compete on upfront prices. 
Proposition 1 reveals that the relationship between equilibrium upfront prices and 
interfirm distance is not smooth. For 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 equilibrium upfront prices become 
smaller as firms locate closer together, since competition is more intense with lower 
interfirm distance. This is in accordance with the predictions of the standard 
endogenous prices Hotelling model (d’Aspremont et al., 1979; Neven, 1985). For 𝑙2 ∈
𝑙2
𝐿 the relationship between equilibrium upfront prices and interfirm distance breaks 
down, as the price floor constraint does not permit upfront prices to be competed below 
𝑓.  
The extent to which changes in interfirm distance correspond to different price 
structures depends crucially on the relative size of 𝑓, 𝑐, ?̿?, 𝑞 and 𝑡. 
Representing the price floor, higher 𝑓 increases the parameter space for which the 
price floor constraint (𝑓𝑖 ≥ 𝑓) is binding. As such, it increases the parameter space for 
which 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 and reduces the parameter space for which 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻. A higher maximum 
add-on fee (?̿?) and a lower proportion of sophisticated types (𝑞) also increase the 
parameter space for which the price floor constraint is binding, leading to a larger 𝑙2
𝐿 
and a smaller 𝑙2
𝐻. To get an intuition recall that firms use revenues from add-on fees to 
subsidise upfront prices.34 This implies the price floor constraint is more likely to be 
binding with higher ?̿? and lower 𝑞, as the former increases the add-on fees that they 
earn from every naïve customer, and the latter increases the proportion of naïve types 
in the market.  
                                                          
34 Subsidisation of upfront prices is common in problems with second-period prices (Shapiro, 1995; 
Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). The extent of the subsidisation in the context of our model is discussed 
further below.    
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A higher marginal cost (𝑐) reduces the parameter space for which the price floor 
is binding, as it increases equilibrium upfront prices for any given location pair. This 
results in a smaller 𝑙2
𝐿 and a larger 𝑙2
𝐻. The effect of inherent differentiability (𝑡) on 
price structure moves in the same direction as the effect of 𝑐. Intuitively, higher 𝑡 
increases the extent to which higher interfirm distance affects upfront prices. As a 
result, it increases the parameter space for which the price floor is slack.  
 
3.3.1.2 Profits 
It is an established result in competitive markets that firms enjoy higher profits the 
more differentiated the products are. This does not necessarily apply in markets with 
naïve consumer types and unexpected add-on fees. While large increases in product 
differentiation increase industry profits, small increases may not. This result follows 
directly from Proposition 1, and is described in Corollary 1. 
 
Corollary 1. (Equilibrium profits and interfirm distance) 
(a) Π𝐻
∗  is increasing in 𝑙2. Π𝐿
∗  is independent of 𝑙2. 
(b) Firms prefer symmetric locations with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 over symmetric locations with 
𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿. 
Proof: In appendix B. 
 
Markets shares are not affected by symmetric increases in interfirm distance. As 
such, any change in profits arises from changes in equilibrium upfront prices. Part (a) 
states that equilibrium profits increase with small increases in interfirm distance only 
if interfirm distance is originally high enough that the price floor constraint is slack. 
When the price floor constraint is binding (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿) firms cannot translate higher 
interfirm distance into higher equilibrium profits, as upfront prices are fixed.  
Part (b) of Corollary 1 states that, given changes in product differentiation large 
enough to change the equilibrium market structure, firms prefer high over low product 
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differentiation. This follows from part (a). To see why, first compare Π𝐻
∗  and Π𝐿
∗ , and 
see that Π𝐻
∗ > Π𝐿
∗  for any 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻. Given that Π𝐻
∗  is increasing in 𝑙2, while Π𝐿
∗ is 
independent of 𝑙2, we can conclude that equilibrium profits are higher when 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻.  
A crucial problem in markets with naïve consumers and add-on fees is 
understanding the extent to which firms enjoy extra profits from such fees; in other 
words, the extent to which revenues from such fees subsidise lower upfront prices. To 
better approach this question it is useful to derive the profits that firms would enjoy 
when naïve consumers are absent – the sophisticated-consumers benchmark. We 
define the benchmark as the result of each firm solving the unconstrained 
maximisation problem max
𝑓𝑖
(𝑓𝑖 − 𝑐) (
1
2
−
𝑓𝑖−𝑓
∗
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
).35 Maximisation yields 
equilibrium profits at the sophisticated-consumers benchmark Π𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ
∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
2
.  
The extent to which firms enjoy profits beyond the sophisticated-consumers 
benchmark depends largely on how differentiated the products are. Firms fully erode 
fee revenues when product differentiation is relatively high (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻), as illustrated by 
the fact that 𝑓𝐻
∗ is reduced by ?̿?(1 − 𝑞). 36 Full subsidisation of upfront prices is 
possible due to the price floor constraint being slack even when subsidy ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) is 
taken into account. The complete erosion of fee revenues results in equilibrium profits 
that are identical to those in the sophisticated-consumers benchmark.37  
In contrast, subsidisation is only partial for relatively low product differentiation 
(𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿), as the price floor constraint does not permit upfront prices to be subsidised 
                                                          
35 This is the profit maximisation problem in the standard Hotelling model with variable prices and 
quadratic distance costs. 
36 In this case fee revenues are conceptually equivalent to a reduction in marginal costs by ?̿?(1 − 𝑞). 
In our model the pass-through rate to such implicit cost reduction is 1. For more general settings that 
host downward-sloping demands and variable marginal costs, pass-through rate depends on demand 
and supply elasticities. For a general treatment of cost pass-through, see Weyl and Fabinger (2013). 
For an application of cost pass-through analysis to markets with hidden fees, see Agarwal et al. 
(2014). 
37 Note that, due to the subsidisation, the equilibrium upfront price may even be below marginal cost. 
This is consistent with the loss leader business model that characterises various markets with add-on 
services (e.g. retail financial products). For an early model of loss-leaders see Lal and Matutes (1994). 
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below 𝑐. As a result, for given locations, firm profits are higher than those in the 
sophisticated-consumers benchmark. To see this compare Π𝐿
∗  with Π𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ
∗  and see that 
Π𝐿
∗ > Π𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ
∗  for 𝑙2 <
1
2
+
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
2𝑡
; that is, for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the result of Corollary 1, depicting how profits of firm 2 
change with the degree of product differentiation.38 Profits of firm 1 follow by 
symmetry. To ensure existence of location pairs that satisfy 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 and existence of 
location pairs that satisfy 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻, figure 3.1 assumes 𝑡 > 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐. The solid 
line represents the profit functions described in Proposition 1. Profits are strictly 
increasing in 𝑙2 for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 and constant for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿. Furthermore, profits for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 
are higher than profits for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿. The dotted line represents profits at the 
sophisticated-consumers benchmark, strictly increasing in 𝑙2 regardless of interfirm 
distance. The vertical distance between the solid and the dotted line represents the 
additional surplus that firm 2 enjoys due to retained add-on revenues – the add-on 
revenues that remain after subsidisation of upfront prices has been exhausted by the 
binding price floor constraint. 
 
3.3.1.3 Consumer effects 
Being the only type that pays the add-on fee, naïve consumers do not enjoy the 
full extent of the subsidy on upfront prices. Sophisticated consumers also benefit from 
the lower upfront prices, as firms cannot offer a discount solely to naïve types. As a 
result, naïve types pay more for the same product in equilibrium. In particular, for 𝑙2 ∈
𝑙2
𝐻 naïve types pay total price 𝑝𝑛
𝐻 = 𝑐 + ?̿?𝑞 + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1), while sophisticated types 
pay only 𝑝𝑠
𝐻 = 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1). For 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 naïve types pay total price 
𝑝𝑛
𝐿 = 𝑓 + ?̿?, while sophisticated types pay only 𝑝𝑠
𝐿 = 𝑓. This creates a distribution 
issue, which can be particularly worrying if naïve consumer behaviour is associated 
with vulnerable consumers (Financial Conduct Authority, 2015). 
                                                          
38 Note the similarities between this figure and figure 4.1 of chapter 4. In the latter firms have an 
incentive to compete on add-on fees for certain values of 𝑙2, resulting in a more complicated 
relationship between profits and interfirm distance.  
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Figure 3.1: Profit and marginal relocation incentives of firm 2 for symmetric 
locations with 𝒕 > 𝒇 + ?̿?(𝟏 − 𝒒) − 𝒄. 
Profits and marginal relocation incentives of firm 1 follow by symmetry. The solid line represents 
profits of firm 2 for symmetric locations with given 𝑙2. The dotted line represents profits of firm 2 at 
the sophisticated-consumers benchmark. The vertical distance between the solid and the dotted line 
represents the additional surplus that firm 2 enjoys due to retained add-on revenues. Given endogenous 
locations, arrows depict marginal relocation incentives of firm 2 for each given symmetric location pair. 
An inward-pointing arrow means that firm 2 prefers to offer more a homogeneous product; an outward-
pointing arrow means that firm 2 prefers to further differentiate its product. Marginal relocation 
incentives converge towards the equilibria described in Proposition 2. 
 
While sophisticates always benefit from the presence of naïve types, the extent of 
the cross-subsidisation they enjoy depends on interfirm distance. To see how, we 
define the benefit that sophisticated types get from the cross-subsidisation as 𝑏𝑠 =
𝑝𝑠
𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ − 𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑞
, where 𝑝𝑠
𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ represents the total price that the average sophisticated 
consumer would pay at the sophisticated-consumers benchmark, and 𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑞 ∈ {𝑝𝑠
𝐿 , 𝑝𝑠
𝐻}, 
with 𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑞 = 𝑝𝑠
𝐿 if 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 and 𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑞 = 𝑝𝑠
𝐻 if 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻. Substituting 𝑝𝑠
𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ and 𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑞
 and 
simplifying yields 𝑏𝑠 = ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) if 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 and  𝑏𝑠 = 𝑐 − 𝑓 + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) if 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿. 
Comparing the two shows that 𝑐 − 𝑓 + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) lies below ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) for all 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿, 
indicating that sophisticated types enjoy a larger proportion of the naïve consumers’ 
add-on expense when product differentiation is relatively large. This is intuitive, as 
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part of the add-on expense is appropriated by the firms due to the binding price floor 
constraint when 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿.  
It is worth noting that reducing the proportion of naïve types in the market does 
not necessarily make sophisticated types worse off. If interfirm distance is such that 
the price floor constraint is binding (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿), marginally increasing 𝑞 has no effect on 
the equilibrium upfront price. As such, it has no effect on the extent of the cross-
subsidisation that sophisticated types enjoy. However, higher 𝑞 reduces the parameter 
range for which the price floor is binding in the first place, as 𝑙2
𝐿 falls with 𝑞. For 𝑙2 ∈
𝑙2
𝐻 cross-subsidisation falls with 𝑞, as firms do not retain any extra revenue from the 
naïve types’ add-on expense. 
Figure 3.2 depicts how the benefit to the average sophisticated consumer from the 
presence of naïve types depends on interfirm distance. The difference between 𝑝𝑠
𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 
and 𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑞
 represents the extent of the cross-subsidisation. The vertical distance between 
𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑞
 and the dotted line represents the additional cross-subsidisation that the average 
sophisticated consumer would enjoy if the price floor constraint was slack. A higher 
proportion of sophisticated types has two effects: (i) it reduces the range 𝑙2
𝐿, as it 
reduces the parameter space for which the price floor is binding, and (ii) shifts the 
upward-sloping part of 𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑞
 upwards. The second effect indicates that cross-
subsidisation falls with higher 𝑞 when the price floor constraint is slack. 
Note that, despite the lower cross-subsidisation, the average sophisticated 
consumer pays less at a market with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿, as the more intense competition results 
in lower upfront prices. The relationship between interfirm distance and the surplus of 
sophisticated (and naïve) consumers is studied in detail in section 3.4. 
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Figure 3.2: Cross-subsidisation of prices paid by the average sophisticated 
consumer for given symmetric locations. 
The vertical distance between 𝑝𝑠
𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ and 𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑞
 indicates the benefit that the average sophisticated 
consumer receives from the cross-subsidisation for any given 𝑙2. The vertical distance between 𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑞
 and 
the dotted line represents the additional cross-subsidisation that the average sophisticated consumer 
would enjoy if the price floor constraint was slack. A higher proportion of sophisticated types (𝑞) has 
two effects: (i) it reduces the range 𝑙2
𝐿, as it reduces the parameter space for which the price floor is 
binding, and (ii) shifts the upward-sloping part of 𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑞
 upwards. The second effect indicates that benefit 
to the average sophisticated consumer falls with higher 𝑞 when the price floor constraint is slack. 
 
3.3.2 Endogenous locations 
Corollary 1 established that firms prefer high over low product differentiation. 
Going further, it implies that firms’ profits are the highest with maximum product 
differentiation. This, however, does not necessarily suggest that firms choose 
maximum product differentiation in equilibrium when locations are endogenous, as 
unilateral deviations may be profitable. 
Each firm’s unilateral choice of whether to deviate from a given location primarily 
depends on two incentives. The first is the incentive to soften competition by offering 
a differentiated product – the price effect. The second is the incentive to capture a 
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larger market share by offering a product that is a close substitute to the rival’s – the 
demand effect. The relative strength of these effects determines whether, for given 
locations, firms prefer to relocate slightly closer to or slightly further apart from their 
rivals. A well-known result in the standard Hotelling model with variable prices and 
quadratic distance costs (d’Aspremont et al., 1979; Neven, 1985) is that the price 
effect dominates the demand effect for any given location pair, establishing a unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium with maximum differentiation. This is not always the 
case in our model, as a price effect may or may not be present depending on whether 
the price floor constraint binds. 
The marginal relocation incentives that arise from the interplay between the price 
and the demand effect are not sufficient to determine the location pairs in equilibrium, 
as they do not take into account the profitability of large deviations. For instance, if 
firm 2 is located at, say, 𝑙2 = 1, it may not have an incentive to deviate to a location 
close to 1, but it may have an incentive to deviate to a location next to its rival. 
Taking into account both local and large deviation incentives yields two subgame 
perfect equilibria. They are presented in Proposition 2. Notation max and min indicates 
the equilibrium that each variable characterises. 
 
Proposition 2. (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria). Let 𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2. 
(a) If 
𝑡
2
≥ 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐 there exists a symmetric maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium with (𝑙1
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑎𝑥) = (0,1), (𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥) = (𝑐 + 𝑡 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞), ?̿?) 
and Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
𝑡
2
.  
(b) If 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐 ≥
25𝑡
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 there exists a symmetric minimum-differentiation 
equilibrium with (𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛) = (
1
2
,
1
2
),(𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛) = (𝑓, ?̿?) and Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
2
. 
(c) No other symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium exists.  
Proof: In appendix B. 
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Proposition 2 reveals that in a market in which sophisticated types can avoid add-
on fees costlessly, consumer naïvete results in two distinct equilibria – one in which 
firms offer maximally differentiated products, and one in which firms offer products 
that are perfect substitutes. To get an intuition behind our model’s divergence from 
the classic result of d’Aspremont et al. (1979) and Neven (1985), notice that in the 
traditional Hotelling model with endogenous prices and quadratic distance costs, the 
relative strength of the price and the demand effect changes smoothly as firms locate 
further apart, since profit functions are continuous and differentiable with respect to 
locations for any (𝑙𝑖, 𝑙𝑗). The price effect dominates regardless of interfirm distance, 
establishing a unique maximum-differentiation equilibrium. In contrast, profit 
functions in our model are kinked, as equilibrium price structure changes depending 
on interfirm distance. As a result, marginal relocation incentives can differ drastically 
depending on firm locations. 
To see why marginal relocation incentives can point towards location pair (0,1), 
recall from Proposition 1 that equilibrium upfront prices are increasing in interfirm 
distance for symmetric location pairs with relatively large interfirm distance (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻). 
Thus, a price effect is present. In particular, the price effect dominates the demand 
effect, so firms prefer to locate further apart. Intuitively, for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 firms behave as 
in a standard variable-prices Hotelling model with quadratic distance costs and 
marginal costs equal to 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞). Firms’ incentive to locate further apart is 
exhausted when interfirm distance is maximised – at location pair (0,1). 
For an intuition behind why firms may prefer to locate at location pair (
1
2
,
1
2
), recall 
from Proposition 1 that symmetric location pairs with relatively small interfirm 
distance (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿) result in equilibrium upfront prices equal to the price floor. Since 
upfront prices are fixed, a price effect does not arise. As a result, each firm’s marginal 
relocation incentive is dominated by the demand effect as in the classic fixed-price 
Hotelling model. Thus for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 each firm prefers to increase its turf by locating 
closer to its rival. Firms’ incentive to locate closer together is exhausted when 
interfirm distance is minimised – for location pair (
1
2
,
1
2
). 
Figure 3.1, introduced to illustrate how equilibrium profits of firm 2 change with 
interfirm distance, can be used to depict marginal relocation incentives. For 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿, 
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firm 2 prefers to locate closer to its rival; this is indicated by an inward-pointing arrow. 
For 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻, it prefers to differentiate its product further; this is indicated by an 
outward-pointing arrow. Marginal relocation incentives of firm 1 follow by symmetry. 
Marginal relocation incentives point towards the symmetric location pairs from 
which firms have no incentive to deviate locally. However, they are not informative 
regarding the profitability of large deviations. The condition in part (a) of Proposition 
2 guarantees that a deviation in which firm 𝑖 locates close to its rival and earns on 
average 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐 from each consumer in the market yields profits that are 
lower than Π𝑚𝑎𝑥. Other large deviations yield even lower profits. This establishes a 
maximum-differentiation equilibrium. Similarly, condition in part (b) of Proposition 
2 ensures that a firm which deviates to any location away from the centre of the line 
in order to enjoy less intense competition cannot earn more than Π𝑚𝑖𝑛. This establishes 
a minimum-differentiation equilibrium. 
Shifts in the models’ parameters can be crucial to the establishment or 
disestablishment of a certain subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, as they may affect 
whether conditions (a) or (b) of Proposition 2 are violated. Higher values of the price 
floor (𝑓) and the maximum add-on fee (?̿?) increase the parameter space for which 
condition (b) is satisfied, so they facilitate the existence of the minimum-
differentiation equilibrium. Intuitively, this is because they increase the add-on 
revenues that firms retain when the price floor constraint is binding. The same is true 
for lower marginal costs (𝑐) and a lower proportion of sophisticated types (𝑞). Higher 
inherent product differentiability (𝑡) opposes the establishment of a minimum-
differentiation equilibrium, as it increases the extent to which a firm can make use of 
higher product differentiation in order to soften competition. In that way, higher 𝑡 
increases the profits that a firm enjoys by deviating to its end of the line. 
Parameter shifts facilitate or inhibit the existence of a maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium in a similar way. Higher 𝑡 increases equilibrium profits, as it permits firms 
to earn more from the maximum interfirm distance. As such, it increases the parameter 
range for which a maximum-differentiation equilibrium exists – the parameter range 
for which condition (b) in satisfied. Higher 𝑓, ?̿?, and lower 𝑐, 𝑞 oppose the 
establishment of such an equilibrium. This is because they work to increase the profits 
that a firm can earn by deviating to a location next to its rival. 
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It is worth noting that the two equilibria coexist for 
𝑡
2
≥ 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐 ≥
25
72
𝑡. 
This raises the issue of equilibrium selection. We have already established, through 
Corollary 1, that firm profits are higher when interfirm distance is large. Then it 
follows that the maximum-differentiation equilibrium is preferred by firms in terms of 
Pareto dominance when both equilibria exist. A minimum-differentiation equilibrium 
is inferior despite firms earning more than in the sophisticated-consumers benchmark. 
However, it is not obvious that firms would find it easy to coordinate towards a 
maximum-differentiation equilibrium. The prospect of such coordination appears less 
likely when one considers possible costs associated with differentiating one’s product 
(Grossman and Shapiro, 1984). 
Going beyond the issue of equilibrium selection when the two multiple equilibria 
arise, it is worth highlighting the market parameters that establish the most favourable 
outcome for firms. We focus our attention on the two parameters that are the central 
to the academic and legislative discussion on markets with add-on fees: the size of the 
add-on fees (?̿?) and the proportion of sophisticated consumers in the market (𝑞).39 
Taken together, these parameters characterise the average add-on revenue per 
consumer that each firm earns, ?̿?(1 − 𝑞). Conventional wisdom suggests that firms 
prefer higher over lower ?̿?(1 − 𝑞). Figure 3.3 shows that this is not always the case. 
Figure 3.3 plots profits at the maximum-differentiation and the minimum-
differentiation equilibrium for different values of ?̿?(1 − 𝑞). The dashed line represents 
Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 for the values of ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) for which the minimum-differentiation equilibrium 
exists. The solid line represents Π𝑚𝑎𝑥. Note that Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 is increasing in ?̿?(1 − 𝑞), as a 
higher ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) allows firms to enjoy higher add-on revenues without subsidising 
lower upfront prices. Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 is independent of ?̿?(1 − 𝑞), as subsidisation takes place. 
However, Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 is greater than Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 for certain parameter values. Hence, whether 
firms prefer higher ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) depends on whether the higher ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) establishes a 
minimum-differentiation equilibrium, and whether that equilibrium features profits 
above Π𝑚𝑎𝑥. Values of ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) such that ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) ≥ 𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑓 establish the best 
outcome for firms as this condition guarantees the existence of a minimum-
                                                          
39 We are discussing the desirability of market policies that affect these two parameters in detail in the 
following section. 
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differentiation equilibrium with Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 > Π𝑚𝑎𝑥. When that condition takes places, 
firms strictly prefer to earn higher average add-on revenue per consumer. If condition 
?̿?(1 − 𝑞) ≥ 𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑓 cannot be satisfied (perhaps due to existing legislation) then 
firms are better off with ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) low enough to establish a maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium, as they can benefit more from the associated higher upfront prices. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Firm profits for given add-on revenues. 
The solid line represents profits at the maximum-differentiation equilibrium (Π𝑚𝑎𝑥), for all values of 
?̿?(1 − 𝑞) for which this equilibrium exists. The dashed line represents profits at the minimum-
differentiation equilibrium (Π𝑚𝑖𝑛), for all values of ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) for which this equilibrium exists. Π𝑚𝑖𝑛  is 
increasing in ?̿?(1 − 𝑞), as a higher ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) allows firms to enjoy higher add-on revenues without 
subsidising lower upfront prices. Π𝑚𝑎𝑥  is independent of ?̿?(1 − 𝑞), as subsidisation takes place. 
However, Π𝑚𝑎𝑥  is greater than Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 for any ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) below 𝑡 + 𝑐 − 𝑓.   
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3.4 Welfare and policy implications  
Markets in which consumers underestimate future costs often face regulatory 
scrutiny, as firms have an incentive to exploit consumer biases. The 2009 Credit Card 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act in the United States is 
recent example of a regulation aimed at protecting consumers. Among other 
interventions, it permits firms to charge overlimit fees only if consumers explicitly opt 
in to such service, and introduces a $25 limit on late fees. In our framework, the first 
intervention would describe an increase in the proportion of sophisticated types, 𝑞. 
The second intervention would be interpreted as a reduction in the maximum fees that 
consumers may pay in any scenario, ?̿?. In this section we explore the extent to which 
similar policies can be used to improve market outcomes in the context of our model.40  
In particular, we study the effect of similar policies on the welfare of the average 
consumer, as well as on the welfare of naïve and sophisticated types separately. With 
consumers distributed on a Hotelling line and full market coverage, consumer welfare 
depends on the prices that the average consumer pays, as well as on the travel costs 
she incurs to purchase from her firm of choice. However, average travel costs are 
always maximised in our model, as the two equilibria are characterised by either 
maximum or minimum product differentiation. As such we ignore this dimension 
when studying changes in consumer surplus. The fact that average travel costs are 
maximised in every equilibrium also implies that the two equilibria are identical in 
terms of total surplus, and that conventional regulatory policies cannot improve market 
outcomes with respect to that standard. Hence, studying how regulatory policies can 
affect total surplus lies outside the scope of our work.41 
Since average travel costs do not play a role in our model, we study consumer 
welfare by focusing on the effect of market policies on the total price paid by the 
average consumer, the total price paid by each sophisticated type, and the total price 
paid by each naïve type. For a market at the maximum-differentiation equilibrium, 
                                                          
40 See Fletcher (2016) for a review on the effectiveness of various types of market remedies. 
41 Analysis of how market remedies can affect average travel costs takes place in Chapter 4, as the 
model studied there features an equilibrium with intermediate product differentiation. 
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average total price is given by 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥(1 − 𝑞) = 𝑐 + 𝑡. Similarly, for a 
market at the minimum-differentiation equilibrium, average total price is given by 
𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛(1 − 𝑞) = 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞). Sophisticated consumers pay only the 
upfront price. As such, the total price paid by the average sophisticated consumer is 
given by 𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑐 + 𝑡 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) at the maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium and by 𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓 at the minimum-differentiation equilibrium. 
Naïve types pay both price components. Hence, the total price paid by the average 
naïve consumer is given by 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑐 + 𝑡 + ?̿?𝑞 at the maximum-
differentiation equilibrium, and by 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓 + ?̿? at the minimum-
differentiation equilibrium. 
We investigate the effectiveness of two well-known categories of policies. The 
first category is disclosure policies that aim to educate consumers about the relevance 
of add-on fees. In our model, this results in a higher proportion of sophisticated types 
(𝑞) in the market. For example, a market remedy that requires banks to send text alerts 
to consumers that are about to go into unarranged overdraft falls in this category. The 
second category is price control policies – policies that impose a cap on the add-on 
fees that naïve consumers pay. In our model this is translated as a reduction in ?̿?. Such 
a policy would, for example, place a limit on the fees that consumers can accumulate 
by being late on their credit card debt payments. 
In order to explore the effectiveness of each policy in detail, we separately study 
how that policy affects the average consumers, naïve consumers, and sophisticated 
consumers. When discussing disclosure policies, we borrow the terminology of 
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and refer to naïve consumers that become sophisticated 
after the policy takes place as “informed naïve consumers”. Accordingly, consumers 
that remain naïve are referred to as “uninformed naïve consumers”. We refer to 
consumers that were sophisticated before the policy takes place simply as 
“sophisticated consumers”. 
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3.4.1 Policies that maintain the market equilibrium 
We first discuss the desirability of policies that do not introduce a shift in the 
market equilibrium. As a first order effect, a disclosure policy (higher 𝑞) reduces the 
proportion of consumers that pay add-on fees in equilibrium. This strictly improves 
the welfare of the informed naïve consumers in both equilibria, since 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 
and 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 > 𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛.  
The same does not necessarily apply to sophisticated consumers or uninformed 
naïve consumers. For a market in a maximum-differentiation equilibrium, both 
sophisticated consumers and uninformed naïve consumers become worse off with 
higher 𝑞, as the resulting lower add-on revenues reduce the subsidisation on upfront 
prices. To see this notice that 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 are increasing in 𝑞. For a market in the 
minimum-differentiation equilibrium, sophisticated consumers and uninformed naïve 
consumers are unaffected by a disclosure policy (𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛 are independent of 
𝑞). This is because the subsidisation of upfront prices is exhausted by the binding price 
floor, so any reduction in add-on revenues only results in lower firm profits.  
The impact of a disclosure policy on the welfare of the average consumer depends 
crucially on whether firms have an incentive respond to the policy by passing the 
reduction of add-on revenues back to consumers through setting higher upfront prices. 
Such supply-side response takes place in the maximum-differentiation equilibrium, as 
equilibrium upfront prices lie above the price floor. As a result, a higher 𝑞 does not 
affect the average total price (𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 is independent of 𝑞). Thus, any benefit to the 
educated consumers is funded by the higher prices that are paid by other consumers. 
In the minimum-differentiation equilibrium, firms have no incentive to respond to the 
policy by increasing upfront prices, as upfront prices are artificially high due to the 
binding price floor constraint. As a result, increasing 𝑞 lowers the add-on revenues 
that firms retain in equilibrium. Thus, any benefit to the educated consumers is funded 
by lowering firms’ profits. 
A policy that lowers ?̿? has the direct effect of lowering the add-on fees that naïve 
consumers pay in both equilibria. As a result, naïve consumers benefit by paying a 
lower total price (𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 are increasing in ?̿?). However, the benefit they enjoy is 
not the same for each equilibrium; it depends on whether firms respond to the lower 
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add-on fees by reducing the subsidy on upfront prices. This response takes place at the 
maximum-differentiation equilibrium, as the price floor constraint is not binding. The 
resulting decrease in the subsidy reduces the benefit to naïve consumers. However the 
benefit is not fully negated, as the loss due to the higher upfront prices is shared evenly 
across consumers. As a result, lowering ?̿?  decreases 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 by a factor 𝑞. In contrast, 
naïve consumers fully enjoy the benefit of a lower ?̿? in a minimum-differentiation 
equilibrium, as firms have no incentive to respond to the policy by increasing upfront 
prices above the binding price floor. As such, 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 decreases by a factor 1. 
A reduction in ?̿? affects total prices paid by sophisticated consumers only through 
the subsidy on upfront prices. In the maximum-differentiation equilibrium a lower ?̿? 
increases the price sophisticated types are paying (𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 is decreasing in ?̿?), as it 
reduces the subsidy on upfront prices. In the minimum-differentiation equilibrium 
firms have no incentive to increase prices above the price floor. As such, decreasing 
?̿? has no effect on the price paid by sophisticates (𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛 in independent of ?̿?). 
The impact of a decrease in ?̿? on the welfare of the average consumer again 
depends crucially on whether firms increase upfront prices in response. In the 
maximum-differentiation equilibrium the total price paid by the average consumer 
does not change, as firms increase upfront prices enough to compensate. Thus, the 
benefit the naïve types receive by the lower add-on fees is funded by the higher upfront 
prices that each consumer pays. In the minimum-differentiation equilibrium firms 
have no incentive to respond by increasing upfront prices. As a result, lowering ?̿? 
results in lower retained add-on revenues. Thus, the benefit to the naïve types is funded 
by the decrease in firm profits. 
 
3.4.2 Policies that shift the market equilibrium 
We now consider policies extensive enough to shift the market equilibrium. As 
with policies that marginally affect market parameter, a policy that shifts a market 
equilibrium may benefit some consumers to the detriment of others. Proposition 3 
collects our findings regarding such equilibrium-shifting market policies.  
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Proposition 3. (Price controls and disclosure policies) 
(i) For a market at a maximum-differentiation equilibrium, policies that decrease ?̿? 
and increase 𝑞 have only marginal effects. 
(ii) Consider a market at a minimum-differentiation equilibrium with 𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑑 
sophisticated types, and a disclosure policy that results in 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤 sophisticated 
types and establishes a maximum-differentiation equilibrium, where 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤 >
𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑑. The disclosure policy: 
(a) Benefits the average consumer if 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑑) > 𝑐 + 𝑡 
(b) Harms sophisticated consumers 
(c) Harms uninformed naïve consumers  
(d) Benefits informed naïve consumers if 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤 satisfies 𝑓 + ?̿? > 𝑐 + 𝑡 −
?̿?(1 − 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤) 
(iii) Consider a market at a minimum-differentiation equilibrium with add-on fees 
?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑, and a price control policy that results in add-on fees equal to ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤 and 
establishes a maximum-differentiation equilibrium, where ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤 < ?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑. The 
price control policy: 
(a) Benefits the average consumer if 𝑓 + ?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑(1 − 𝑞) > 𝑐 + 𝑡 
(b) Harms sophisticated consumers 
(c) Benefits naïve consumers if ?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑 and ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤 satisfy 𝑓 + ?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑 > 𝑐 + 𝑡 + ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑞 
Proof: In appendix B. 
 
For an intuition behind part (i) of Proposition 3, notice that conventional 
disclosure and price control policies can only lead to a new market equilibrium if the 
market is originally at a minimum-differentiation equilibrium. This is because, as we 
showed in Proposition 2, lower ?̿? and higher 𝑞 both facilitate the existence of a 
maximum-differentiation equilibrium and inhibit the existence of a minimum-
differentiation equilibrium.  
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3.4.2.1 Effect on the average consumer 
Given that higher equilibrium profits only arise from a higher average total price, 
the question whether a shift to the maximum-differentiation equilibrium benefits the 
average consumer is answered in Figure 3.3. A shift to the maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium leads to lower firm profits only if the pre-intervention market parameters 
satisfy ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) ≥ 𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑓, as in that case, total average prices at a minimum-
differentiation equilibrium are higher than prices with maximum product 
differentiation. Conditions in parts (ii-a) and (iii-a) rearrange condition ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) ≥
𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑓 to more clearly compare the total average pre-intervention price (given 
minimum product differentiation) with the total average post-intervention price (given 
maximum product differentiation).  
 
3.4.2.2 Effect on naïve and sophisticated consumers 
A policy that shifts the market equilibrium does not affect naïve and sophisticated 
types in the same way. Furthermore, whether each types is made better off depends on 
whether the shift to a maximum-differentiation equilibrium is the result of a disclosure 
or a price control policy. Since sophisticated consumers avoid any add-on fees, 
disclosure policies and price controls provide no benefit to them. In fact, sophisticated 
consumers are harmed by a shift to the maximum-differentiation equilibrium, as that 
equilibrium features higher upfront prices than the minimum-differentiation 
equilibrium. A disclosure policy that establishes a maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium makes uninformed naïve consumers worse off, as it results in higher 
upfront prices, while leaving add-on prices unaffected. Whether informed naïve 
consumers become better off depends on whether the benefit from avoiding add-on 
fees outweighs the loss from paying higher upfront prices. Intuitively, the higher the 
𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤, the lower is the benefit to the informed naïves. This is because a smaller number 
of uninformed naïve types in the market results in lower add-on revenues, and by 
extension, smaller subsidies on upfront prices. A price control policy that establishes 
a maximum-differentiation equilibrium improves the position of the average naïve 
consumer if the reduction in the add-on fees that she pays can make up for the higher 
upfront prices associated with the maximum-differentiation equilibrium.  
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Taken together with the findings of section 3.4.1, Proposition 3 shows that a 
change in product locations as a supply-side response can drastically affect the 
effectiveness of a policy intervention, as it can undo any benefits to consumers or even 
result in further harm. In particular, a regulator that takes such a supply-side response 
into account may find that policies that have a large effect on market parameters may 
be less beneficial than policies that have a small effect on market parameters. For 
example, given a market at the minimum-differentiation equilibrium, a decrease in 
add-on fees benefits naïve consumers and has no effect on the prices paid by 
sophisticated consumers if the decrease is small enough that the market remains at the 
minimum-differentiation equilibrium. However, decreasing add-on fees enough to 
shift the market to the maximum-differentiation equilibrium harms sophisticated 
consumers and may even harm naïve consumers, due to the associated higher upfront 
prices.  
Overall, in agreement with past literature, Proposition 3 shows that standard 
regulatory policies will create winners and losers. Thus, a regulator needs to look 
beyond the impact on the welfare of the average consumer and pay attention to how a 
policy distributes surplus between naïve and sophisticated types.  
Going beyond the different impact on naïve and sophisticated types, designing 
policies solely aimed to benefit the average consumer is not without issues. Parts (ii-
a) and (iii-a) of Proposition 3 state that interventions which shift the market to a 
maximum-differentiation equilibrium may be beneficial. The maximum-
differentiation equilibrium is, however, not the best outcome for the average 
consumer. As long as post-intervention parameters satisfy ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) < 𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑓, a 
market policy that results in a minimum-differentiation equilibrium makes her better 
off. This is because the minimum-differentiation equilibrium with such parameters 
features lower total average prices compared to the maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium. To see this, notice that Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 is below Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 in Figure 3.3 for all 
?̿?(1 − 𝑞) < 𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑓. 
Note that shifting the market from a maximum-differentiation to a minimum-
differentiation equilibrium requires a rather unconventional policy. This is because a 
minimum-differentiation is established when the proportion of sophisticated 
consumers (𝑞) is relatively small, and the add-on fees (?̿?) are relatively high. Such an 
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unconventional policy could, for instance, permit firms to present various contingency 
charges using smaller fonts, reducing the attention that consumers may pay to them. 
It could also increase the cap on such charges, permitting firms to earn more from 
naïve types.  
Finally, viewing Figure 3.3 from the perspective of the average consumer also 
reveals that standard measures of market performance, such as supra-competitive 
profits, may not be revealing of the markets in which the average consumer is harmed 
the most. A seemingly competitive market – one in which products are perfect 
substitutes – may be considered problematic if firms earn supra-competitive profits by 
retaining add-on revenue. However, this is the best outcome for consumers if market 
parameters satisfy ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) < 𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑓. In contrast, a market in which firms offer 
maximally differentiated products and earn profits that are analogous to the degree of 
product differentiation may be considered to be performing well, despite consumers 
getting a worse deal compared to a market with perfect substitutes and supra-
competitive profits. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
When consumers make mistakes, firms may adjust choice variables in order to 
exploit them. This chapter studies how the possibility of profitably exploiting 
consumer mistakes impacts such a choice variable – horizontal product differentiation.  
We show that the degree of product differentiation critically influences price 
structure and the size of extra profits that firms can retain from naïve consumers that 
accidentally buy unwanted add-ons. High differentiation yields high prices, but results 
in full dissipation of add-on revenues, while low differentiation permits retention of 
some extra profits, but results in lower upfront prices. This more complex relationship 
between product differentiation and profitability can incentivise firms to offer less 
differentiated products and may, under certain conditions, establish a minimum-
differentiation equilibrium. While firms at the minimum-differentiation equilibrium 
profit from the naïve consumers’ add-on expenditure, they may earn less compared to 
a market populated solely by sophisticated types. 
84 
 
We show that exploiting naïve consumer may have a silver lining, as the resulting 
competition on product locations may outweigh consumer harm from unanticipated 
prices.  Market policies can harm consumers if they weaken firms’ incentives to 
compete on product locations. The overall effectiveness of interventions depends on 
the pre-intervention market equilibrium, as well as on whether interventions can shift 
the market to a different equilibrium. 
Being one of the first to address the importance of product differentiation when 
analysing markets with naïve consumers, our model leaves many questions 
unanswered. For example, in considering an exogenous proportion of naïve consumers 
it does not explore the incentives of firms to educate or further confuse consumers. It 
also does not take into account the various consumption distortions that may arise from 
below-cost upfront prices and above-cost add-on fees. We leave these questions for 
future work. 
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3.6 Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Given symmetric locations (𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2), best response functions become  
𝑓1
𝐵𝑅 = max(
𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) + 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) + 𝑓2
2
, 𝑓) 
𝑓2
𝐵𝑅 = max(
𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) + 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) + 𝑓1
2
, 𝑓) 
Symmetric locations imply that both firms play the same equilibrium upfront 
price, 𝑓∗. Suppose that the price floor is not binding. Then 𝑓∗ satisfies 𝑓∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)+𝑐−?̿?(1−𝑞)+𝑓
∗
2
. Solving gives 𝑓∗ = 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) + 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞). The price floor 
constraint is not binding as long as 𝑓∗ > 𝑓. Solving the inequality for 𝑙2 gives that the 
price floor is not binding if 𝑙2 ∈ [
1
2
+
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
2𝑡
, 1] = 𝑙2
𝐻. Thus, for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 there 
exists a pure strategy price equilibrium with 𝑓∗ = 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) + 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) = 𝑓𝐻
∗. 
The price floor is binding if 𝑙2 ∈ [
1
2
,
1
2
+
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
2𝑡
) = 𝑙2
𝐿. Thus for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 there exists 
a pure strategy price equilibrium with 𝑓∗ = 𝑓 = 𝑓𝐿
∗. To find equilibrium profits Π𝐻
∗ , 
Π𝐿
∗ replace 𝑓𝐻
∗ and 𝑓𝐿
∗ in place of 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 in Π1 = (𝑓1 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐)𝑥 and Π2 =
(𝑓2 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐)(1 − 𝑥).∎ 
 
Proof of Corollary 1. 
For part (a), see that 
𝑑Π𝐻
∗
𝑑𝑙2
> 0, while 
𝑑Π𝐿
∗
𝑑𝑙2
= 0. For part (b), recall that symmetric 
location pairs with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 yield equilibrium profits Π𝐻
∗ , while symmetric location 
pairs with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 yield equilibrium profits Π𝐿
∗. Comparison between the two yields 
that Π𝐻
∗ > Π𝐿
∗. Since, by part (a), profits in 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 are independent of 𝑙2, the statement 
of part (b) is true. ∎ 
 
 
86 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
The proof proceeds in 4 steps. In step 1 we solve the price equilibrium for general 
locations. The price equilibrium is unique and comes in four types, depending on firm 
locations. In step 2 we examine marginal relocation incentives from any given 
symmetric location pair. Marginal relocation incentives converge towards location 
pairs (0,1) and (
1
2
,
1
2
). In step 3 we explore the profitability of large deviations from 
pair (0,1) and arrive at the condition in part (a) of the Proposition. In step 3 we explore 
the profitability of large deviations from pair (
1
2
,
1
2
) and arrive at the condition in part 
(b) of the Proposition. 
 
Step 1. Price equilibrium for general locations. 
To characterise the equilibrium locations we first solve the pricing stage for 
general locations. Suppose firm locations are such that the price floor constraint is not 
binding for either firm; that is 𝑓1
𝐵𝑅 =
𝑡(𝑙1+𝑙2)(𝑙2−𝑙1)+𝑐−?̿?(1−𝑞)+𝑓2
2
 and 𝑓2
𝐵𝑅 =
𝑡(2−𝑙1−𝑙2)(𝑙2−𝑙1)+𝑐−?̿?(1−𝑞)+𝑓1
2
. Simultaneously solving for 𝑓1
∗, 𝑓2
∗ yields a unique 
solution (𝑓1
∗
𝑁𝐵
, 𝑓2
∗
𝑁𝐵
) = (𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑡
3
(𝑙2 − 𝑙1)(2 + 𝑙1 + 𝑙2), 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑡
3
(𝑙2 − 𝑙1)(4 − 𝑙1 − 𝑙2)), where notation NB denotes a non-binding price floor 
constraint for both firms. For (𝑓1
∗
𝑁𝐵
, 𝑓2
∗
𝑁𝐵
) to describe an equilibrium it must hold 
that the price floor constraint does not bind for either firm; that is 𝑓 ≤ 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑡
3
(𝑙2 − 𝑙1)(2 + 𝑙1 + 𝑙2) and 𝑓 ≤ 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑡
3
(𝑙2 − 𝑙1)(4 − 𝑙1 − 𝑙2).  
Now suppose that the price floor constraint is binding for firm 1 only; that is 
𝑓1
𝐵𝑅 = 𝑓 and 𝑓2
𝐵𝑅 ≥ 𝑓. Then, simultaneously solving the system of best response 
functions yields a unique solution (𝑓1
∗
𝐴𝐵1
, 𝑓2
∗
𝐴𝐵1
) = (𝑓, 𝑐 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑡
3
(𝑙2 −
𝑙1)(4 − 𝑙1 − 𝑙2)), where notation AB1 denotes a price floor constraint that is only 
binding for firm 1. For (𝑓1
∗
𝐴𝐵1
, 𝑓2
∗
𝐴𝐵1
) to describe an equilibrium it must hold that the 
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price floor constraint binds for firm 1 only; that is  
𝑡(𝑙1+𝑙2)(𝑙2−𝑙1)+𝑐−?̿?(1−𝑞)+𝑓2
∗
2
< 𝑓 and 
𝑡(2−𝑙1−𝑙2)(𝑙2−𝑙1)+𝑐−?̿?(1−𝑞)+𝑓1
∗
2
≥ 𝑓. 
Next suppose that the price floor constraint is binding for firm 2 only; that is 
𝑓2
𝐵𝑅 = 𝑓 and 𝑓1
𝐵𝑅 ≥ 𝑓. Then, simultaneously solving the system of best response 
functions yields a unique solution (𝑓1
∗
𝐴𝐵2
, 𝑓2
∗
𝐴𝐵2
) = (
𝑡(𝑙1+𝑙2)(𝑙2−𝑙1)+𝑐−𝑎+𝑓
2
, 𝑓), where 
notation AB2 denotes a price floor constraint that is only binding for firm 2. For 
(𝑓1
∗
𝐴𝐵2
, 𝑓2
∗
𝐴𝐵2
) to describe an equilibrium it must hold that the price floor constraint 
binds for firm 2 only; that is  
𝑡(𝑙1+𝑙2)(𝑙2−𝑙1)+𝑐−?̿?(1−𝑞)+𝑓2
∗
2
≥ 𝑓 and 
𝑡(2−𝑙1−𝑙2)(𝑙2−𝑙1)+𝑐−?̿?(1−𝑞)+𝑓1
∗
2
< 𝑓. 
Finally, suppose that the price floor constraint is binding for both firms; that is 
𝑓1
𝐵𝑅 = 𝑓2
𝐵𝑅 = 𝑓. This implies an equilibrium price pair (𝑓1
∗
𝐵𝐵
, 𝑓2
∗
𝐵𝐵
) = (𝑓, 𝑓), where 
notation BB denotes a price floor constraint that is binding for both firms. For this to 
be the case it must hold that 
𝑡(𝑙1+𝑙2)(𝑙2−𝑙1)+𝑐−?̿?(1−𝑞)+𝑓2
∗
2
< 𝑓 and 
𝑡(2−𝑙1−𝑙2)(𝑙2−𝑙1)+𝑐−?̿?(1−𝑞)+𝑓1
∗
2
< 𝑓. 
 
Step 2. Marginal relocation incentives converge towards location pairs (0,1) and 
(
1
2
,
1
2
). 
In order to calculate the marginal relocation incentives of each firm for a given 
symmetric location pair we need to express equilibrium profits in terms of 𝑙1, 𝑙2.  
First, consider symmetric location pairs that satisfy 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻. Applying 𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2 
and 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 in the conditions of step 1 gives that for symmetric locations with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻, 
the price equilibrium is of type 𝑁𝐵. Substituting (𝑓1
∗
𝑁𝐵
, 𝑓2
∗
𝑁𝐵
) at each firm’s profit 
function gives that firm 1 earns profit Π𝐻1
∗ =
𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)(2+𝑙1+𝑙2)
2
18
, while firm 2 earns profit 
Π𝐻2
∗ =
𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)(4−𝑙1−𝑙2)
2
18
. Differentiation yields 
𝑑Π𝐻1
∗
𝑑𝑙1
< 0 and 
𝑑Π𝐻2
∗
𝑑𝑙2
> 0; that is, each 
firms prefers to locate further away from its rival. Now notice that (𝑙1
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑎𝑥) 
satisfies 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻. Since (𝑙1
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑎𝑥) describes locations at the ends of the line we can 
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conclude that any local deviation from (𝑙1
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑎𝑥) is unprofitable, as firms cannot 
locate any further apart. Replacing 𝑙1
𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑙2
𝑚𝑎𝑥 in equilibrium prices and profits 
gives the desired 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥, and Π𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
Next, consider symmetric location pairs that satisfy 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿. Applying 𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2 
and 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 in the conditions of step 1 gives that for symmetric locations with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿, 
the price equilibrium is of type 𝐵𝐵. Substituting (𝑓1
∗
𝐵𝐵
, 𝑓2
∗
𝐵𝐵
) at each firm’s profit 
function gives that firm 1 earns profit Π𝐿1
∗ =
(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)(𝑙1+𝑙2)
2
, while firm 2 earns 
profit Π𝐿2
∗ =
(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)(2−𝑙1−𝑙2)
2
. Differentiation yields 
𝑑Π𝐿1
∗
𝑑𝑙1
> 0 and 
𝑑Π𝐿2
∗
𝑑𝑙2
< 0; that 
is, each firms prefers to locate closer to its rival. But (𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛) satisfies 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 and 
describes locations at the centre of the line. This any local deviation from (𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
is unprofitable, as firms cannot locate any further apart. Replacing 𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛 in 
equilibrium prices and profits gives the desired 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛, and Π𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
 
Step 3. Profitability of large deviations from location pair (0,1). 
Let 𝑙2 = 1 and consider a deviation at some 𝑙1
𝑑max ∈ (0,1]. Deviation incentives 
of firm 2 follow in an analogous manner by relabelling firms. Deviation profits of firm 
1 are given by Π1
𝑑
𝑁𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥
= (𝑓1
∗
𝑁𝐵
+ 𝑎 − 𝑐)(
𝑙1
𝑑max
2
+
1
2
−
𝑓1
∗
𝑁𝐵−𝑓2
∗
𝑁𝐵
2𝑡(1−𝑙1
𝑑max)
) if 𝑙1
𝑑max is such 
that the price equilibrium is of type NB; that is if 𝑙1
𝑑max ∈ (0, 2 −
√1 +
3(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
𝑡
] = 𝑙1
𝑑
𝑁𝐵
max
. Differentiating with respect to 𝑙1 yields that 
𝑑Π1
𝑑
𝑁𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑑𝑙1
𝑑max
=
(𝑓1
∗
𝑁𝐵
+ ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐) (
1
2
−
2
3(1−𝑙1
𝑑max)
) < 0. Thus, deviating to any 𝑙1
𝑑max ∈ 𝑙1
𝑑
𝑁𝐵
max
 
is less profitable than choosing 𝑙1 = 0. 
Deviation profits are given by Π1
𝑑
𝐵𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥
= (𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐) (
𝑙1
𝑑max
2
+
1
2
) if 𝑙1
𝑑max 
is such that the price equilibrium is of type BB; that is if 𝑙1
𝑑max ∈
(√1 −
(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
𝑡
, 1] = 𝑙1
𝑑
𝐵𝐵
max
. Differentiating with respect to 𝑙1 yields that 
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𝑑Π1
𝑑
𝐵𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑑𝑙1
𝑑max
=
(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
2
> 0. This implies that among the 𝑙1
𝑑max ∈ 𝑙1
𝑑
𝐵𝐵
max
, the optimal 
deviation for firm 1 is at 𝑙1
𝑑max = 1 − 𝜖, where 𝜖 is an infinitesimal positive value. At 
𝑙1
𝑑max = 1 − 𝜖, deviation profit is almost equal to 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐. Therefore, this 
deviation is profitable if 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐 >
𝑡
2
. 
Deviation profits are given by Π1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵2
𝑚𝑎𝑥
= (𝑓1
∗
𝐴𝐵2
+ ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐) (
𝑙1
𝑑max
2
+
1
2
−
𝑓1
∗
𝐴𝐵2−𝑓
2𝑡(1−𝑙1
𝑑max)
) if 𝑙1
𝑑max is such that the price equilibrium is of type AB2; that is if 𝑙1
𝑑max ∈
(2 − √1 +
3(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
𝑡
, √1 −
(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
𝑡
] = 𝑙1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵2
max
. Differentiating with respect 
to 𝑙1 yields that 
𝑑Π1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵2
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑑𝑙1
𝑑max
= (𝑓1
∗
𝐴𝐵2
+ ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐)(
1
2
−
𝑡(1−𝑙1
𝑑max
2
)−(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
4𝑡(1−𝑙1
𝑑max)
2 ). 
For 𝑡 < 3 (𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐), it can be seen that 
𝑑Π1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵2
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑑𝑙1
𝑑max
> 0. Therefore, deviation 
profits at 𝑙1
𝑑max ∈ 𝑙1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵2
max
 are lower than deviation profits at 𝑙1
𝑑max ∈ 𝑙1
𝑑
𝐵𝐵
max
, which we 
examined above. For 𝑡 ≥ 3 (𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐), deviation profits have a local 
maximum at 𝑙1
𝑑max =
2
3
−
√1−
3(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
𝑡
3
 or a corner solution. After some algebra it 
can be seen that neither the local maximum nor any corner solution constitutes a 
profitable deviation, as deviation profits are always below Π𝑚𝑎𝑥.  
Finally, there does not exist an 𝑙1
𝑑 such that the price equilibrium is of type AB1. 
Therefore, there exists a maximum-differentiation equilibrium if 
𝑡
2
≥ 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) −
𝑐. 
 
Step 4. Profitability of large deviations from location pair (
1
2
,
1
2
). 
Let 𝑙2 =
1
2
 and consider a deviation at some 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,
1
2
). Deviation incentives 
of firm 2 follow in an analogous manner by relabelling firms. Deviation profits of firm 
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1 are given by Π1
𝑑
𝑁𝐵
𝑚𝑖𝑛
= (𝑓1
∗
𝑁𝐵
+ 𝑎 − 𝑐)(
𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
2
+
1
4
−
𝑓1
∗
𝑁𝐵−𝑓2
∗
𝑁𝐵
2𝑡(
1
2
−𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛)
) if 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 is such 
that the price equilibrium is of type NB; that is if 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈
[
 
 
 
 
0, −1 +
√9−
12(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
𝑡
2
)
 
 
= l1
𝑑
𝑁𝐵
𝑚𝑖𝑛
. Differentiating with respect to 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 yields that 
𝑑Π1
𝑑
𝑁𝐵
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
=
(𝑓1
∗
𝑁𝐵
+ ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐)
−(𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛+
1
2
)
2(
1
2
 −𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛)
< 0. This implies that deviation profits have a 
local maximum at 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0, thus maximum deviation profits are given by Π1
𝑑
𝑁𝐵
𝑚𝑖𝑛
=
25𝑡
144
. Comparing with Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 gives that a deviation at 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0 is profitable if 
25𝑡
144
>
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
2
⟹ 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐 <
25𝑡
72
. 
Deviation profits are given by Π1
𝑑
𝐵𝐵
𝑚𝑖𝑛
= (𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐) (
𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
2
+
1
4
) if 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 
is such that the price equilibrium is of type BB; that is if 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈
(
 
 
1 −
√4(𝑓+?̿?
(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
𝑡
+1
2
,
1
2
)
 
 
= l1
𝑑
𝐵𝐵
𝑚𝑖𝑛
. Differentiating with respect to 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 yields that 
𝑑Π1
𝑑
𝐵𝐵
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
=
(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
2
> 0. Thus, deviating to any 𝑙1
𝑑 ∈ l1
𝑑
𝐵𝐵
𝑚𝑖𝑛
 is less profitable than choosing 
𝑙1 = 0. 
Deviation profits are given by Π1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
= (𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐) (
𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
2
+
1
4
−
𝑓−𝑓2
∗
𝐴𝐵1
2𝑡(
1
2
−𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛)
) if 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 is such that the price equilibrium is of type AB1; that is if 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈
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[
 
 
 
 
−1 +
√9−
12(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
𝑡
2
, 1 −
√4(𝑓+?̿?
(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
𝑡
+1
2
)
 
 
= l1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
. Differentiating with respect to 
𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 yields that 
𝑑Π1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
= (𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐)(
1
4
−
(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
4𝑡(
1
2
−𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛)
2 ). First and second 
order conditions yield a local maximum at 𝑙1
𝑑 =
1
2
− √
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
𝑡
, while lies inside 
l1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
 if 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐 >
9𝑡
16
 and lies to the left of l1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
 otherwise. If 
1
2
−
√
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
𝑡
 lies inside l1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
 then the maximum deviation profits at 𝑙1
𝑑 ∈ l1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
 are 
given by 
(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
(
 
3√(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)𝑡
2
−(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)
)
 
2√(𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐)𝑡
, which is greater than Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 if 𝑓 +
?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐 <
𝑡
4
. But 
𝑡
4
<
9𝑡
16
. Thus, if 
1
2
− √
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
𝑡
 lies inside l1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
, any 
deviation at 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ l1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
 is unprofitable. If 
1
2
− √
𝑓+?̿?(1−𝑞)−𝑐
𝑡
 lies to the left of l1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
then the firm 1 is better off deviating at some 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ l1
𝑑
𝑁𝐵
𝑚𝑖𝑛
, as 
𝑑Π1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
< 0 for all 𝑙1
𝑑 ∈
l1
𝑑
𝐴𝐵1
𝑚𝑖𝑛
. 
Finally, there does not exist an 𝑙1
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 such that the price equilibrium is of type 
AB2. Therefore, there exists a minimum-differentiation equilibrium if 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) −
𝑐 ≥
25𝑡
72
. ∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
(i) By Proposition 2, a maximum-differentiation equilibrium exists if 
𝑡
2
≥ 𝑓 +
?̿?(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑐. Since lower values of ?̿? and higher values of 𝑞 increase the parameter 
space for which this inequality holds, a market policy that lowers ?̿? or increases 𝑞 
cannot shift the market away from the maximum-differentiation equilibrium. 
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(ii-a) At a minimum-differentiation equilibrium with 𝑞 = 𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑑, the average 
consumer pays an total average price 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑑). At a maximum-
differentiation equilibrium with 𝑞 = 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤, the average consumer pays a total average 
price 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑐 + 𝑡. Thus, the average consumer is better off after a disclosure policy 
if 𝑓 + ?̿?(1 − 𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑑) > 𝑐 + 𝑡. 
(ii-b) At a minimum-differentiation equilibrium with 𝑞 = 𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑑, the average 
sophisticated consumer pays an total price 𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓. At a maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium with 𝑞 = 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤, the average sophisticated consumers pays a total price 
𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑐 + 𝑡 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤). Thus, the average sophisticated consumer is better off 
after a disclosure policy if 𝑓 > 𝑐 + 𝑡 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤). But by part (b) of Proposition 2, 
a maximum-differentiation cannot exist for a 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤 that satisfies this inequality. This 
the average sophisticated consumers is always made worse off by such a market 
policy. 
(ii-c) At a minimum-differentiation equilibrium with 𝑞 = 𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑑, the average naïve 
consumer pays an total price 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓 + ?̿?. At a maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium with 𝑞 = 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤, the average naïve consumer pays a total price 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑐 +
𝑡 + ?̿?𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤. Thus, the average naïve consumer that remains uninformed after a 
disclosure policy is better off after the policy if 𝑓 + ?̿? > 𝑐 + 𝑡 + ?̿?𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤. But, again, 
by part (b) of Proposition 2, a maximum-differentiation cannot exist for 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤 that 
satisfies this inequality. Thus, the average uninformed naïve consumer is always made 
worse off by such a market policy. 
(ii-d) At a minimum-differentiation equilibrium with 𝑞 = 𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑑, the average naïve 
consumer pays an total price 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓 + ?̿?. At a maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium with 𝑞 = 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤, the average sophisticated consumer pays a total price 
𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑐 + 𝑡 − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤). Thus, the average naïve consumer that becomes 
informed after a disclosure policy is better off after the policy if 𝑓 + ?̿? > 𝑐 + 𝑡 −
?̿?(1 − 𝑞𝑛𝑒𝑤).  
(iii-a) At a minimum-differentiation equilibrium with ?̿? = ?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑, the average 
consumer pays an total average price 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓 + ?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑(1 − 𝑞). At a maximum-
differentiation equilibrium with ?̿? = ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤, the average consumer pays a total average 
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price 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑐 + 𝑡. Thus, the average consumer is better off after a price control 
policy if 𝑓 + ?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑(1 − 𝑞) > 𝑐 + 𝑡. 
(iii-b) At a minimum-differentiation equilibrium with ?̿? = ?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑, the average 
sophisticated consumer pays a total price 𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓. At a maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium with 𝑞?̿? = ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤, the average sophisticated consumers pays a total price 
𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑐 + 𝑡 − ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤(1 − 𝑞). Thus, the average sophisticated consumer is better off 
after a disclosure policy if 𝑓 > 𝑐 + 𝑡 − ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤(1 − 𝑞). But by part (b) of Proposition 2, 
a maximum-differentiation cannot exist for an ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤 that satisfies this inequality. This 
the average sophisticated consumers is always made worse off by such a market 
policy. 
(iii-c) At a minimum-differentiation equilibrium with ?̿? = ?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑, the average naïve 
consumer pays a total price 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓 + ?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑. At a maximum-differentiation 
equilibrium with ?̿? = ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤, the average naïve consumer pays a total price 𝑝𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑐 +
𝑡 + ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑞. Thus, the average naïve consumer is better off after the policy if 𝑓 +
?̿?𝑜𝑙𝑑 > 𝑐 + 𝑡 + ?̿?𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑞. ∎ 
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Chapter 4 
Paying for Desirable Add-ons in a 
Market with Endogenous Product 
Differentiation 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In many markets, consumers may pay extra to use add-on services that 
complement their primary purchase. For example, personal current account holders 
may pay to use overdraft facilities; mobile phone users that exhaust their allowance 
may pay overage charges to make more phone calls; air travellers may buy on-board 
meals; car owners may pay for maintenance. Due to behavioural biases such as 
overconfidence and lack of self-control, consumers often miscalculate their future 
demand for such services while shopping around for the primary good. As a result, 
they purchase add-ons more often42 than they anticipate. 
While firms may want to exploit consumers’ short-sightedness by setting high fees 
for add-on services, exploitation is undermined by competition forces. In the absence 
                                                          
42 See, for example, Office of Fair Trading (2008), par. 4.68, 4.69 on personal current accounts and 
Federal Communications Commission (2010) on phone plans. 
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of constraints, firms compete more fiercely for profitable biased consumers, lowering 
advertised prices possibly below marginal cost and dissipating profits from the 
unanticipated fees43. However, competitive pressure can, in some cases, be 
inadequate. In particular, firms can retain some excess profit if a lower bound44 on 
upfront prices prevents full dissipation. Past literature has studied how retaining some 
excess profits due to a price floor affects firm behaviour in terms of pricing strategy 
(Ellison, 2005), aftermarket monopolization efforts (Miao, 2010), shrouding 
(Heidhues et al., 2017), and R&D expenditure (Heidhues et al., 2016).  
In this chapter we study how the retention of profits from the sale of desirable45 
add-on services interacts with the degree of horizontal product differentiation46 in the 
primary market.  
In particular, we have two aims. The first is to investigate the effect of 
exogenously given product differentiation on equilibrium price structure and on the 
ability of firms to retain extra profits from unanticipated add-on fees. We show that a 
price equilibrium generally exhibits low upfront prices and high add-on fees, but is 
not necessarily in pure strategies. The degree of product differentiation critically 
influences how much extra profits firms can retain. 
Our second aim is to explore the levels of product differentiation that 
endogenously arise in such markets. We show that firms face a trade-off between 
softening competition in the primary market by offering horizontally differentiated 
products, and retaining larger profits from unanticipated fees by offering products that 
are closer substitutes. This trade-off can establish an equilibrium in which profits from 
                                                          
43 Gabaix and Laibson (2006) contains such a profit irrelevance result regarding unanticipated desirable 
add-ons. A similar dissipation argument appears in models where firms have monopoly power over an 
aftermarket due to switching costs (see, for example, Lal and Matutes, 1994; Shapiro, 1995). 
44 For a careful discussion on why price-cutting may be constrained see section 3.1 in Chapter 3. See 
also sections 2.2 and 2.3 in Heidhues and Koszegi (2018). 
45 We define as desirable the add-on services that can be sold to rational consumers at prices above cost. 
46 Horizontal differentiation may be real or spurious (Spiegler, 2006; Tremblay and Polasky, 2002). We 
model it in a traditional way, as a choice of product characteristics over which consumers have 
heterogeneous preferences. 
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unanticipated fees are eroded, and two equilibria in which some of these profits are 
retained. Consumers may be better off in the latter. 
Our work focuses on markets in which firms sell desirable add-ons at prices that 
both sophisticated and myopic consumers accept.47 This feature may apply to markets 
with sufficiently large population of sophisticated types. It may also apply to markets 
in which sophisticates’ outside option is very costly.  
We analyse a simultaneous-move two-stage duopoly model in which firms first 
choose locations on a Hotelling line and then choose prices. To more simply model a 
market in which each firm offers a primary good and a desirable add-on service we 
assume that each firm sells a unique, indivisible product, and charges two separate 
price components: an upfront price, paid by consumers upon purchase, and an add-on 
fee, paid by consumers at a later period unless an avoidance cost is incurred. In real 
world terms, that avoidance cost represents the cost of an outside option.  
Not all consumers understand that the add-on fee is avoidable only at a cost. 
Sophisticated types do so, but naïve types believe they will never pay the add-on fee 
regardless of whether they pay for avoidance. In real terms, the naïve types 
erroneously believe that the add-on service is provided for free.  
To capture the idea that competition does not always erode profits completely, we 
assume a lower bound on upfront prices in the form of a price floor. The degree of 
horizontal differentiation is crucial to whether firms can enjoy any excess profits, as a 
binding price floor constraint requires products to be sufficiently close substitutes. 
This creates two conflicting incentives for the firms’ location choice: (i) locate far 
apart to soften competition and enjoy higher upfront prices, but do not take advantage 
of the price floor constraint, or (ii) locate closer together to compete more fiercely for 
customers, while retaining some profits from the add-on fees due to the price floor. 
The relative strength of these incentives depends non-monotonically on interfirm 
distance. Our model reveals the locations pairs were firms’ relocation incentives 
converge.  
                                                          
47 Chapter 3 investigates the interaction between add-on profits and horizontal differentiation in markets 
where add-ons services are unwanted and purchased only by myopic consumers. 
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In contrast with traditional Hotelling models (Hotelling, 1929; d’Aspremont et al., 
1979; Neven, 1985) in which fixed prices lead to minimum differentiation and variable 
prices lead to maximum differentiation, we find that the combination of consumer 
naïvete and a relevant price floor can generate maximum, minimum or intermediate 
differentiation in equilibrium. Intermediate differentiation is unambiguously preferred 
in terms of average consumer travel costs. Consumers are worse off in the maximum-
differentiation equilibrium despite firms dissipating all extra profits. 
Our model advises caution when considering regulatory interventions in markets 
that feature unexpected add-on fees. The effectiveness of interventions depends on the 
ex-ante degree of product differentiation in the market and on whether firms respond 
by choosing different product locations. While modest interventions can be beneficial, 
excessive interventions that can shift the market to a different equilibrium type can 
lead to losses in both social and consumer surplus.  
We contribute to growing study of markets with behavioural consumers (Heidhues 
and Koszegi, 2018; Grubb, 2015a) by investigating how the firms’ choice of product 
differentiation is affected by their desire to exploit consumer mistakes. We show that, 
compared to a rational benchmark, exploitative firm behaviour can increase total 
surplus by improving product matching. Other works show that exploitative firm 
behaviour can create inefficiencies. Such inefficiencies include excessive 
consumption of the primary good (Heidhues and Koszegi, 2010; 2015), waste of effort 
and resources, or altering of consumption patterns in order to avoid future payments 
(Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Grubb, 2015b), prevalence of low quality products 
(Michel, 2018; Gamp and Krahmer, 2018; Heidhues et al., 2017) and redirection of 
resources away from value-enhancing R&D (Heidhues et al., 2016). 
By modelling a market with desirable add-ons whose demand is miscalculated by 
some consumers, our work contributes to the discussion on whether sophisticated 
“shoppers” can improve the deals available to all consumer types (Varian, 1980; 
Armstrong and Chen, 2009; Armstrong, 2015). We show that the opposite is possible; 
the presence of naïve types can establish equilibria that benefit both types but are 
unavailable in markets populated solely by sophisticates.  
On studying the interplay between market transparency and product 
differentiation incentives, our work is most closely related to Schultz (2004). For a 
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certain parameter space our model predicts similar firm behaviour to that in Schultz’s 
work. However, our inclusion of both salient prices and unanticipated fees establishes 
more than a single market outcome. We find that increasing transparency may 
incentivise firms to offer more, rather than less, differentiated products.  
Finally, our policy implications place our paper alongside works that investigate 
the benefits and unintended consequences of regulatory interventions in markets with 
naïve consumers (e.g. Grubb, 2015b; Armstrong et al. (2009); Kosfeld and Schuwer, 
2017). We contribute to this literature by revealing that interventions may influence 
the degree of product differentiation in the market, leading to losses in both consumer 
and total surplus. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 sets up our model. 
Section 4.3 presents our equilibrium analysis. In section 4.3.1 we characterise the price 
equilibrium for fixed symmetric locations. In section 4.3.2 we study firms’ relocation 
incentives and present the location pairs towards which these incentives converge. In 
Section 4.4 we study welfare and policy implications. Section 4.5 concludes.  
 
4.2 Model 
Consider two firms located at 𝑙1, 𝑙2 on a Hotelling line between 0 and 1, and 
without loss of generality, let 𝑙1 ≤ 𝑙2. Each firm produces a homogenous good of 
utility 𝑣 at cost 𝑐, 𝑐 < 𝑣. Assume that 𝑣 is large enough that the market is always fully 
covered. 
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] and have mass 1. Each 
consumer has unit demand and may purchase from at most one firm. For a consumer 
located at 𝜒 ∈ [0,1], purchasing from firm 𝑖 entails a distance cost 𝑡(𝜒 − 𝑙𝑖)
2. 
Purchasing product 𝑖 entails two price components: an upfront price 𝑓𝑖 ∈ [𝑐, +∞), 
where  𝑐 acts as an exogenous price floor48, and an add-on fee 𝑎𝑖 ∈ (−∞,+∞). Both 
price components of each firm are known to all consumers before purchase. 
                                                          
48 The idea that the marginal cost constitutes a price floor is natural in markets with marginal costs very 
close to zero. Intuitively, a price below zero is unprofitable if it attracts a large number of extremely 
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In period 1 each consumer purchases from her firm of choice by paying 𝑓𝑖. In 
period 2, each consumer that has purchased in period 1 from firm 𝑖 learns she will 
have to pay the add-on fee, 𝑎𝑖, in period 3. Every consumer pays 𝑎𝑖 in period 3, unless 
that consumer incurs an early-avoidance cost ?̅? in period 1, or a late-avoidance cost ?̿? 
in period 2.49 Assume ?̿? > ?̅? > 0.50 
Consumers come in two types, depending on their belief about whether they will have 
to pay the add-on fee, 𝑎𝑖. Proportion 𝑞 of consumers are sophisticated in that they 
understand that purchase in period 1 comes with a charge 𝑎𝑖 in period 3. Therefore, 
they will pay the early-avoidance cost ?̅? in period 1 if they observe 𝑎𝑖 > ?̅?. Proportion 
1 − 𝑞 of consumers are naïve in that they make a purchase in period 1 believing they 
will not be charged 𝑎𝑖 in period 3. In period 2 they learn they will be charged 𝑎𝑖. 
Therefore, they pay the late-avoidance cost ?̿? in period 2 if 𝑎𝑖 > ?̿?. Both types are 
uniformly distributed on the line. As a tie-breaker, assume that consumers always 
choose to pay the fee if they are indifferent between paying and avoiding. To ensure 
that firms prefer to collect add-on fees from both consumer types we assume that ?̅? >
                                                          
sophisticated consumers that earn the subsidy while costlessly avoiding any add-on fees. If arbitrage is 
possible then setting upfront price below 𝑐 may be a dominated strategy even for markets with relatively 
high marginal costs. This is because it may allow a rival to purchase below cost and resale, effectively 
gaining a cost advantage. Finally, firms may have preference against below-cost prices to avoid 
accusations of predatory pricing. See sections 2.2, 2.3 in Heidhues and Koszegi (2018) for a range of 
works that study markets with price floors. 
49 For example, a consumer purchasing a mobile contract can avoid overage charges in two ways. The 
first way is by paying attention to her balance and making only the most valuable calls. ?̅? represents the 
sum of the necessary attention cost and the utility loss from forfeiting marginal calls. The second way 
is by stopping using her phones once she is alerted that overage charges apply. ?̿? represents the utility 
loss from forfeiting all calls after the alert. 
50 The assumption of a positive early avoidance cost (?̅?) equates to the notion that add-ons are desirable, 
as it implies that consumers prefer not to avoid add-on consumption if the price of the add-on is not 
above ?̅?. 
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?̿?(1 − 𝑞).51 52 We also assume ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) ≥ ?̅?𝑞 to ensure that a price equilibrium in 
symmetric locations is always tractable.53 
The timing is as follows. In stage 1 firms simultaneously choose locations on the 
line. In stage 2 firm simultaneously set prices. Consumer behaviour consists of three 
periods. In period 1 consumers observe firm locations and prices 𝑓𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖, form 
expectations about their probability of being charged 𝑎𝑖 in period 3, and choose from 
which firm to purchase and whether or not to incur the early-avoidance cost ?̅?. 
Sophisticated consumers correctly believe they will be charged 𝑎𝑖 in period 3 with 
probability 1 and choose to avoid the payment by incurring the early-avoidance cost 
?̅? if they observe 𝑎𝑖 > ?̅?. Naïve consumers erroneously believe they will not be 
charged 𝑎𝑖 in period 3. In period 2, each naïve consumer that has purchased in period 
1 learns that she will be charged 𝑎𝑖 in period 3. She chooses to avoid the payment by 
incurring the late-avoidance cost ?̿? if 𝑎𝑖 > ?̿?. In period 3, consumers that have not 
engaged in costly avoidance in the previous periods pay 𝑎𝑖. We solve the game using 
backward induction looking for symmetric equilibria. 
 
4.3 Equilibrium analysis 
4.3.1 Equilibrium price structure for fixed symmetric locations 
We first analyse the Nash equilibrium in prices for symmetric exogenously given 
locations pair (𝑙1, 𝑙2). An equilibrium may be in pure or in mixed strategies. Our 
                                                          
51 This assumption is satisfied for a sufficiently high proportion of sophisticated consumers. It can be 
rearranged to 𝑞 >
?̿?−?̅?
?̅?
. Inasmuch as the degree of sophistication is endogenously chosen by consumers, 
a larger ?̿? − ?̅? would endogenously bring about a higher 𝑞, maintaining the validity of this assumption. 
A study of consumers’ incentives to become sophisticated lies outside the scope of this paper. See 
Armstrong et al. (2009) and Heidhues et al. (2018) studies of such incentives.  
52 Chapter 3 models a market in which the add-on component is worthless and easy to avoid – that is, a 
case in which ?̅? = 0. Specifications with ?̅? < ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) are qualitatively similar. 
53 Since ?̿? > ?̅? this assumption is satisfied if, for instance, 𝑞 <
1
2
. 
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analysis proceeds as follows. In Lemmas 1 and 2 we derive the prices that arise in a 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium, given that such an equilibrium exists. In Lemma 3 we 
provide conditions under which the derived equilibrium prices result in a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium, and conditions under which only an equilibrium in mixed strategies 
exists. Proposition 1 collects our results. 
With full coverage, each firms’ demand is determined by the position of the 
consumer who is indifferent between buying from firm 𝑖 versus buying from firm 𝑗. A 
sophisticated consumer who makes a purchase in period 1 from firm 𝑖 realises an 
associated cost 𝑎𝑖
𝑠 ∈ {𝑎𝑖, ?̅?, ?̿?}, depending on her behaviour. 𝑎𝑖 represents her cost if 
she pays 𝑎𝑖 in period 3 to firm 𝑖, ?̅? represents her early-avoidance cost if she chooses 
to avoid in period 1, and ?̿? represents her late-avoidance cost if she chooses to avoid 
in period 2. Hence, the location of the indifferent sophisticated consumer is given by 
𝑥𝑠, which satisfies 𝑓1 + 𝑎1
𝑠 + 𝑡(𝑥𝑠 − 𝑙1)
2 = 𝑓2 + 𝑎2
𝑠 + 𝑡(𝑥𝑠 − 𝑙2)
2. Solving for 𝑥𝑠 
gives 𝑥𝑠 =
𝑙1+𝑙2
2
−
𝑓1+𝑎1
𝑠−𝑓2−𝑎2
𝑠
2𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)
. In contrast, a naïve consumer makes a purchase 
expecting an associated cost 𝑎𝑖
𝑛 = 0. As such, the location of the indifferent naïve 
consumer is given by 𝑥𝑛, which satisfies 𝑓1 + 𝑡(𝑥
𝑛 − 𝑙1)
2 = 𝑓2 + 𝑡(𝑥
𝑛 − 𝑙2)
2. 
Solving for 𝑥𝑛 gives 𝑥𝑛 =
𝑙1+𝑙2
2
−
𝑓1−𝑓2
2𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)
.  
With 𝑙1 < 𝑙2, firm 1 (2) serves every consumer to the left (right) of the indifferent 
consumer. At any symmetric pure strategy equilibrium each firm enjoys demand from 
both consumer types. Hence, given demand weights 𝑞 for sophisticated and 1 − 𝑞 for 
naïve consumers, for prices around an equilibrium price pair (𝑓∗, 𝑎∗) the demand of 
firm 1 is given by 𝐷1 = 𝑞𝑥
𝑠 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑥𝑛. Accordingly, the demand of firm 2 is given 
by 𝐷2 =  𝑞(1 − 𝑥
𝑠) + (1 − 𝑞)(1 − 𝑥𝑛). 
 
4.3.1.1 Pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
By Lemma 1, equilibrium add-on fees are such that no consumer type prefers to 
avoid them. 
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Lemma 1. If it exists, a pure strategy price equilibrium is characterised by 𝑎𝑖
∗ = 𝑎∗ ≤
?̅?. 
Proof: In appendix C. 
 
Intuitively, the best 𝑎𝑖 for a firm that aims to earn fee revenues from only the naïve 
types is ?̿?, since this is the highest fee for which sophisticated types avoid while naïve 
types pay. For a firm aiming to earn fee revenues from both consumer types the best 
fee is some 𝑎𝑖
∗ ≤ ?̅?, as sophisticates avoid any 𝑎𝑖 > ?̅?. Assumption ?̅? > ?̿?(1 − 𝑞) 
ensures that, at a pure strategy price equilibrium, firms prefer to earn fees for both 
types, thus any pricing strategy with ?̿? is strictly dominated. 
For prices around an equilibrium price combination (𝑓∗, 𝑎∗) demand from either 
consumer type is given by the second line of equations (1), (2).54 Making use of 
symmetry in locations (𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2), we can express each firm’s maximisation 
problem by max
𝑓𝑖,𝑎𝑖
Π𝑖  𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑓𝑖 ≥ 𝑐, 𝑎𝑖 ≤ ?̅? , where
55  
 Π𝑖 = (𝑓𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐) (
1
2
−
𝑞(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎
∗)
2𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1)
−
𝑓𝑖 − 𝑓
∗
2𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1)
) (1) 
The solution to the constrained maximisation problem is presented in Lemma 2. 
Subscripts in 𝑓∗, 𝑎∗ denote the range of 𝑙2 for which these variables characterise a pure 
strategy price equilibrium, if such an equilibrium exists. For example, if there exists a 
pure strategy price equilibrium for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻, it is characterised by 𝑓𝐻
∗, 𝑎𝐻
∗ , and Π𝐻
∗ . 
 
 
                                                          
54 Since, by Lemma 1, 𝑎𝑖
∗ ≤ ?̅?, sophisticated types prefer to pay the add-on fees. As such, we have 𝑎𝑖
𝑠 =
𝑎𝑖 in the expression for 𝑥
𝑠.  
55 Note that the profit function is discontinuous at 𝑎𝑖 = ?̅?, since sophisticates avoid any 𝑎𝑖 > ?̅?. Then 
if 𝑎∗ = ?̅? equation (1) describes firm 𝑖’s profits only for 𝑎𝑖 slightly below ?̅?. This is not a problem since, 
by Lemma 1, firm 𝑖 never plays 𝑎𝑖 > ?̅?. 
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Lemma 2. Let 𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2. If it exists, a pure strategy price equilibrium is 
characterised by: 
(a) (𝑓𝐻
∗, 𝑎𝐻
∗ ) = (𝑐 − ?̅? + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1), ?̅?) and Π𝐻
∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
2
 for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 = [
1
2
+
?̅?
2𝑡
, 1] 
(b) (𝑓𝐼
∗, 𝑎𝐼
∗) = (𝑐, ?̅?) and Π𝐼
∗ =
?̅?
2
 for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼 = (
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
,
1
2
+
?̅?
2𝑡
) 
(c) (𝑓𝐿
∗, 𝑎𝐿
∗) = (𝑐,
𝑡
𝑞
(2𝑙2 − 1)) and Π𝐿
∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
2𝑞
 for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 = [
1
2
,
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
] 
(d) Every (𝑓∗, 𝑎∗) such that 𝑓∗ + 𝑎∗ = 𝑐 + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) if 𝑞 = 1 
Proof: In appendix C. 
 
To get an intuition behind why there does not exist a pure strategy price 
equilibrium with both 𝑓∗ > 𝑐 and 𝑎∗ < ?̅? recall that the demand is more elastic with 
respect to upfront prices than with respect to add-on fees. Then, a firm choosing (𝑓𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖) 
such that 𝑓𝑖 > 𝑐, 𝑎𝑖 < ?̅? can do better by increasing its fee and reducing its upfront 
price by an equal amount. In that way, the firm enjoys the same mark-up while 
attracting more naïve consumers (who pay no attention to add-on fees when 
purchasing). Incentives to back-load are exhausted either when 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑐, as the price 
floor prevents lower upfront prices, or when 𝑎𝑖 = ?̅?, as 𝑎𝑖 > ?̅? results in sophisticates 
avoiding any fee payments, which is unprofitable by Lemma 1. 
The difference in demand elasticity between fees and upfront prices is also the 
reason why the shape of 𝑓∗, 𝑎∗changes at different interfirm distance intervals. At any 
location pair, it is in the firms’ best interest to compete primarily on upfront prices 
while charging the highest possible fees, as a cut on upfront prices attracts both naïve 
and sophisticated consumers. It is only for location pairs for which the price floor 
constraint binds – that is, competition on upfront prices is exhausted – that firms have 
any incentive to compete on fees. These location pairs are described in parts (b) and 
(c) of Lemma 2.  
To see why the price floor is binding when products are located relatively close 
together, note that the equilibrium upfront price 𝑓∗ falls with lower interfirm distance. 
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This is because competition is more intense the lower the product differentiation in 
the market. Consequently, the price floor constraint is stricter the closer firms are 
located. 
For 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼  firms’ incentive to compete on upfront prices is exhausted. However, 
neither do they have an incentive to compete on fees. The reason is that any cut in fees 
reduces the mark-up from every customer but only attracts a small number of 
sophisticates. Cutting fees is profitable only if products are located sufficiently close 
together – for location pairs with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿. Due to the quadratic transport costs, the 
effect of a reduction in 𝑎𝑖 increases firm 𝑖’s demand more the closer products are 
located. To see this analytically, notice that, for symmetric locations with 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑐, we 
have 
𝜕Π𝑖
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= (
1
2
−
𝑞(𝑎𝑖−𝑎
∗)
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
) + (𝑎𝑖) (−
𝑞
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
). Then, the demand effect of a shift in 
𝑎𝑖 is stronger than the mark-up effect only if 𝑙2 <
1
2
+
𝑞(−?̅?+2𝑎𝑖)
2𝑡
. Substituting 𝑎𝑖 = ?̅? 
gives that cutting fees below ?̅? can only be profitable if 𝑙2 <
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
, which is exactly 
described by interval 𝑙2
𝐿. 
Part (d) describes the pricing stage in a market with no naïve types. Demand 
elasticity with respect to upfront prices is equal to demand elasticity with respect to 
fees since sophisticates correctly anticipate they will pay for both price components. 
Then the sum of the price components in a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium is 
identical to the equilibrium price in a standard Hotelling model with a single, salient 
price. Consequently, the location stage will also be played in an identical way. For the 
rest of the paper we will ignore this case and analyse the model assuming there is a 
population of both consumer types in the market. 
 
4.3.1.2 Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
For a pure strategy price equilibrium to exist it must hold that firms have incentive 
to both serve and extract 𝑎∗ from some sophisticated consumers. However, if 𝑙2 is too 
small this is not the case. Recall that 𝑎𝐿
∗  falls with lower interfirm distance, while 𝑓𝐿
∗ 
is constant at 𝑐. Then, since demand from naïve types is independent of 𝑎𝑖, there exist 
𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 for which firms prefer to raise their fees to ?̿? and earn fee revenues only from 
naïve consumers, over earning fee revenue 𝑎𝐿
∗  from every customer type. Note that a 
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deviation to ?̿? can only be profitable for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿. This is because 𝑎∗ = ?̅? for higher 
interfirm distance, and firms prefers to earn ?̅? from both types over earning ?̿? from 
only the naïve types. This critical 𝑙2 below which a deviation to ?̿? is profitable is 
presented in Lemma 3.  
 
Lemma 3. Let 𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2. A pure strategy price equilibrium exists only if 𝑙2 ≥
1
2
+
?̿?𝑞(1−𝑞)
2𝑡
. If 𝑙2 <
1
2
+
?̿?𝑞(1−𝑞)
2𝑡
 there exists a mixed strategy price equilibrium 
characterised by 𝑓∗ = 𝑐 and 𝑎∗ randomly drawn from a distribution, with expected 
profits Π𝑖 =
?̿?(1−𝑞)
2
. 
Proof: In appendix C. 
 
The intuition behind the non-existence of a pure strategy price equilibrium follows 
the logic of Varian (1980). When products are relatively close substitutes, upfront 
prices are competed down to the price floor. As naïve types pay no attention to add-
on fees, they purchase from the firm that is closest to them.56 Then, if rival’s fees are 
too low, a firm may find it profitable to set a price combination (𝑐, ?̿?) and profit from 
all its naïve customers while abandoning all sophisticates.57 Interfirm distance is 
critical for such behaviour to arise. For 𝑙2 ≥
1
2
+
?̿?𝑞(1−𝑞)
2𝑡
 no firm has an incentive to 
focus exclusively the naïve types, as earning 𝑎∗ from customers of both types is more 
profitable than earning ?̿? from only naïve types.  
In the associated mixed strategy price equilibrium firms compete fiercely on 
upfront prices, resulting in 𝑓𝑖
∗ = 𝑐. Add-on fees, on the other hand, are randomly 
chosen from a distribution. ?̿? always belongs in that distribution, as it is the optimal 
fee for a firm that aims to extract the highest possible surplus from its naïve customers.  
                                                          
56 Naïve consumers behave exactly as in Varian (1980) when products are perfect substitutes, in which 
case they randomly choose from which firm to purchase.  
57 Proof of Lemma 3 shows that a firm which aims to serve only naïve types maximises profits with 
(𝑓𝑖, 𝑎𝑖) = (𝑐, ?̿?). 
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Since profits are identical at any price combination in the distribution, expected 
profits at the mixed strategy price equilibrium are given by Π𝑖 =
?̿?(1−𝑞)
2
. Intuitively, at 
a price combination (𝑐, ?̿?) firm 𝑖 earns ?̿? from its naïve customers, since they pay both 
price components, and 0 from any sophisticated customers, since they avoid the add-
on fee.58 Proposition 1 collects our results with respect to the pricing stage. 
 
Proposition 1. (Price equilibria for symmetric fixed locations). Let 𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2. 
(a) For 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 = [
1
2
+
?̅?
2𝑡
, 1] there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium with 
(𝑓𝐻
∗, 𝑎𝐻
∗ ) = (𝑐 − ?̅? + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1), ?̅?) and Π𝐻
∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
2
. 
(b) For 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼 = (
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
,
1
2
+
?̅?
2𝑡
) there exist a pure strategy price equilibrium with 
(𝑓𝐼
∗, 𝑎𝐼
∗) = (𝑐, ?̅?) and Π𝐼
∗ =
?̅?
2
. 
(c) For 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 = [
1
2
+
?̿?𝑞(1−𝑞)
2𝑡
,
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
] there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium 
with (𝑓𝐿
∗, 𝑎𝐿
∗) = (𝑐,
𝑡
𝑞
(2𝑙2 − 1)) and Π𝐿
∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
2𝑞
 
(d) For 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝑀 = [
1
2
,
1
2
+
?̿?𝑞(1−𝑞)
2𝑡
) there exists a mixed strategy price equilibrium 
with 𝑓𝑀
∗ = 𝑐, 𝑎𝑀
∗  drawn randomly from a distribution, and Π𝑀
∗ =
?̿?(1−𝑞)
2
. 
 
Proposition 1 sums up our findings on how product differentiation, traditionally 
represented by 𝑡(𝑙2 − 𝑙1) in Hotelling models, is crucial to determining the price 
structure. To better comprehend its effect, it is useful to decompose product 
differentiation into two distinct elements: inherent differentiability, denoted by 𝑡, and 
the degree to which firms exploit the inherent differentiability, denoted by interfirm 
distance 𝑙2 − 𝑙1. For ease in exposition we make use of the symmetry in firm locations 
                                                          
58 At the mixed strategy price equilibrium firms share the naïve types since 𝑓1
∗ = 𝑓2
∗ = 𝑐. Demand from 
sophisticated types depends on the distribution of add-on fees. Schultz (2005) characterises firm 
demand in a similar problem. 
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and denote interfirm distance by 𝑙2, with high (low) 𝑙2 representing large (small) 
interfirm distance. 
Keeping everything else constant, Proposition 1 shows that high interfirm distance 
(𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻) establishes a pure strategy price equilibrium in which firms set fees equal to 
the early-avoidance cost and compete on the upfront price. Intermediate interfirm 
distance (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼 ) establishes a pure strategy price equilibrium in which fees are equal 
to the early-avoidance cost and upfront prices are competed down to the price floor. 
For small interfirm distance (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿) firms, unable to compete further on upfront 
prices, compete for the business of sophisticated types by reducing fees. Finally, for 
extremely small interfirm distance (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝑀) firms exhaust competition on upfront 
prices and randomise over fees.   
The extent to which changes in interfirm distance correspond to different price 
structures depends crucially on the relative size of the early avoidance cost ?̅?, the late-
avoidance cost ?̿?, and the inherent differentiability 𝑡. 
Everything else constant, higher ?̅? affects equilibrium price structure in two ways. 
First, given a binding price floor constraint (𝑓𝑖 ≥ 𝑐), higher ?̅? reduces the parameter 
space for which the early-avoidance constraint (𝑎𝑖 ≤ ?̅?) is binding. Second, given a 
binding early-avoidance constraint, higher ?̅? increases the parameter space for which 
the price floor constraint is binding. The first effect is obvious, as ?̅? represent the 
highest add-on fee that firms can set for which no consumer prefers costly avoidance. 
To get the intuition behind the second effect recall that firms have an incentive to use 
profits from add-on fees to subsidise upfront prices.59 This implies the price floor 
constraint is more likely to be binding with higher ?̅?, as that results in lower 
equilibrium upfront prices. 
Higher ?̅? shrinks the parameter space for which 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻, as it reduces the interfirm 
distance for which the price floor constraint is slack. For ?̅? > 𝑡 there does not exist a 
parameter combination for which firms set upfront prices above the price floor. 
Consequently, 𝑙2
𝐻 is empty. The parameter space for which 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼  is affected by ?̅? in 
                                                          
59 Subsidisation of upfront prices is common in problems with second-period prices (Shapiro, 1995; 
Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). The extent of the subsidisation in the context of our model is discussed 
further below.    
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two ways. First, the upper bound of 𝑙2
𝐼  increases in ?̅? as the price floor constraint is 
more easily binding. Second, the lower bound of  𝑙2
𝐼  also increases in ?̅?, as the early-
avoidance constraint is less easily binding. The net effect is generally positive since 
𝑞 ≤ 1; that is, the parameter range for which 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼  increases with ?̅?. 𝑙2
𝐼  shrinks as 𝑞 
approaches 1. Intuitively, firms’ incentive to compete on fees becomes stronger as the 
proportion of sophisticated types in the market increases. As a result, the range of 𝑙2 
for which firms exhaust competition on upfront prices but do not compete on fees, 𝑙2
𝐼 , 
becomes smaller. Lastly, note that there cannot exist a symmetric location pair on the 
line that satisfies 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼  if ?̅?𝑞 > 𝑡. Intuitively, firms have some incentive to compete 
on fees at any interfirm distance when inherent differentiability is small, since products 
are relatively close competitors regardless of 𝑙2. Finally, the parameter space for which 
𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 becomes larger as ?̅? increases, since the parameter space for which early-
avoidance constraint is binding becomes smaller. 
A higher late-avoidance cost (?̿?) increases the parameter space for which the price 
equilibrium is in mixed strategies – the parameter space for which 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝑀. Intuitively, 
higher ?̿? increases the profitability of maximally exploiting naïve types. Accordingly, 
the parameter space for which 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 shrinks, as firm profits in a pure strategy price 
equilibrium became smaller compared to profits that firms can earn by extracting ?̿? 
from just the naïve types.  
The effect of inherent differentiability (𝑡) on price structure moves in a direction 
opposite to the effect of ?̅?. Intuitively, higher 𝑡 increases the extent to which higher 
interfirm distance affects upfront prices and fees. As a result, it increases the parameter 
space for which the price floor is slack and the parameter space for which the early-
avoidance cost is binding. Higher 𝑡 also reduces the parameter space for which 𝑙2 ∈
𝑙2
𝑀. This is because 𝑡 generally increases the fee revenues that firms enjoy from 
sophisticated types for given 𝑙2, making a deviation to ?̿? less profitable in comparison. 
To see this notice that 𝑎𝐿
∗  is increasing in 𝑡. 
A direct implication of Proposition 1 regarding the profitability of markets with 
naïve consumer types and non-salient fees is that large increases in product 
differentiation increase industry profits, but small increases in product differentiation 
do not necessarily do so. The former follows directly from the fact that Π𝐻
∗ |𝑙2∈𝑙2𝐻 >
Π𝐼
∗|𝑙2∈𝑙2𝐼 > Π𝐿
∗|𝑙2∈𝑙2𝐿 > Π𝑀
∗ |𝑙2∈𝑙2𝑀. To see the latter, notice that, for a small increase in 
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interfirm distance to increase profits, it must be that at least one constraint is slack. In 
other words, it must be that 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 or 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿. For markets with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼 , a small 
increase in 𝑙2 has no effect on profits, as competition is sufficiently intense to bring 
equilibrium upfront prices equal to the price floor, but not intense enough to 
incentivise firms to compete on fees. For markets with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝑀 products are so close 
substitutes that equilibrium upfront prices are competed down to the price floor, while 
firms randomise over fees. Since expected profits are equal to Π𝑀
∗ =
?̿?(1−𝑞)
2
 and the 
late-avoidance fee is not a function of interfirm distance, we can conclude that 𝑙2 has 
no effect on Π𝑀
∗ . 
A crucial problem in markets with naïve consumers and unexpected fees is 
understanding the extent to which firms enjoy extra profits from such fees; in other 
words, the extent to which revenues from such fees subsidise lower upfront prices. To 
better approach this question, it is useful to derive the profits that firms would enjoy 
in absence of add-on fees – the sophisticated-consumers benchmark. We define the 
benchmark as the result of each firm solving the unconstrained maximisation problem 
max
𝑝𝑖
(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐) (
1
2
−
𝑝𝑖−𝑝
∗
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
), where 𝑝𝑖 denotes a price combination 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑝
∗ 
denotes an equilibrium price combination 𝑓∗ + 𝑎∗.60 Maximisation yields profits at 
the sophisticated-consumers benchmark Π𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ
∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
2
. Proposition 1 states that the 
extent to which firms enjoy profits beyond the sophisticated-consumers benchmark 
depends largely on how differentiated the products are. 
Firms fully erode fee revenues when product differentiation is sufficiently high 
(𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻), as illustrated by the fact that 𝑓𝐻
∗ is reduced by the term ?̅?. 61 Full subsidisation 
                                                          
60 This is the profit maximisation problem in the standard Hotelling model with variable prices and 
quadratic distance costs. Firms compete on the total price, as sophisticated consumers give equal 
weights to both price components. A price floor is never binding, as firms can compete on add-on fees 
if upfront prices cannot be reduced further.  
61 In this case fee revenues are conceptually equivalent to a reduction in marginal costs by 𝑎. In our 
model the pass-through rate to such implicit cost reduction is 1. For more general settings that host 
downward sloping demands and variable marginal costs, pass-through rate depends on demand and 
supply elasticities. For a general treatment of cost pass-through, see Weyl and Fabinger (2013). For an 
application of cost pass-through analysis to markets with hidden fees, see Agarwal et al. (2014). 
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of upfront prices is permitted due to the price floor constraint being slack even when 
subsidy ?̅? is taken into account. The complete erosion of fee revenues results in 
equilibrium profits that are identical to those in the sophisticated-consumers 
benchmark. In contrast, subsidisation is only partial for intermediate product 
differentiation (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼 ), as the price floor constraint does not permit upfront prices to 
be subsidised below 𝑐. As a result, for given locations, firm profits are higher than 
those in the sophisticated-consumers benchmark. To see this, notice that 
?̅?
2
>
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
2
 
for all 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼 . Partial subsidisation also characterises a market with low product 
differentiation (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿), as upfront prices are constrained by 𝑐. However, fee revenues 
are below ?̅? per customer, since firms compete on fees in order to attract sophisticated 
types. As a result, firm profits for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 are lower than profits for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼 . However, 
profits for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 are still higher than those in the sophisticated-consumers 
benchmark. This is because any cut on fees attracts only sophisticated types, giving 
firms less incentive to compete on fees. Finally, partial subsidisation characterises the 
price equilibrium also when products are extremely close substitutes (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝑀), as 
firms play 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑐 with certainty. The extent of retained fee revenues depends on 𝑎𝑀
∗ , 
which is randomly drawn. Average profits are higher than profits in the sophisticated-
consumers benchmark, since, regardless of the rival’s fees, firms can earn ?̿? from 
every naïve customer.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates how profits of firm 2 change with the degree of product 
differentiation.62 Profits of firm 1 follow by symmetry. To include every case in 
Proposition 1, figure 4.1 assumes 𝑡 > ?̅?. The solid line represents the profit functions 
described in Proposition 1. Profits are weakly increasing in 𝑙2; strictly increasing for 
𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻, 𝑙2
𝐿 and constant for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼 , 𝑙2
𝑀. The dotted line represents profits at the 
sophisticated-consumers benchmark, strictly increasing for all 𝑙2. The vertical distance 
between the solid and the dotted line area represents the additional surplus that firms 
enjoy due to retained fee revenues. Demonstrably, it is only in sufficiently competitive 
                                                          
62 Note the similarities between this figure and figure 3.1 in chapter 3. In chapter 3 firms have no 
incentive to compete on add-on fees, as sophisticated types avoid them while naïve types ignore them. 
As such, the associated figure 3.1 depicts a simpler relationship between profits and interfirm distance. 
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markets (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝑀, 𝑙2
𝐿 , 𝑙2
𝐼 ) that firms are benefitting from the non-salience of add-on 
fees.63  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Profit and marginal relocation incentives of firm 2 for symmetric 
locations with 𝒕 > ?̅?. 
Profits and marginal relocation incentives of firm 1 follow by symmetry. The solid line represents 
profits of firm 2 for symmetric locations with given 𝑙2. The dotted line represents profits of firm 2 at 
the sophisticated-consumers benchmark. The vertical distance between the solid and the dotted line 
represents the additional surplus that firm 2 enjoys due to retained fee revenues. Arrows depict marginal 
relocation incentives of firm 2 for each given symmetric location pair. An inward-pointing arrow means 
that firm 2 prefers to offer a more homogeneous product; an outward-pointing arrow means that firm 2 
prefers to further differentiate its product. Marginal relocation incentives converge towards locations 
1
2
, 
1
2
+
?̅?𝑞
2𝑡
, and 1, as described in Proposition 2. 
                                                          
63 Put in the context of primary goods with aftermarket services (Shapiro, 1995; Carlton and Waldman, 
2009), this result shows that competition in the primary good needs to be sufficiently intense for firms 
to profit from aftermarket power. 
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4.3.2 Local equilibria in locations  
For any given equilibrium price strategy, each firm’s choice of location on the line 
depends on two incentives. The first is the incentive to soften competition by offering 
a differentiated product – the price effect. The second is the incentive to capture a 
larger market share by offering a product that is a close substitute to the rival’s – the 
demand effect. The relative strength of these effects determines whether firms prefer 
to locate close to or far apart from their rivals. 
In the standard Hotelling model with quadratic distance costs and endogenous 
prices (d’Aspremont et al., 1979; Neven, 1985) the strength of each incentive changes 
smoothly as firms locate further apart, since profits functions are continuous and 
differentiable with respect to locations for any (𝑙𝑖, 𝑙𝑗). This results in relocation 
incentives that converge to a unique location pair. In contrast, profit functions in our 
model are kinked, as the equilibrium price structure changes depending on interfirm 
distance. As a result, relocations incentives can differ drastically depending on firm 
locations. 
For symmetric location pairs with large interfirm distance (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻), a price effect 
is present, as equilibrium upfront prices are increasing in interfirm distance (𝑙2). In 
particular, the price effect dominates the demand effect, so firms prefer to locate 
further apart. To get an intuition notice that for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 firms behave as in the standard 
Hotelling model with quadratic distance costs and marginal costs equal to 𝑐 − ?̅?.  
For symmetric location pairs with intermediate interfirm distance (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼 ), a price 
effect does not arise, as both upfront prices and add-on fees are fixed to 𝑐 and ?̅? 
respectively. As a result, each firm’s marginal relocation incentive is dominated by 
the demand effect. Thus for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼  each firm prefers to increase its turf by locating 
closer to its rival. 
For symmetric location pairs with relatively small interfirm distance (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿) a 
price effect is again present, as firms can increase equilibrium add-on fees by locating 
further apart. This price effect is stronger that the demand effect, resulting in firms 
preferring to differentiate their products. It is worth noting that the price effect for 
symmetric location pairs with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 is stronger than that for symmetric location pairs 
with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻; that is, firms profits increase more quickly in interfirm distance for 𝑙2 ∈
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𝑙2
𝐿 than for 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻. Intuitively, this is because firms with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 compete on fees, 
which are salient only to sophisticated types, whereas firms with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻 compete on 
upfront prices, which are salient to both consumer types. As a result, firms with 𝑙2 ∈
𝑙2
𝐿 can take better advantage of larger interfirm distance, since an increase in fees in 
associated by a smaller loss in demand compared to an increase in upfront prices. It 
follows that firms have a stronger incentive to increase interfirm distance when 𝑙2 ∈
𝑙2
𝐿.64  
Finally, for symmetric location pairs that result in a mixed strategy price 
equilibrium (𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝑀), each firm’s expected profits are equal to its profits if it ignores 
all sophisticated types and extracts ?̿? from its naïve customers. Since ?̿? is independent 
of interfirm distance, a price effect does not arise. As a result, each firm prefers to 
locate closer to its rival in order to attract more naïve types.  
The arrows in Figure 4.1 illustrate the marginal relocation incentives of firm 2 for 
each given symmetric location pair. An inward-pointing arrow means that firm 2 
prefers to offer a more homogeneous product; an outward-pointing arrow means that 
firm 2 prefers to further differentiate its product. Marginal relocation incentives of 
firm 1 follow by symmetry.  
Marginal relocation incentives are exhausted – that is, deviations to nearby 
locations are unprofitable – for the locations pairs described in Proposition 2. These 
location pairs constitute local Nash equilibria. We restrict our attention to the case in 
which 𝑡 > ?̅?, in order to avoid parameter specifications for which some interfirm 
distance sets (𝑙2
𝐻, 𝑙2
𝐼 , 𝑙2
𝐿 , 𝑙2
𝑀) are infeasible. Notation max, min and int indicates the local 
equilibrium that each variable characterises. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64 This outcome is consistent with the finding of Schultz (2004) that increasing market transparency 
(i.e. increasing the proportion of sophisticated types) weakens firms’ incentive to locate further apart. 
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Proposition 2. (Symmetric local equilibrium). Let 𝑡 ≥ ?̅?. 
(a) There exists a symmetric maximum-differentiation local equilibrium with 
(𝑙1
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑎𝑥) = (0,1), (𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥) = (𝑐 − ?̅? + 𝑡, ?̅?) and Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
𝑡
2
. 
(b) There exists a symmetric intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium with 
(𝑙1
𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡) = (
1
2
−
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
,
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
),(𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡) = (𝑐, ?̅?), and Π𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
?̅?
2
.  
(c) There exists a symmetric minimum-differentiation local equilibrium with 
(𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛) = (
1
2
,
1
2
), 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑐,  𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛 drawn randomly from [?̿?
(1−𝑞)
1+𝑞
, ?̅?) ∪ {?̿?}, 
and Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
?̿?(1−𝑞)
2
. 
No other local equilibrium exists. 
Proof: In appendix C. 
 
Proposition 2 provides important insight regarding the equilibrium structure of 
markets with naïve consumers and add-on fees that are paid by both consumer types. 
It unveils that such markets are expected to operate in three equilibrium types.  
The first type is described by the maximum-differentiation local equilibrium. To 
get an intuition behind the existence of this local equilibrium notice that (𝑙1
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑎𝑥) 
describes a symmetric location pair with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻. Consequently, firms have an 
incentive to further differentiate their products, but any further differentiation is 
impossible as firms already enjoy maximum interfirm distance. Since firm locations 
satisfy 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻, this local equilibrium is characterised by upfront prices above the price 
floor, and add-on fees equal to the consumers’ early-avoidance cost. Firm profits are 
equal to the sophisticated-consumers benchmark (Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 = Π𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ
∗ |𝑙2=1), as firms 
dissipate all fee revenues by subsidising upfront prices.  
The second type is described by the intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium. 
To get an intuition behind the existence of this local equilibrium notice that 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡 lies 
between 𝑙2
𝐿 and 𝑙2
𝐼 . This means that symmetric location pairs with interfirm distance 
slightly smaller than or equal to (𝑙1
𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡) are characterised by 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿, so firms have 
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an incentive to locate further apart in order to soften competition on the add-on fees. 
Symmetric locations with interfirm distance slightly larger than (𝑙1
𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡) are 
characterised by 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼 , so firms have an incentive to locate closer together in order 
to increase their turf. As a result, marginal relocation incentives from both sides 
converge towards (𝑙1
𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡). Location pair (𝑙1
𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡) represents the minimum 
interfirm distance for which firms have no incentive to reduce add-on fees below the 
early-avoidance cost. As such, the intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium is 
characterised by upfront prices equal to the price floor and add-on fees equal to the 
consumers’ early-avoidance cost. It follows that firms in the intermediate-
differentiation local equilibrium retain some fee revenues, as the price floor constraint 
prevents full dissipation. Thus, firm profits are higher than the sophisticated-
consumers benchmark (Π𝑖𝑛𝑡 > Π𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ
∗ |
𝑙2=
1
2
+
?̅?𝑞
2𝑡
). However, this does not imply that an 
intermediate differentiation structure results in higher profits than a maximum 
differentiation structure. On the contrary, the more intense competition on upfront 
prices due to the limited product differentiation results in lower profits overall.  
Interfirm distance in the intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium depends 
crucially on the relative values of ?̅?, 𝑞, 𝑡. Everything else constant, a higher early-
avoidance cost (?̅?) increases product differentiation. This is because it permits firms 
to increase fees further by locating further apart. A high proportion of sophisticated 
consumers (𝑞) works in the same direction. Since it is only the sophisticated types that 
respond to differences in fees, increasing the proportion of sophisticated types 
strengthens each firm’s incentive to soften competition on fees by differentiating its 
product. Higher inherent differentiability (𝑡) stifles firms’ incentive to locate 
marginally further apart. Intuitively, higher 𝑡 increases the effect that a small increase 
in interfirm distance has on fees. As a result, the early-avoidance constraint 𝑎𝑖 ≤ ?̅? 
binds with less product differentiation.  
The third type is described by the minimum-differentiation local equilibrium. To 
get an intuition behind its existence notice that (𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛) describes a symmetric 
location pair with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝑀, implying that each firm has individual incentive to offer a 
product that is a closer substitute to its rival’s product. Since firms located at 
(𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛) already offer products that are perfect substitutes, any relocation to 
increase substitutability is not feasible. The minimum-differentiation local equilibrium 
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is characterised by upfront prices equal to the relevant price floor, and temporal 
dispersion in add-on fees. In particular, firms randomise between fee values that all 
consumers prefer to pay and fee values that sophisticated consumers prefer to avoid. 
To see why there is a gap in the fee support notice that no firm has incentive to set fees 
between ?̅? and ?̿?, as that results in sophisticated types preferring costly avoidance. 
Therefore, firms are better off with fees equal to ?̿? and maximise fee revenues from 
naïve customers. Firms in the minimum-differentiation local equilibrium retain some 
fee revenues due to the binding price floor, and earn profits that are, on average, higher 
than the sophisticated-consumers benchmark (Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 > Π𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ
∗ |
𝑙2=
1
2
). However, as 
competition pushes fees below the early-avoidance cost, profits are lower than those 
in an intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium. 
In Proposition 2 we restricted our attention to the case in which 𝑡 ≥ ?̅?. Other 
parameter specifications do not necessarily permit all three local equilibria. The 
maximum-differentiation local equilibrium does not exist for 𝑡 < ?̅?, as 𝑙2
𝐻 is empty. 
Intuitively, firms have weaker incentive to take use product differentiation to soften 
competition on the upfront prices if the inherent product differentiability (𝑡) too small 
to permit upfront prices above the price floor. Similarly, the intermediate-
differentiation local equilibrium does not exist for inherent product differentiability 
small enough to satisfy 𝑡 < ?̿?𝑞(1 − 𝑞), as this results in 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝑀 for any symmetric 
location pair. Intuitively, such low value of 𝑡 implies that products are close substitutes 
regardless of interfirm distance, so firms play a mixed strategy price equilibrium at 
any symmetric location pair. As such, at any symmetric location pair firms prefer to 
locate closer together. Finally, the intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium, if it 
exists, is not characterised by the same equilibrium fees if inherent product 
differentiability satisfies 𝑡 ≤ ?̅?𝑞. Intuitively, 𝑡 ≤ ?̅?𝑞 implies that products cannot be 
differentiated enough for equilibrium fees to be reach the early-avoidance cost; in 
other words the upper bound of 𝑙2
𝐿 is greater than 1. Consequently, firms’ incentive to 
differentiate their products for any location pair with 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿 is exhausted when 𝑙2 =
1, resulting in maximum product differentiation and equilibrium fees equal to 
𝑡
𝑞
, below 
?̅?. 
The following section discusses the effectiveness of certain types of regulation in 
each market type and compare the local equilibria of Proposition 2 in terms of welfare. 
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4.4 Welfare and policy implications  
Given the inability of competition forces to fully shield naïve or unaware 
consumers from exploitation, regulatory bodies have taken up the role of monitoring 
markets, often imposing remedies to improve market performance.65 Some market 
remedies aim at improving consumers’ ability to evaluate products, incentivising firms 
to offer better deals. For example, in order to better inform prospective mutual funds 
investors, Securities and Exchange Commission’s requires funds’ prospectuses to 
include a summary section with key information.66 Other remedies aim to directly 
influence the deals offered to consumers by placing a limit to non-salient add-on fees 
(or by improving quality). Financial Conduct Authority’s price cap on payday loans is 
an example of such an outcome control remedy, imposing a total cost cap and limiting 
various charges.67 In this section we explore the extent to which similar interventions 
can be used to improve market outcomes in the context of our model.  
We investigate the effectiveness of interventions under two welfare standards: 
average consumer surplus and total surplus. To study changes in average consumer 
surplus, we explore how interventions affect firm profits and average consumer travel 
costs. Firm profits fully describe the surplus transfers between consumers and firms; 
an increase in profits represents and equal and opposite change to the surplus of the 
average consumer. Naturally, the optimal outcome for consumers in this dimension is 
a market with zero profits. Average consumer travel costs represent how well, on 
average, products match consumer tastes. Increasing average travel costs corresponds 
to a worsening in matching, as it increases the real or psychological cost that the 
average consumers need to travel for their preferred product. To study changes in total 
surplus we explore how interventions affect average travel costs alone, as that fully 
describes the deadweight loss due to the imperfect matching between firm locations 
and consumer tastes. 
                                                          
65 See Fletcher (2016) for a review on the effectiveness of various types of market remedies. 
66 https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-8998.pdf 
67 https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/policy-statements/ps14-16.pdf 
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Our framework is not suited to study other sources of welfare loss that may be 
relevant to regulators, such as avoidance costs and participation distortions. Their 
study is left for future work. 
 
4.4.1 Policies that maintain the local equilibrium 
We first discuss the desirability of policies that do not introduce a shift in the local 
equilibrium. We investigate the effectiveness of three categories of policies. The first 
category is policies that educate consumers about the relevance of add-on fees, 
resulting in a higher proportion of sophisticated types (𝑞) in the market. An advertising 
campaign aiming to improve consumer awareness regarding scenarios that their 
insurance plan does not cover falls in this category. The second category is policies 
that make early avoidance less costly (lower ?̅?) by introducing competition in the 
secondary market. Such a policy would, for example, give consumers the option to 
borrow funds from a rival bank instead of using their bank’s overdraft facility. The 
third category is policies that impose a cap on the fees that firms can extract from 
consumers in period 3 (lower ?̿?). A policy that places a limit on the fees that consumers 
can accumulate by being late on their credit card debt payments falls in this category.  
At a first glance, increasing 𝑞 would be expected to reduce firm profits by 
intensifying firm competition in fees. This is not the case at the maximum-
differentiation local equilibrium; firms have no incentive to compete on fees, as 
competition on upfront prices is not exhausted. Higher 𝑞 does not affect average travel 
costs either, as it does not affect firm locations. Intuitively, firms’ incentive to locate 
further apart is driven by their desire to soften competition on upfront prices. The latter 
is independent of the proportion of sophisticated types in the market.  
For a market at the intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium, increasing 𝑞 has 
no effect on firm profits but affects average travel costs. Intuitively, this is because 
that equilibrium is characterised by the symmetric product locations with the smallest 
interfirm distance for which firms have no incentive to reduce add-on fees below the 
early-avoidance cost. Hence firms at the intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium 
respond to an increase in 𝑞 by increasing interfirm distance sufficiently to maintain 
the same level of fee revenues. Whether higher 𝑞 benefits consumers in terms of 
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average travel costs depends on whether it shifts (𝑙1
𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡) closer to or away from the 
location pair that minimises average travel costs, (
1
4
,
3
4
). This is likely to put severe 
informational challenges to a regulator that is interested in how well products match 
consumer tastes, as expressing location pair (
1
4
,
3
4
) in a real market terms may not be 
straightforward. 
For a market at a minimum-differentiation local equilibrium increasing 𝑞 has a 
negative effect on average firm profits. To see why, recall that average profits at this 
equilibrium are equal to the profits of a firm that earns ?̿? from its naïve customers 
only. A lower proportion of naïve types, thus, reduces the population from which such 
fees can be extracted. An increase in 𝑞 is neutral with respect to average travel costs, 
as offering perfect substitutes is the unique equilibrium when firms randomise across 
fees.  
A policy intervention that lowers ?̅? has the direct effect of lowering the fees that 
consumers pay at the maximum-differentiation local equilibrium. However lowering 
fees has no effect on firm profits, as firms respond to such intervention by reducing 
the subsidy on upfront prices. Lower ?̅? has no effect on product differentiation either, 
as firms incentive to soften competition on upfront prices is independent of the fee 
revenues they are earning.  
A policy that reduces ?̅? is effective at lowering firm profits when applied to a 
market in the intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium. This is because it reduces 
the fee revenues that firms retain due to the binding price floor. Lowering ?̅? also results 
in firms locating closer together, as the minimum interfirm distance for which firms 
achieve 𝑎𝑖 = ?̅? decreases. Whether reducing interfirm distance benefits consumers in 
terms of average travel costs again depends on whether it shifts (𝑙1
𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡) closer to or 
away from (
1
4
,
3
4
).  
Finally, lowering ?̅? has no effect on average profits at the minimum-differentiation 
local equilibrium, as average profits are driven by the late-avoidance cost. 
Accordingly, lowering ?̅? does not affect firms’ incentive to offer products that are 
perfect substitutes. 
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Reducing the late-avoidance cost, ?̿?, does not constrain firm behaviour at the 
maximum-differentiation and the intermediate-differentiation local equilibria. 
Intuitively, this is because firms extract fees from both consumer types, so their 
behaviour is constrained by the value of the early-avoidance cost, ?̅?. For a market at 
the minimum-differentiation local equilibrium, reducing ?̿? strictly lowers firm profits, 
as it reduces the fee revenue that firms can extract from the naïve types if they choose 
the highest fee in the support. Firm’s incentive to offer perfect substitutes remains, as 
average profit per customer is independent of locations. 
 
4.4.2 Welfare comparison of local equilibria 
Now suppose that, through market interventions, a regulator can steer the market 
towards one of the local equilibria presented in Proposition 2. A equilibrium-shifting 
intervention would, for instance, introduce enough competition in the secondary 
market that ?̅? > 𝑡. This would eliminate the maximum-differentiation local 
equilibrium. 
A regulator that is concerned solely with total surplus needs only compare the 
local equilibria in terms of average travel costs. It is, then, easy to see that the 
intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium is superior under the total surplus 
standard. This is since average travel costs are the highest when the market exhibits 
maximum or minimum product differentiation.  
A regulator that is solely concerned with improving the position of the average 
consumer is interested in firm profits and average travel costs. Thus, in order to rank 
the local equilibria in terms of average consumer surplus we compare them in terms 
of average consumer expense. We define average consumer expense as the sum of 
industry profits and average travel costs.68 Proposition 3 presents the findings of the 
comparison.  
                                                          
68 The consumer expense that goes towards covering marginal costs remains the same in each local 
equilibrium, so we ignore it from the average consumer expense calculation. We also ignore the early-
avoidance costs that sophisticated consumers incur at the minimum-differentiation local equilibrium if 
both firms set 𝑎𝑖 = ?̿?, as that happens with almost zero probability. 
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Proposition 3. (Consumer surplus comparison).  
(a) The average consumer prefers the minimum-differentiation local equilibrium 
over the maximum-differentiation local equilibrium. 
(b) The average consumer prefers the intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium 
over the maximum-differentiation local equilibrium. 
(c) The average consumer prefers the intermediate-differentiation local equilibrium 
over the minimum-differentiation local equilibrium if 
?̅?𝑞(𝑡−?̅?𝑞)
4𝑡
> ?̅? − ?̿?(1 − 𝑞). 
Proof: In appendix C. 
 
Comparing the minimum-differentiation equilibrium with the maximum-
differentiation equilibrium is fairly straightforward, since both market structures entail 
the same average travel costs. The average consumer prefers a minimum-
differentiation equilibrium, as that involves lower total prices overall. A comparison 
between the intermediate-differentiation equilibrium and either of the other two 
equilibria requires considering differences in both average total prices and average 
travel costs. In particular, the intermediate-differentiation equilibrium is preferred 
over the maximum-differentiation equilibrium in both aspects, as it entails lower 
average profits and non-extreme locations. Lastly, the intermediate-differentiation 
equilibrium is preferred over the minimum-differentiation equilibrium if the average 
consumer’s gain in travel costs is higher than her detriment with respect to prices. The 
condition in part (c) of Proposition 3 reflects this. The right-hand side represents the 
net benefit to consumers in terms of travel cost in the intermediate-differentiation 
structure. The left-hand side represents the additional average surplus that consumers 
yield to firms in the intermediate-differentiation equilibrium. 
Overall, Proposition 3 states that maximum differentiation is the worst outcome 
for consumers. This raises two crucial issues for regulators interested in consumer 
welfare. First, it shows that, rather than being a redeeming feature, dissipation of fee 
revenues may in fact indicate that consumer surplus is at its lowest. Consumers, on 
average, would be better off at an equilibrium that exhibits some retention of fee 
revenues, as such an equilibrium would be characterised by better deals due to the 
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lower product differentiation. It follows that the markets most in need of monitoring 
may be the ones exhibiting large product differentiation, and upfront prices that are 
not constrained by a relevant price floor. 
Second, it raises the possibility that the presence of naïve types may in fact be 
improving the deals available to all consumers by establishing a minimum-
differentiation or an intermediate-differentiation equilibrium.  Firm in a market 
populated solely by sophisticated types would instead offer maximally differentiated 
products at higher prices, behaving as in the standard Hotelling model with quadratic 
distance costs and endogenous prices. 
Hence, Proposition 3 advises caution when intervening in markets with 
unanticipated fees. Inasmuch as policy interventions can shift the market to a different 
local equilibrium, regulating a market at, for instance, the minimum-differentiation 
local equilibrium can harm consumers and social surplus if that regulation establishes 
a maximum-differentiation equilibrium. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Despite economists’ reliance on competition as the best means to protect 
consumers’ interests, the ways in which firms’ incentive to exploit myopic consumers 
affects and is affected by competition intensity remains understudied. Our paper 
attempts to shed some light on this area by studying how the firms’ ability to retain 
profits from unanticipated add-on fees interacts with the degree of horizontal product 
differentiation in the market.  
We show that the firms’ locations on a Hotelling line critically influence price 
structure and the size of extra profits that firms can retain. High differentiation yields 
high prices, but results in full dissipation of add-on revenues. Intermediate 
differentiation permits retention of some extra profits, but results in lower prices 
overall. Low differentiation also permits retention of some extra profits, but can only 
establish a price equilibrium in mixed strategies. When firm locations are endogenous, 
firms’ well-known incentive to soften competition by offering differentiated products 
conflicts with their incentive to maximise retained profits by offering closer 
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substitutes. We show that this conflict can establish equilibria with maximum, 
minimum, or intermediate product differentiation.  
Whether regulatory interventions are beneficial depends on the existing market 
equilibrium, and whether interventions can shift the market to a different equilibrium. 
Despite firms retaining extra profits, consumers are strictly better off in equilibria with 
lower differentiation, as they are associated with lower total prices and, in the case of 
intermediate-differentiation equilibrium, lower distance costs. The fact that these 
equilibria do not arise in a fully rational benchmark calls into question the established 
belief that market transparency improves market outcomes for consumers. On the 
contrary, it suggests that all consumers may be better off in markets with a proportion 
of myopic consumers. 
Our model, while useful for addressing our research questions, does not come 
without limitations. The complexity of the pricing game with asymmetric locations 
does not permit us to explore the profitability of large deviations at this stage. We are 
leaving this problem for future work. Another interesting research question for future 
research would be to study how product differentiation incentives change when 
exploitation of consumer short-sightedness creates consumption distortions. A model 
attempting to answer this question would relax the assumptions of unit demand and 
full market coverage. Finally, our model provides a first look at how firms’ product 
differentiation incentives change when consumers value add-on extras but mispredict 
their demand for them. Future work can look at this issue in greater depth by modelling 
a world in which consumers can choose to become sophisticated, or firms can choose 
to educate consumers about their likelihood of using add-on services. 
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4.6 Appendix C 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
First see that any 𝑎𝑖 > ?̿? is dominated by 𝑎𝑖 ≤ ?̿?. This is because every customer 
of firm 𝑖 prefers to pay either ?̅? in period 1 or ?̿? in period 2 over paying 𝑎𝑖 in period 
3. Therefore, firm 𝑖 is better off with any 𝑎𝑖 < ?̿?, as this guarantees at least some 
revenues from add-on fees. 
Second see that any 𝑎𝑖 ∈ (?̅?, ?̿?) is dominated by 𝑎𝑖 = ?̿?. This is because naïve 
consumers pay any fee smaller or equal to ?̿?, whereas sophisticated consumers prefer 
to incur ?̅? in period 1 over paying 𝑎𝑖 ∈ (?̅?, ?̿?] in period 3.  
Third, notice that for given 𝑓𝑖 firm 𝑖’s demand with 𝑎𝑖 = ?̅? is the same as its 
demand with 𝑎𝑖 = ?̿?. This is because sophisticated consumers that purchase from firm 
𝑖 with 𝑎𝑖 = ?̿? incur ?̅? to avoid the paying the add-on fee. Therefore, firm 𝑖’s demand 
from sophisticates is described by 𝑥𝑖
𝑠(𝑎𝑖
𝑒𝑠 = ?̅?), which is the same as firm 𝑖’s demand 
from sophisticates with 𝑎𝑖 = ?̅?. 
By assumption ?̅? > ?̿?(1 − 𝑞), firm 𝑖 prefers to earn 𝑎𝑖 = ?̅? from both customer 
types over earning 𝑎𝑖 = ?̿?  only from the naïve types. Thus, any price combination 
(𝑓𝑖, ?̿?) is inferior to (𝑓𝑖 , ?̅?). Therefore, there does not exist a pure strategy price 
equilibrium with 𝑎𝑖 > ?̅?. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. 
Let 𝑞 < 1. We will first show that in a pure strategy price equilibrium at least one 
constraint is always binding. To see this consider a pricing strategy with 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑓?̂? >
𝑐, 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎?̂? < ?̅?. Firm 𝑖’s demand is given by D𝑖 = (
1
2
−
𝑞(𝑎𝑖−𝑎
∗)
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
−
𝑓𝑖−𝑓
∗
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
). 
Differentiation yields 
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑓𝑖
<
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑎𝑖
, which suggests that demand’s slope is more steep 
with respect to upfront prices that with respect to add-on fees. Then firm 𝑖 can strictly 
increase its profits by playing 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑓?̂? − 𝜖, 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎?̂? + 𝜖, maintaining the same mark-up 
while strictly increasing demand. Therefore, any pricing strategy with 𝑓𝑖 > 𝑐, 𝑎𝑖 < ?̅? 
is strictly dominated. 
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Since we know that at least one constraint is always binding, we can internalise 
one constraint each time and reduce the problem to a maximisation problem with one 
argument and one inequality constraint. First order conditions of the unconstrained 
maximisation problem are  
 𝑓𝑖
∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) + (𝑎
∗ − 𝑎𝑖)𝑞 + 𝑓
∗ − 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑐
2
 (2) 
 𝑎𝑖
∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) + 𝑞(𝑎
∗ − 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑐) − 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑓
∗
2𝑞
 (3) 
 
Suppose that the early-avoidance constraint is binding in equilibrium; that is (3) 
satisfies 
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)+𝑞(𝑎
∗−𝑓𝑖+𝑐)−𝑓𝑖+𝑓
∗
2𝑞
> ?̅? (3𝑎). Then we can substitute 𝑎∗ = 𝑎𝑖 = ?̅? in 
(2) and rewrite it as 𝑓𝑖
∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)+𝑓
∗−?̅?+𝑐
2
 (2𝑎). Second order condition verifies that 
(1𝑎) describes a local maximum. Applying 𝑓𝑖
∗ = 𝑓∗ in (2𝑎) and rearranging yields 
𝑓∗ = 𝑐 − ?̅? + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1). Comparing 𝑓
∗ with 𝑐 gives that, given a binding early-
avoidance constraint, the price floor constraint is binding if 𝑙2 <
1
2
+
?̅?
2𝑡
, and non-
binding if 𝑙2 ≥
1
2
+
?̅?
2𝑡
. Put differently: 
𝑓∗ = {
𝑐                                    𝑖𝑓 𝑙2 <
1
2
+
?̅?
2𝑡
𝑐 − ?̅? + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1)   𝑖𝑓 𝑙2 ≥
1
2
+
?̅?
2𝑡
 
Substituting 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑓
∗ =  𝑐 − ?̅? + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) back in (3𝑎) yields that the early-
avoidance constraint is also binding. This is expected since at least one constraint is 
binding in equilibrium. Therefore, for 𝑙2 ≥
1
2
+
?̅?
2𝑡
 a pure strategy price equilibrium, if 
it exists, is characterised by 𝑓∗ =  𝑐 − ?̅? + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1) and 𝑎
∗ = ?̅?. This is described 
in part (a) of Lemma 2. Substituting 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑓
∗ = 𝑐 back in (3𝑎) and rearranging yields 
that the early-avoidance constraint 𝑎∗ = ?̅? is binding if 𝑙2 >
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
. Therefore, for 
1
2
+
?̅?
2𝑡
> 𝑙2 >
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
 a pure strategy price equilibrium, if it exists, is characterised by 𝑓∗ =
 𝑐 and 𝑎∗ = ?̅?. This is described by part (b) of Lemma 2. 
126 
 
Repeating this process by initially assuming a binding price floor in equilibrium 
verifies that for 
1
2
+
?̅?
2𝑡
> 𝑙2 >
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
 a pure strategy price equilibrium, if it exists, is 
characterised by 𝑓∗ = 𝑐 and 𝑎∗ = ?̅?. It also shows that for 𝑙2 <
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
 a pure strategy 
price equilibrium, if it exists, is characterised by 𝑓∗ =  𝑐 and 𝑎∗ =
𝑡
𝑞
(2𝑙2 − 1). This is 
described by part (c) of Lemma 2. 
Now let 𝑞 = 1. Then 
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑓𝑖
=
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑎𝑖
, so demand is equally sensitive to both price 
components. Then we can rewrite the maximisation problem as max
𝑝𝑖
(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐) (
1
2
−
𝑝𝑖−𝑝
∗
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
), where 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖. Since firms can allocate 𝑝𝑖 in any way between 𝑓𝑖 and 
𝑎𝑖 we can ignore the constraints. First and second order conditions yield that profits 
are maximised at 𝑝𝑖
∗ = 𝑐 + 𝑡(2𝑙2 − 1). 
To find profits in each equilibrium substitute 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑓
∗ and 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎
∗ in (1).∎ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3.  
Let 𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2. Consider a candidate pure strategy price equilibrium with (𝑐, 𝑎
∗), 
where 𝑎∗ =
𝑡
𝑞
(2𝑙2 − 1). The proof proceeds in 5 steps. Step 1 establishes that a 
profitable deviation from (𝑓∗, 𝑎∗) requires that firm 𝑖 serves at least some naïves. Steps 
2 and 3 establish that firm 𝑖 maximises deviation profits by playing (𝑓𝑖, 𝑎𝑖) = (𝑐, ?̿?). 
Step 4 shows the 𝑙2 for which such deviation is profitable. Step 5 shows that at a mixed 
strategy price equilibrium each firm 𝑖 plays 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑐 with probability 1 and earns Π𝑖 =
?̿?(1−𝑞)
2
. 
 
Step 1. A deviation in which firm 𝑖 serves only sophisticated types is not profitable. 
A deviation by firm 𝑖 with (𝑓𝑖, 𝑎𝑖) such that all naïve types purchase from the rival 
requires that 𝑓𝑖 is sufficiently greater that 𝑓𝑗. Then for firm 𝑖 to attract any sophisticated 
types it must be that 𝑎𝑖 < 𝑎𝑗. But such a price combination is suboptimal, since by 
Lemma 1, firm 𝑖 is better off increasing 𝑎𝑖 and reducing 𝑓𝑖 by the same amount, 
increasing demand from naïve types and leaving demand from sophisticates 
unchanged. 
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Step 2. For any 𝑓𝑖
𝑑, firm 𝑖 maximises deviation profits by choosing 𝑎𝑖
𝑑 = ?̿?. 
Let 𝑎𝑖
𝑑
𝑛𝑠
(𝑓𝑖
𝑑) represent the 𝑎𝑖
𝑑 above which the deviating firm enjoys no demand 
from sophisticates, and suppose 𝑎𝑖
𝑑
𝑛𝑠
(𝑓𝑖
𝑑) ∈ (𝑎∗, ?̅?]. For deviations with 𝑎𝑖
𝑑 < 𝑎𝑖
𝑑
𝑛𝑠
 
the deviating firm enjoys some demand from sophisticates, so its profit maximisation 
problem is described by equation (3). Therefore, a pricing strategy with 𝑎𝑖 ≠ 𝑎
∗ is 
strictly dominated by 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎
∗. For deviations with 𝑎𝑖
𝑑 ∈ [𝑎𝑖
𝑑
𝑛𝑠
(𝑓𝑖
𝑑), ?̿?] the deviating 
firm serves only naïve consumers. Then any 𝑎𝑖
𝑑 ∈ [𝑎𝑖
𝑑
𝑛𝑠
(𝑓𝑖
𝑑), ?̿?) is strictly dominated 
by 𝑎𝑖
𝑑 = ?̿?, as ?̿? extracts the largest possible surplus from naïve consumers.  
Now suppose 𝑎𝑖
𝑑
𝑛𝑠
(𝑓𝑖
𝑑) > ?̅?. Then a deviation with  𝑎𝑖
𝑑 ≤ ?̅? cannot be profitable, 
as, again, the deviating firm’s profit maximisation problem is described by equation 
(1). Therefore, the deviating firm 𝑖 is better off playing 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎
∗. For 𝑎𝑖
𝑑 > ?̅? any 
sophisticated customers of firm 𝑖 avoid paying fees. This is because, from the 
sophisticated types’ point of view, purchasing from firm 𝑖 entails a future avoidance 
cost ?̅?. Therefore, any 𝑎𝑖
𝑑 ∈ (?̅?, ?̿?) is strictly dominated by ?̿?, as ?̿? extracts the largest 
possible surplus from naïve consumers. 
 
Step 3. For 𝑎𝑖
𝑑 = ?̿?, firm 𝑖 maximises deviation profits by choosing 𝑓𝑖
𝑑 = 𝑐. 
Consider a price combination (𝑓𝑖
𝑑, ?̿?) such that both types purchase from firm 𝑖. 
Firm 𝑖’s deviation profits are given by (𝑓𝑖
𝑑 + ?̿? − 𝑐)(1 − 𝑞) (
1
2
−
𝑓𝑖
𝑑−𝑐
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
) +
(𝑓𝑑 − 𝑐)𝑞 (
1
2
−
𝑓𝑖
𝑑+?̅?−𝑐−𝑎∗
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
). Maximisation with respect to 𝑓𝑖
𝑑 yields 𝑓𝑖
𝑑∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)+𝑐+?̿?𝑞−?̿?+𝑐−?̅?𝑞+𝑎
∗𝑞
2
. Since 𝑓𝑖
𝑑∗ is increasing in 𝑙2. Then, comparing 𝑓𝑖
𝑑∗ 
evaluated at 𝑙2 =
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
, with 𝑐 gives that 𝑓𝑖
𝑑∗ ≤ 𝑐  for all 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿, 𝑎 ∈ [𝑎∗, ?̅?] if 
?̿?(1 − 𝑞) ≥ ?̅?𝑞. 
Consider a deviation at 𝑓𝑖
𝑑 , ?̿? such that only naïve types purchase from firm 𝑖. Firm 
𝑖’s deviation profit with 𝑎𝑖 = ?̿? is (𝑓𝑖
𝑑 + ?̿? − 𝑐)(1 − 𝑞) (
1
2
−
𝑓𝑖
𝑑−𝑐
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
). Maximisation 
with respect to 𝑓𝑖
𝑑 yields 𝑓𝑖
𝑑∗∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)+𝑐−?̿?+𝑐
2
. Then, comparing 𝑓𝑖
𝑑∗∗ evaluated at 
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𝑙2 =
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
, with 𝑐 gives that  𝑓𝑖
𝑑∗∗ ≤ 𝑐 for all 𝑙2 ≤
1
2
+
?̿?
2𝑡
. But 
1
2
+
?̿?
2𝑡
 lies to the right 
of 𝑙2
𝐿. Therefore, for all 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿, 𝑓𝑖
𝑑∗∗ = 𝑐.  
 
Step 4. Deviation with (𝑓𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖) = (𝑐, ?̿?) is profitable if and only if 𝑙2 ≤
1
2
+
?̿?𝑞(1−𝑞)
2𝑡
. 
At (𝑐, ?̿?), the deviating firm’s profits are 
?̿?(1−𝑞)
2
. Then, the deviation is profitable 
if 
?̿?(1−𝑞)
2
>
𝑎𝐿
∗
2
. Expressing the inequality in terms of 𝑙2 gives that the deviation is 
profitable if 𝑙2 ≤
1
2
+
?̿?𝑞(1−𝑞)
2𝑡
. Therefore, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium with 
prices as described in Lemma 2 if 𝑙2 >
1
2
+
?̿?𝑞(1−𝑞)
2𝑡
. 
 
Step 5. There exists a mixed strategy price equilibrium in which firms play 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑐 with 
probability 1 and earn, on average, Π𝑖 =
?̿?(1−𝑞)
2
. 
To show that 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑐 is part of an equilibrium strategy we only need to show that 
firm 𝑖 has no incentive to play 𝑓𝑖 > 𝑐 if firm 𝑗 plays 𝑓𝑗 = 𝑐. Recall that firm 𝑖 can only 
play 𝑓𝑖 > 𝑐 if 𝑎𝑖 ∈ {𝑎, ?̿?}. Otherwise, firm 𝑖 can strictly increase its profit by 
marginally reducing the upfront price and increasing the add-on fee by the same value. 
Therefore, we only need to consider the profit maximising value of 𝑓𝑖 given 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎 
and 𝑎𝑖 = ?̿?. 
First, suppose 𝑎𝑖 = ?̿? and 𝑓𝑗 = 𝑐. Then replacing 𝑎
∗ with 𝑎𝑗
𝑒𝑠 ∈ [𝑎∗, ?̅?] and 
repeating step 3 gives that 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑐 maximises profit for any 𝑎𝑗 if 𝑎𝑖 = ?̿?, 𝑓𝑗 = 𝑐. To 
see why 𝑎𝑗
𝑒𝑠 is bound above by ?̅? recall that sophisticated types prefer to incur ?̅? and 
avoid fees over paying 𝑎𝑗 > ?̅?. 
Next, suppose 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎 and 𝑓𝑗 = 𝑐, and suppose that both types purchase from firm 
𝑖. Then firm 𝑖’s profits are given by (𝑓𝑖 + 𝑎 − 𝑐) (
1
2
−
𝑓𝑖−𝑓+𝑞(?̅?−𝑎𝑗
𝑒𝑠)
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
). Maximisation 
with respect to 𝑓𝑖 yields 𝑓𝑖
∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)+𝑐−?̅?+𝑐−?̅?𝑞+𝑎𝑗
𝑒𝑠𝑞
2
. Notice that 𝑓𝑖
∗ is increasing in 
𝑙2, 𝑎𝑗
𝑒𝑠. Therefore, replacing 𝑙2 with the upper bound of 𝑙2
𝐿, 
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
 and 𝑎𝑗
𝑒𝑠 by its highest 
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value, ?̅?, gives the highest value of 𝑓𝑖
∗
. Comparing 𝑓𝑖
∗
 evaluated at 𝑙2 =
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
, 𝑎𝑗
𝑒𝑠 =
?̅? with 𝑐 gives that 𝑓𝑖
𝑑∗ ≤ 𝑐.  
Now suppose that only naïve types purchase from firm 𝑖. Firm 𝑖’s deviation profit 
with 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎 is (𝑓𝑖 + 𝑎 − 𝑐)(1 − 𝑞) (
1
2
−
𝑓𝑖−𝑐
2𝑡(2𝑙2−1)
). Maximisation with respect to 𝑓𝑖 
yields 𝑓𝑖
∗∗ =
𝑡(2𝑙2−1)+𝑓−𝑎+𝑐
2
. Comparison with 𝑐 yields that  𝑓𝑖
∗∗ ≤ 𝑐 for all 𝑙2 ≤
1
2
+
𝑎
2𝑡
. But 
1
2
+
𝑎
2𝑡
 lies to the right of 𝑙2
𝐿. Hence 𝑓𝑖
∗∗ = 𝑐 for all 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿. Therefore, 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑐 
maximises profit for any 𝑎𝑗 if 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎, 𝑓𝑗 = 𝑐.  
By step 2 we have that ?̿? is always an element of the fee support in the mixed 
strategy price equilibrium. Then since profits are identical at every fee in the support, 
firm 𝑖’s profits at a mixed strategy price equilibrium are 
?̿?(1−𝑞)
2
.∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
Let 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻. In order to calculate the marginal relocation incentives of each firm 
for a given symmetric location pair we need to express equilibrium profits in terms of 
𝑙1, 𝑙2. To do so we will solve the maximisation problem of section 4.3.1.1 without 
making use of the symmetry condition 𝑙1 = 1 − 𝑙2. Recall that firm demands at a 
symmetric pure strategy price equilibrium are given by 𝐷1 = 𝑞𝑥
𝑠 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑥𝑛, 
and 𝐷2 =  𝑞(1 − 𝑥
𝑠) + (1 − 𝑞)(1 − 𝑥𝑛). Thus firm 1 maximises Π1 = (𝑓1 + 𝑎1 −
𝑐) (
𝑙1+𝑙2
2
−
𝑓1−𝑓2
2𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)
−
𝑞(𝑎1−𝑎2)
2𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)
); firm 2 maximises Π2 = (𝑓2 + 𝑎2 − 𝑐) (1 −
𝑙1+𝑙2
2
+
𝑓1−𝑓2
2𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)
+
𝑞(𝑎1−𝑎2)
2𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)
) 
Let 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻. By Proposition 1 we know that each firm sets 𝑎𝑖 = ?̅? and 𝑓𝑖 < 𝑐. Thus 
equilibrium prices are 𝑓𝐻1
∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑓1 + ?̅? − 𝑐) (
𝑙1+𝑙2
2
−
𝑓1−𝑓2
2𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)
) and 𝑓𝐻2
∗ =
 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑓2 + ?̅? − 𝑐) (1 −
𝑙1+𝑙2
2
+
𝑓1−𝑓2
2𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)
). Solving simultaneously yields 𝑓𝐻1
∗ =
𝑐 − ?̅? +
𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)(2+𝑙1+𝑙2)
3
 and 𝑓𝐻2
∗ = 𝑐 − ?̅? +
𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)(4−𝑙1−𝑙2)
3
. Substituting back to each 
firm’s profit function yields Π𝐻1
∗ =
𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)(2+𝑙1+𝑙2)
2
18
 and Π𝐻2
∗ =
𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)(4−𝑙1−𝑙2)
2
18
. 
Differentiation yields 
𝑑Π𝐻1
∗
𝑑𝑙1
< 0 and 
𝑑Π𝐻2
∗
𝑑𝑙2
> 0; that is, each firms prefers to locate 
130 
 
further away from its rival. Now notice that (𝑙1
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑎𝑥) satisfies 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐻. Since 
(𝑙1
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑎𝑥) describes locations at the ends of the line we can conclude that any local 
deviation from (𝑙1
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑎𝑥) is unprofitable, as firms cannot locate any further apart. 
Replacing 𝑙1
𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑙2
𝑚𝑎𝑥 in equilibrium prices and profits gives the desired 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥, 
𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥, and Π𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
Now let 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐼 . By Proposition 1 we know that each firm sets 𝑎𝑖 = ?̅? and 𝑓1 = 𝑐. 
Profits of firm 1 are given by Π𝐼1
∗ =
?̅?(𝑙1+𝑙2)
2
 and Π𝐼2
∗ =
?̅?(2−𝑙1−𝑙2)
2
. Differentiation 
yields 
𝑑Π𝐼1
∗
𝑑𝑙1
> 0 and 
𝑑Π𝐼2
∗
𝑑𝑙2
< 0; that is, each firm prefers to offer a product that is a closer 
substitute to its rival’s product. 
Next let 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝐿. By Proposition 1 we know that each firm sets 𝑓1 = 𝑐. Then 𝑎𝐿1
∗ =
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑎1) (
𝑙1+𝑙2
2
−
𝑞(𝑎1−𝑎2)
2𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)
) and 𝑎𝐿2
∗ =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑎2) (1 −
𝑙1+𝑙2
2
+
𝑞(𝑎1−𝑎2)
2𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)
). 
Solving simultaneously yields 𝑎𝐿1
∗ =
𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)(2+𝑙1+𝑙2)
3𝑞
 and 𝑎𝐿2
∗ =
𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)(4−𝑙1−𝑙2)
3𝑞
. 
Substituting back to each firms profit functions yields Π𝐿1
∗ =
𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)(2+𝑙1+𝑙2)
2
18𝑞
 and 
Π𝐿2
∗ =
𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)(4−𝑙1−𝑙2)
2
18𝑞
. Differentiation yields 
𝑑Π𝐿1
∗
𝑑𝑙1
< 0 and 
𝑑Π𝐿2
∗
𝑑𝑙2
> 0; that is, each 
firm prefers to locate further away from its rival. 
To see why location pair (𝑙1
𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡) constitutes a local equilibrium notice that 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡 
lies on the bound between 𝑙2
𝐼  and 𝑙2
𝐿. Therefore, evaluating firm 2’s profits at 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡 from 
the right yields Π2|𝑙2=𝑙2𝑖𝑛𝑡
+ = Π𝐼2
∗ =
?̅?(2−𝑙1−𝑙2)
2
, while evaluating them from the left 
yields Π2|𝑙2=𝑙2𝑖𝑛𝑡
− = Π𝐿2
∗ =
𝑡(𝑙2−𝑙1)(4−𝑙1−𝑙2)
2
18𝑞
. It follows that the right-side derivative 
with respect to 𝑙2 is 
𝑑Π2
∗
𝑑𝑙2
|
𝑙2=𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡+
=
𝑑Π𝐼2
∗
𝑑𝑙2
< 0, while  the left-side derivative with respect 
to 𝑙2 is 
𝑑Π2
∗
𝑑𝑙2
|
𝑙1=𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡−
=
𝑑Π𝐿2
∗
𝑑𝑙2
> 0. The same holds for firm 1 by symmetry. Thus we can 
conclude that location pair (𝑙1
𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑙2
𝑖𝑛𝑡) constitutes a local equilibrium. 
Finally, let 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝑀. As established in Proposition 1, in the price equilibrium firm 
𝑖’s profits are on average equal to its profits if it sets ?̿? and serves all naïve types at its 
turf and half the naïve types located between firm 𝑖 and firm 𝑗. Then we can express 
firm 1’s expected profits by Π𝑀1
∗ =
?̿?(1−𝑞)(𝑙1+𝑙2)
2
 and firm 2’s expected profits by 
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Π𝑀2
∗ =
?̿?(1−𝑞)(2−𝑙1−𝑙2)
2
. Differentiation yields 
𝑑Π𝑀1
∗
𝑑𝑙1
> 0 and 
𝑑Π𝑀2
∗
𝑑𝑙2
< 0; firms prefer to 
offer more homogeneous products. Now notice that (𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛) satisfies 𝑙2 ∈ 𝑙2
𝑀. It, 
then, follows from Proposition 1 that firms set 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑐 and choose 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛 randomly. 
Since (𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛) describes locations at the centre of the line we can conclude that 
any local deviation from (𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛) is unprofitable, as firms cannot locate any closer 
together. Therefore, (𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛) constitutes a local equilibrium. Replacing 𝑙1
𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 
𝑙2
𝑚𝑖𝑛 in Π𝑀1
∗  and Π𝑀2
∗  gives the desired Π𝑚𝑖𝑛.  
The proof for the characterisation of the support of 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛 is as follows. Let 𝑎
− 
denote the lower bound in the support. If firm 𝑖 sets 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎
− it serves half the naïve 
types in the market and every sophisticated type. Its profits are given by Π𝑖(𝑎
−) =
𝑎− (
(1−𝑞)
2
+ 𝑞). Since firm 𝑖 must be indifferent between any fee in the support, 𝑎− 
satisfies Π𝑖(𝑎
−) = Π𝑚𝑖𝑛. Substituting and rearranging gives 𝑎
− = ?̿?
(1−𝑞)
1+𝑞
. To see why 
there exists a gap in the fee support notice that firm 𝑖 has no incentive to play 𝑎𝑖 ∈
[?̅?, ?̿?). For 𝑎𝑖 ∈ (?̅?, ?̿?) any sophisticated types that purchase from firm 𝑖 avoid fees. 
Therefore, firm 𝑖 can increase its profits by setting 𝑎𝑖 = ?̿?, extracting higher fee 
revenues from naïve types while maintaining the same demand from sophisticated 
types. For 𝑎𝑖 = ?̅? firm 𝑗 has a lower fee with probability almost equal to 1, so it almost 
surely attracts all sophisticated types. Then firm 𝑖 is again better off playing 𝑎𝑖 = ?̿?, 
extracting higher fee revenues from any naïve types it serves while serving 
sophisticated types with almost zero probability.∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.  
Recall that 𝜒 represents consumer locations. Average consumer expense at the 
maximum-differentiation market structure is given by 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑡 (∫ (0 −
1
2
0
𝜒)2𝑑𝜒 + ∫ (1 − 𝜒)2𝑑𝜒
1
1
2
) = 𝑡 +
𝑡
12
. Average consumer expense at the minimum-
differentiation market structure is given by 𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 2Π𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝑡 ∫ (
1
2
− 𝜒)
2
𝑑𝜒
1
0
=
?̿?(1 − 𝑞) +
𝑡
12
. Average consumer expense at the intermediate-differentiation market 
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structure is given by 𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 2Π𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝑡 (∫ (
1
2
−
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
− 𝜒)
2
𝑑𝜒
1
2
0
+ ∫ (
1
2
+
𝑞?̅?
2𝑡
−
1
1
2
𝜒)
2
𝑑𝜒) = ?̅? +
𝑡2−3?̅?𝑞𝑡+3?̅?2𝑞2
12𝑡
. Comparison yields the desired results.∎ 
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